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The UNESCO Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights (www.unescobiochair. 
org) organized a workshop on “Bioethics, Multiculturalism and Religion” 
and the papers submitted here form the collection of this edited volume. 
This UNESCO Chair was established in 2009 with two Roman univer-
sities. It offers a university framework of reflection and study, providing 
information and fostering the application of bioethical principles in sci-
ence, medicine and new technologies based on the Universal Declaration 
on Bioethics and Human Rights. Through integral education, research and 
information, it seeks to contribute towards the recognition and promotion 
of a global and integral vision of bioethics, bringing to light universal val-
ues and principles as well as social and legal implications in relation to 
human rights. By creating a community of persons who are interested in 
these values, it seeks to promote cultural dialogue and encounters in a spirit 
of solidarity. 
This book has been elaborated under the EU project i-CONSENT
(https://i-consentproject.eu) that has received funding from the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant 
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 Joseph Tham 
Informed consent is a gold standard in Western medicine. There are nuances 
to its application under diverse contexts, be they in public health, clinical 
research or the bedside. Since the 1960s, the backbone of informed consent 
in research has been firmly enshrined. Its formulation and justification have 
evolved since the Nuremberg code and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In medical research, we can find guidelines on informed consent 
in numerous international documents including, for instance, the Belmont 
Report (1978), Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention (1997), The Uni-
versal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) and 
constant updates from Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS), the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Hel-
sinki and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2006). 
Despite the general acceptance and practice of informed consent in medi-
cal intervention and research ethics, there are still challenges to overcome 
and concerns that need further evaluation. For instance, informed consent 
needs to be tailored to the individual and is a process rather than a formality. 
The ways to communicate, present information will, therefore, depend on 
the literacy and cultural context of the subjects and patients. A genuinely 
informed decision needs to be free and enlightened, and a simple signature 
is not enough. There must be a trusting relationship between the patient and 
the physician–researcher who, at the same time, must consider the vulner-
ability of being someone who is ill and in need. We must address the false 
hopes and desires of participating in trials that may or may not be cura-
tive. There is a greater awareness of the exercise of autonomy in vulnerable 
groups of subjects such as volunteers, children, migrants and ethnic minori-
ties. We need to consider the communitarian nature of decision-making in 
many cultures. 
As a Research and Innovation program (2014–2020) of the European 
Union, Horizon 2020 funded the i-CONSENT consortium to improve 
the information that patients receive from clinical research by creating 












2 Joseph Tham 
personalized and innovative informed consent.1 Being a partner in this ven-
ture, the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights investigated “the 
ethical gaps, barriers and challenges currently present in obtaining informed 
consent in biomedical research, prior to the administration of vaccines, and 
during translational/clinical vaccine research involving human partici-
pants.”2 Within this project, the UNESCO Chair has a particular focus on 
the multicultural and interdisciplinary dimension of informed consent. This 
volume, therefore, collects the papers generated from i-Consent as well as 
other related articles. 
Together with some of the i-Consent partners, the UNESCO Chair held its 6th
International Bioethics, Multiculturalism and Religion Workshop on the topic
of Informed Consent on 21–23 February 2018. Bioethical and religious schol-
ars from Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam
came to Rome to discuss the key challenges and the requirements of informed
consent in clinical research. They identified some of the challenges present in 
obtaining informed consent from patients/subjects in different, challenging
cultural contexts representing minority groups and vulnerable populations.
Multiculturalism and relational autonomy 
The first section of this book collects four articles on the topic of informed 
consent in cross-cultural contexts. In these essays and reports, there is an 
unease with the overtly individualistic conception of autonomy that under-
girds the process of informed consent championed in Western medicine. The 
process of obtaining consent in different cultures, minors, family dynamics 
and community settings may require more than a straightforward signature 
of the patients or their proxies. These different situations mean that an over-
emphasis on individual rights and autonomy might be detrimental to truly 
informed consent. The articles evince the need to consider autonomy as 
relational—where family members, community and other stakeholders can 
play an essential part in the consent process. 
Already in the report generated for the Horizon 2020, i-Consent project 
has a section that focuses on how multicultural background can influence 
informed consent. The challenges regard the prospective patients’ ability to 
fully understand the disclosed information as well as the procedural barriers 
that prevent them from giving genuinely informed consent. It discovers that 
there is a need to examine cultural and social variables when assessing the 
ethical validity of this consent process because a monolithic, individual-
centred version of autonomy in the Western contexts may not be congenial 
to vulnerable migrants or cultural groups. The report recommends a new 

















legitimacy of a decision not only belong to a single person but involves the 
community—such as the family—to which the subject belongs.3 
The first chapter from Garcia and Garasic looks at informed consent 
from the angle of human rights and mental privacy. Advances in biotechnol-
ogy and neuroscience propitiate the need to consider additional rights that 
protect cognitive liberty, mental privacy, mental integrity and psychologi-
cal continuity. These new requirements will have implications for informed 
consent in the context of religious diversity. 
Garasic and Macioce’s chapter on “Informed Consent and Minors in 
a Multicultural Society” looks at the unique needs of minors who cannot 
give full, independent and competent consent as they are not yet grown-
ups. In cross-cultural and multi-religious settings, this legal age distinction 
can create additional problems of interpreting individual autonomy. The 
case of the underaged minors calls for an adaptation of the notion of self-
determination to include relational autonomy. 
Daverio’s chapter on “Community engagement in the informed con-
sent process in global clinical research: international recommendations
and guidelines” delineates how informed consent in global clinical
research will require engagement with the community. This involvement
in collaborative research will need further analysis and formulation of
ethical goals and guidelines towards meaningful participatory processes.
The author discusses the main strategies for community involvement in
research settings internationally and the steps to work towards a more
relational view of the self.
Finally, Tham and Letendre confront the cultural shift of individual to 
relational self in the West and the implications of decision-making and 
informed consent in healthcare. The article traces the history of West-
ern medicine from “paternalism” to autonomy in the physician–patient 
relationship as a result of rapid advances in medicine. Due to different 
historical and legal demands, patients became gradually more involved 
in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that 
informed consent may turn out to be a procedural or legal requirement 
that does not holistically embrace all the patient’s situation. To correct this 
imbalance, they observe in the literature a more nuanced shift from the indi-
vidual to the relational self where a richer conception of moral agency is 
emerging. 
Religious traditions on informed consent 
In the second section of the book are the papers submitted to the workshop 








4 Joseph Tham 
According to Zhang, Buddhism does not have any canonical norms on 
most bioethical topics, which are Western constructs. Buddhism would 
allow for the rights language of informed consent to protect the individual 
agency, truth disclosure and self-determination in healthcare decisions. 
However, the Buddhist tradition is wary of any individualist notion of a sub-
stantial self as someone who can make real free choices. Since ontological 
selfhood is elusive, any exaltation of autonomy would be problematic. The 
Buddhist vision of interdependence sees absolute self-determination as 
untenable since we cannot fully define the self except in relation to others. 
Buddhists consider that we are predetermined and conditioned socially, and 
karmic causality is at work without our knowledge. As Zhang says: 
In the case of informed consent, it is very often difficult for physicians 
(as well as for patients) to determine if a patient’s deferral of decision-
making is his/her own choice or the result of formative influences of 
the family. It follows that the patient’s capacity for intentional action is 
also questionable. Voluntariness involves the idea of “free will,” which 
would be problematic for Buddhists, and medical decision-making 
based entirely on patient-centered orientation would be problematic for 
Buddhists as well. 
According to Ruiping Fan, Confucian ethics is based on virtues rather 
than on rights, liberty and equality so prominent in Western ethical systems. 
However, Confucianism will accept legitimate human rights that protect 
individual interests to enhance virtuous living. Fan thinks that neo-
Confucianism can accept minimalist rights developed along the lines of 
Rawls that would include the right to life, security, liberty, conscience and 
equality before the law. However, these are not to be conflated with full-
fledged individual rights understood in the West. Confucian China considers 
medicine as the art of ren or benevolence. In this understanding, the training 
of the physician is meritocratic and virtue-based. Patients implicitly trust 
the benevolence of their doctors, and informed consent is, therefore, absent 
in this relationship. Fan claims, 
Chinese physicians must have gained consent, either explicitly or
implicitly, from patients and their families in order to conduct medical 
treatment, but it is also clear that obtaining such consent before 
treatment has never been formally and clearly required in the tradition. 
Besides, Confucianism emphasizes shared family decision-making in health-
care, which can come into conflict with the liberal understanding of autonomy.














healthcare decisions, which does not necessarily mean medical paternalism.
Instead, it implies that Confucian patients can autonomously accept familism
as the best choice to make these decisions. Autonomy and self-determination
are not part of the Confucian virtue-based ethical system.
Lunstroth looks at the classical texts of “Hinduism” for the grounding of 
consent in research. India is a secular state that accepts biomedical ethics, 
despite being Western constructs, as a political structure to protect the vul-
nerable. Since Hindu ethics is only relevant to the householder stage of life, 
which is of the political order guided by dharma as order, law or duties, only 
the Arthasastra of Kautilya contains a systematic theory of political/legal 
order. This text can offer insight into the  dharma of the scientific enterprise 
and the role of informed consent. As such, Hinduism evaluates research eth-
ics through the ethos of sacrifice. 
Lunstroth is highly critical of the current arrangement, where a subject 
often becomes a data point for the sake of scientific advances. There is a 
commodification of human bodies as tools to be exploited. Benefits for the 
future generations are also not evident, as the results of the research are often 
oriented to commercial benefits or privatized as intellectual property. The 
research subjects are sacrificed and do not receive the benefits for them-
selves or for their community, and they cannot readily negotiate or sue the 
researchers. As Lunstroth comments, 
The emphasis of the rule on the sacrifice being completed suggests the 
state is interested in maintaining the integrity of the sacrificial transac-
tion . . . the drug company sacrifices the individuals who “consent” to 
participate. The company strips value from them, aggregates and then 
monetizes it for itself. The god is the neoliberal economic system that 
awards greed, and the sacrifice usually works. 
Hence, in the context of the Arthasastra, informed consent in research is an 
impure sacrifice since the research subject is often ignorant, the researchers 
and industry are somewhat corrupt and the political order is too compro-
mised to protect its citizens. 
We now turn to the monotheistic religions. The Jewish discussion of 
informed consent relied on rabbinical sources, according to David Heyd. 
The underlying question deals with the question of whether one can sacri-
fice physically to help or save someone else. This tradition seeks a balance 
between self-preservation and self-care, and the supererogatory social 
commitment to promote the public good. Contemporary rabbinic opinion 
on informed consent holds that doctors need to consult patients or family 
before they enter experimental trials. There is also a presumptive force for 
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of informed consent, it rejects its theoretical basis of autonomy since God 
alone is sovereign over our lives or our bodily parts. Heyd explains, 
The requirement of consent in medical treatment is based on the poten-
tial suffering and harm to the body and on the duty of self-care rather 
than on the idea of the absolute control of human beings over their 
lives. Thus, informed consent is not a major principle in the doctor-
patient relationship, since there is a duty of the doctor to heal and a 
parallel duty of the patient to be healed. Being cured is not a matter of 
choice or of personal autonomy. 
Akin to Muslim practices, Judaism allows for “different amounts of infor-
mation to different subjects based on their individual degree of anxiety.” 
Finally, informed consent depends more on legitimacy—mediated through 
the rabbis—than on individual autonomy. 
Laura Palazzani recognizes that informed consent in research, as prac-
tised in the West, is compatible with the Christian worldview. The values of 
human rights, dignity, respect for privacy, freedom to decide, justice, risk 
and benefits, beneficence and non-maleficence found in the secular frame-
work resonates with the Christian ethical framework. However, Palazzani 
notes that Christianity derives these bioethical principles from the concepts 
of God’s creation, human finitude, imago Dei, our ability to know the truth 
and act according to it and the infinite value of human life and its eternal 
destiny. The dignity of human life also implies the possible choice to sacri-
fice oneself in research out of charity and solidarity. It is a laudable act for 
the benefit of the common good. Hence, Palazzani believes that informed 
consent is: 
inspired by Jesus, who cured the sick with compassion, generosity, 
and understanding. Christians believe that disease and suffering are 
trials from God to bring them closer to salvation through death and 
into His grace. Scientific research should be done for the purpose of 
serving those who are ill, not solely or primarily for the benefit of the 
researchers. 
Nevertheless, there are also aspects of informed consent that might diverge 
from the secular approach. The protection of vulnerable groups due to 
the severity of the illness, age, gender, socio-cultural conditions must 
also extend to the most fragile member of the human family—the human 
embryo and foetus. Hence, research done on them is highly contentious. 
The Christian and mainly Catholic understanding of human sexuality pre-












reproductive technologies, especially if they could harm the embryos. On 
certain occasions, the physicians and researchers should have recourse to 
conscientious objection to abstain from participating in some acts which, as 
stated before, are essential values for Christian living where objective truth 
and salvation are at stake. 
Padela shows in his chapter that Islamic moral theology will support 
aspects of informed consent although it would not ground this ethically 
from the principle of respect for autonomy. Instead, something equivalent 
to the basis of informed consent will come from Islamic theology of moral 
liability in front of God. Moral liability (taklīf) means standing before God 
in judgement and being morally responsible for one’s actions. For Islamic 
bioethics, every action has moral significance, and patients need to properly 
consider both the mundane and afterlife ramifications of participating in 
medical research. Hence, informed consent processes can aid Islamic indi-
viduals to live morally. 
Islamic theology aside, Muslim states and culture are also varied, accord-
ing to Padela. Many of them have pronounced communitarian ethos, with 
responsibilities of medical decision-making residing in the broader com-
munity. Padela writes, 
In many Muslim societies the patient-doctor dyad is often not the only 
locus of decision-making. . . . People trust their relatives and commu-
nity members and value interdependence, therefore limiting decision-
making within person-centric rights can deny the value attached to
such relationships. 
Muslim patients do not expect or desire a great deal of explicit information. 
Paradoxically, too much information can leave them to feel uninformed 
and can even generate distrust. Moreover, Muslim societies need to ground 
ethics regulations within Islamic law. For instance, Saudi laws make 
repeated references to the Sharia as a source of guidance on research ethics. 
The inadequacy of the autonomous self 
These chapters have shown that many religious traditions challenge the 
Western idealization of the autonomous self. They prefer a more relational 
or communitarian understanding of doctor–patient or researcher–subject 
relationship. Western medicine and its current gold standard of informed 
consent may not adequately address the theoretical scepticism by different 
religions and cultures towards its underlying grounding of autonomy. 
As these chapters have shown, Eastern religions are more sceptical of the 
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are more compatible with the informed consent discourse.4 Despite external 
similarities and acceptance of informed consent at a practical level, there 
are deep theoretical and foundational problems. The concept of the self in 
different religions can explain how these difficulties arise. 5 In Eastern cul-
tures, selfhood is illusory or derives meaning through interdependence with 
nature, family or community. This understanding can pose a challenge to 
the atomic self from which informed consent is derived. Western monothe-
istic religions define self-identity with a transcendent God. They tend to be 
more legalistic in their approach and derive legitimacy from the scriptures 
or religious authority. In all the religions, the language of sacrifice is promi-
nent in the framework of research ethics, where the patients act virtuously 
in solidarity for the greater good of fellow humans. Informed consent points 
not only to earthly existence but also to the less tangible questions of life, be 
they in the imperceivably small embryos or that of the mysterious afterlife. 
From a practical point of view, these differences in the foundational values 
are becoming more pronounced with migration and increased affirmations 
of cultural groups when they participate in clinical research. A swift from 
individual to relational autonomy may be more consonant with the greater 
research populace who tend to frame healthcare decisions and understand-
ing of illness and well-being in religious terms. Embracing these ideas can 
offer a more nuanced improvement of the readability, design and obtaining 
process of consent. As different chapters in this book show, this shift will 
better align the conscious and unconscious cultural biases of the investiga-
tors with the multicultural and religious variables of the subjects. This shift 
can proffer a cross-cultural vision of vulnerability that can enhance knowl-
edge, communication and empathy in consent to research. Consequently, 
more individualized approaches will help frame multi-layered informed 
consent which includes these global perspectives. 
Notes 
1 This book has been elaborated under the EU project i-CONSENT (https://i-
consentproject.eu) that has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 
2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 741856. 
2 The full report can be accessed here: https://i-consentproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/01/D1.4-Ethical-issues-concerning-informed-consent-in-translationalclinical-
research-and-vaccination.pdf.
 3 Ibid. 
4 See J. Tham, K.M. Kwan, and A. García ( eds. ), Religious Perspectives on Human 
Rights and Bioethics (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2017). 
5 See J. Tham, C. Durante, and A. García G ómez ( eds. ), Mind, Genes and Self: 
Religious Reflections on the Impact of Emerging Technologies on Human Identity
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018). 
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 1 Ethical issues concerning 
informed consent in 
translational/clinical 
research and vaccination 
Alberto García and Mirko Garasic
Improving the health literacy of patients in relation to medical practices and 
research is essential for upholding the principle of respect for autonomy— 
that is, respecting the patient’s ability to make self-governed choices regard-
ing medical interventions or research participation that reflects the patient’s 
beliefs and values. 
 This report 1 provides a full review of informed consent challenges (i.e. 
ethical gaps, barriers and priority needs) that are unique to certain vulner-
able groups, namely, preadolescents, adolescents, and pregnant women, 
with a specific emphasis on how neurobioethical, multicultural and interre-
ligious variables should be taken into account when assessing the appropri-
ateness of the current documents relying on the notion of informed consent. 
In exploring how we are to improve the process of obtaining informed con-
sent, we will also highlight the relevance of bias and privacy in the debate. 
The objective is to offer recommendations on how these gaps, barriers and 
challenges may be solved or avoided in the future. 
There are two categories of challenges. The first category comprises chal-
lenges that are patient-centred, which prevent a research subject from fully 
comprehending the disclosed information. The second category comprises 
challenges that are process-centred, which are procedural barriers that pre-
vent obtaining truly informed consent from prospective patients. 
The types of recommendations explored for solving or avoiding these 
two forms of barriers in the context of research and vaccine administration 
include: 1) understanding more in depth the potential information derived 
from progress in neuroscience; 2) taking into account the role of religion 
and non-Western cultures in relation to a person-centred way of conceptual-
izing informed consent; 3) improving the readability and design of consent 
forms; 4) identifying the cultural and other bias of both the patient and 
the doctor/researcher; 5) evaluating the role of privacy in the collection of 
sensitive data connected to informed consent; 6) incorporating education-
specific strategies to improve patients’ or participants’ understanding of 









12 Alberto García and Mirko Garasic 
consent information; 7) initiating discussion of meningitis, HPV or RSV
immunization and clearly explaining the benefits of infection prevention 
through immunization; 8) inviting questions at every step of the consent 
process; 9) acknowledging and addressing discrimination based on age 
and gender; 10) obtaining consent from legal representatives (in the case 
of children or pregnant women limited by mental defects or disorders); 11) 
protecting the privacy of participants enrolled in vaccine-related research; 
12) acknowledging patients’ or participants’ own experiences with menin-
gitis, RSV and/or HPV infection; 13) implementing procedures to assess 
patients’ or participants’ capacity to consent; 14) supporting parenting strat-
egies and lifestyle practices that reduce and reverse predisposing risk fac-
tors to meningitis, RSV and HPV infection; 15) adopting individualized 
approaches to promote health protective behaviours (tailoring the consent 
process to reduce concerns relating to vaccine cost, pain, safety, side effects, 
perceived appropriateness to lifestyle and/or need for multiple doses) and 
16) implementing a dynamic informed consent model with participant con-
trol, accompanied by appropriate privacy safeguards. 
A multicultural and interreligious perspective 
on informed consent 
The UNESCO International Bioethics Committee stressed in more than one 
occasion that an individual has to be informed as much as possible on the 
outcomes of the procedure in which she is involved in: 
The close connection between autonomy and responsibility supposes 
that consent be freely given by the person concerned, the clearest pos-
sible information be provided, his/her faculties of comprehension be 
intact, that he/she has been able to assess the consequences of partici-
pating in a research project and the development of the entire process, 
as well as fully understanding the advantages and disadvantages of 
possible alternatives, also in terms of treatment.2 
Aside from this analysis, various cultural and social variables are to be con-
sidered when assessing the ethical validity of the informed consent pro-
cess. Oftentimes, such considerations might impinge upon the monolithic, 
individual-centred version of autonomy that we tend to give for granted in 
the Western contexts, creating a space for new versions of vulnerability—in 
which the vulnerable population is represented by those individuals unable to
see their attitude and perception of autonomy as sufficiently represented by 
current legislations. In some scenarios, for example, we could use “commu-









Ethical issues concerning informed consent 13 
deliberation and the legitimacy of a decision to belong not only to a single 
person but rather the community to which one belongs (i.e. family). Often 
leaders of the community—nearly always family members—are those who 
make the decisions and their judgement is not questioned due to their age, 
expected wisdom and knowledge of the community’s internal dynamics in 
place. 
Individual and relational autonomy 
In line with what just described, the words of Joseph Tham and Marie 
Letendre are particularly relevant to understand more accurately how some 
of our standard ways of conceptualizing the discussion around informed 
consent might not be as given as expected. 
Cultural norms specify behavior. ‘Honesty is an ideal value for most 
Americans, but it varies in strength as a real value for other cultures.’3 
Honor is highly prized in the Japanese culture as is female purity in the 
Islamic world. Direct eye contact is avoided in several cultures, notably 
Asian and the Middle Eastern culture; the Navaho use silence to for-
mulate their thoughts in order to give the most complete answer. Trust 
is given only to family members in the Gypsy culture. Masculine and 
feminine pronouns do not exist in Asian languages, and ‘yes’ does not 
always mean the affirmative since many cultures use the ‘yes’ as a way 
of avoiding an embarrassing ‘no’. This is just a short list of cultural 
variables that inform and form communication styles. A cross-cultural 
health care ethic combines the tenets of patient—family centered care 
with an understanding of the social and cultural influences that affect 
the quality of medical services and treatment. Developing sensitivity to 
different cultures can make health care programs and activities attrac-
tive and interesting for a broader population base. In contrast, a lack of 
cultural sensitivity can deter people from using health care services.4 
Hence, not all documents that assume that focusing on the individual 
might be sufficiently sensitive towards how one person with a cultural, reli-
gious or identitarian background might want (or is capable) to express her 
views, values and desires if disconnected from her community. In accepting 
this reality, it is equally important to bear in mind, as Loredana Persampieri 
rightly stresses, that—though contemplated—relational autonomy has no 
effective role in the shaping of informed consent in official forms. 5 
Seeking consent from an individual is necessary, even if the commu-
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once the community has given its approval or disapproval, often raises 
concern. Nevertheless, such reasons should not lead to the conclusion 
that cultural considerations pave the way to situations where, excep-
tionally, for members of some groups communal autonomy may over-
ride individual autonomy. Conversely, we should always bear in mind 
that “respect for cultural diversity and pluralism should not be used to 
infringe fundamental freedoms nor any of the principles set out in the 
Declaration.”6 In this perspective, the Italian National Bioethics Com-
mittee suggests an interpretation of the concept of autonomy in terms 
of “relational autonomy,” which may be better tailored to an intercul-
tural approach aimed at accommodating the value of the community 
dimension in certain cultural settings (i.e. African tribes) and respect 
for the person.7 
As the notion of informed consent relies on a set value of individual auton-
omy that not all cultures and approaches to life share, a patient’s cultural 
disposition and past experiences with medical healthcare professionals will 
have an impact on the amount of trust that they can have in a vaccines’ 
efficacy, for example. Although local culture may shape people’s percep-
tion over time, people are more likely to trust experts that share a similar 
background, tradition, religion and culture with them.8 When working with 
ethnic minority patients, it is important to note that comprehension may also 
transcend simply linguistic barriers. The conceptualization of illness and 
cultural bias both plays a role in the ways that information is presented and 
understood. Thus, it is important to understand the role that culture plays in 
obtaining informed consent.9 In particular, in multicultural societies, where 
a large portion of the society is made up of immigrants with varying cultural 
backgrounds, there may be differing attitudes regarding the role of physi-
cians. Moreover, the quality of informed consent may be dependent on the 
relationship between a physician and their patient. 
To improve the physician–patient relationship and for the consent 
gained to be effective, there has to be a partnership based on openness, 
trust and good communication between the two parties.10 Individual’s reli-
gious beliefs or related cultural values can lead to questions and concerns 
that health professionals, unfamiliar with the religion or culture, have not 
encountered before. It has been shown that culture (which can also include 
religious and spiritual backgrounds) can impact one’s vulnerability to infec-
tious diseases. Rejecting treatments or prevention measures due to religious 
or cultural values is not a new phenomenon; there have been reports of 
vaccines-preventable outbreaks in religious schools, congregations and 
religious communities.11 As a case study, the World Health Organization 
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against polio. The reason for the low vaccination rates is that the commu-
nity is predominantly Muslim, and they believe that the polio drops are used 
as a tool to sterilize the children. Likewise, a study from the Netherlands has 
shown that municipalities with high orthodox protestant domination have 
lower vaccination rates compared to municipalities without an orthodox 
protestant domination.12 
Regarding the way informed consent notion interacts with biomedical 
research, some of the key questions that we want to address here are: 
a) How much of the notion of informed consent is applied in one’s tradi-
tion? And in which way? 
b) Can or should we have different informed consent forms for differently 
vulnerable populations? 
c) Do all traditions agree with the general principles behind informed 
consent (i.e. the prioritization of individual autonomy)? If not, what 
alternative values/approach could support widespread vaccination, for 
example? 
Recommendations 
As the main objective of this project is to identify the ethical gaps, barri-
ers and challenges currently present in obtaining informed consent from
patients in different, challenging contexts and address the issues with
some practical suggestions for future policies, two main deliverables
can be extracted from the inputs here analysed. They should be further
expanded and taken into consideration when developing new models and
forms that aim at providing convincing guidelines for the informed con-
sent process.
The first aspect to take into account is the role of religious keywords. 
Implementation of some key terms directly refers to some religious tradi-
tions. For example, kosher or halal in vaccines, or reference to xiaodao and 
dadao as notions helpful to conceptualize better why we, as single individu-
als, should behave in a certain way in relation to society. Not only ensur-
ing the “religious approval” from different traditions will increase the trust 
towards doctors and researchers, but it will also make more evident and 
immediate in the eyes of the believer terms that will help him filling up 
required forms and documents with more conviction, speeding up the pro-
cess of sharing scientific information. 
The second point is that international accepted notions and values, such 
as human duties,13 should be considered when discussing informed con-
sent, not only human rights. Where possible, use the specific tradition to 
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of the public interest (maslahat al-ummah) that sees vaccines as a way to 
protect others in Islam. Or the idea of dharma in the Hindu tradition in rela-
tion to laws and duties towards society (stressed by many other traditions 
through different concepts, notions and approaches but still very similar in 
practice). 
These are the final recommendations to increase the effectiveness of mul-
ticultural and interreligious perspective: 
• Taking into account that not all traditions and religions give the same 
level of importance to the individual-centred version of autonomy at 
the base of the informed consent form conceived to be signed by a 
single individual. 
• Implementing some key terms directly referring to some cultural and 
religious traditions. Considering other key notions such as human 
duties, not only human rights. 
• Fostering participation of trained cross-cultural professionals as mem-
bers of the ethical research committees to validate cultural and religious 
concerns during research. Increasing the diversity of the healthcare 
professionals, improve the opportunity to have individuals capable to 
filter more directly certain scientific notions into some religious and 
traditional guidelines. 
• Stimulating the composition of cross-cultural research teams, facilitat-
ing an understanding of cultural and religious diversity when recruiting 
and when carrying out research in patients with different cultural back-
grounds and religious convictions. 
• Capturing the patient religious or cultural background to allow the 
researcher to introduce appropriate religious and cultural concepts (or 
terms), when necessary, in the IC form and during the communication 
process, facilitating the understanding, trust and acceptance of believ-
ers towards social value of science and research, improving the accep-
tance rate of participation in clinical trial. 
• Changing the categorization of the patients focusing on a shared com-
mon cultural identity. Healthcare professionals should ask questions 
about other social identities to shift their attention from the patient’s 
ethnicity or religious background helping to reduce racial or cultural 
biases to improve recruitment of minorities. 
• Fostering the religious and community leaders’ analysis and possible 
support or approval of specific scientific biomedical research (i.e. spe-
cific therapy or vaccines) so that their support might illuminate believ-
ers and increase the trust towards doctors and researchers as well as 
participation in clinical trials. 
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 2 Informed consent and minors 
in a multicultural society 
Mirko Daniel Garasic and Fabio Macioce
Minors’ participation in clinical research trials 
According to the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki: 
“while the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowl-
edge, this goal can never take precedence over the rights and interests of 
individual research subjects.”1 Hence, voluntary and informed consent is 
a necessary condition. However, if trials need to involve persons unable to 
consent, the duty to protect them becomes pivotal. A strict interpretation 
of this duty could leave groups of vulnerable people without significant 
benefits and knowledge about their condition. Hence, we need to justify the 
involvement of minors and those unable to consent in clinical trials. 
Due to the minors’ incomplete physical and psychological develop-
ment, their vulnerability is a preliminary question on every ethical dis-
cussion about paediatric clinical trials. Above all, there is a risk of harm
because children cannot protect themselves, and official documents have
highlighted this reality. Besides the risk of damage to health, the pro-
tection of children’s rights and proper acquisition of informed consent
could be legal and ethical in a multicultural society such as ours. We will
employ a multicultural approach if it does not infringe upon fundamental
human rights.
Given the low involvement rates presently, children’s participation in 
clinical trials is considered insufficient. 
The reasons for these deficits are to be found in a lack of interest on 
the part of the pharmaceutical industry, firstly because of the lower 
economic potential (smaller markets) and secondly because studies 
involving children are more complex, time-consuming, and expensive. 
This is enhanced by the fact that the conditions of trials change depend-
ing on the different stages of childhood development and the related 
risks are therefore more difficult to assess. 2
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In research, it is essential to involve people who cannot consent, includ-
ing children, so that they can assess benefits for their health, balanced with 
related risks. For these reasons, various institutional documents have high-
lighted the importance of informed consent, risk assessment and inclusion 
criteria in clinical trials on human subjects. We need to handle these issues 
carefully when dealing with minors because they cannot understand the 
technical information and freely give consent.3 
First and foremost, we need to stress the necessity and utmost importance 
of paediatric clinical trials. Official documents request children involved in 
scientific research: “Growth and maturation processes, as well as certain 
specific diseases are unique to children. Specific consequences of medical 
interventions may be seen in children and may only appear long after expo-
sure.”4 Therefore, from an ethical perspective, their involvement in clinical 
research need not be viewed as a necessary evil. 
In the past, many new products were not tested in children or adoles-
cents although they were directed at diseases also occurring in child-
hood. In some cases, this resulted in children or adolescents being 
exposed to interventions that were either not effective or harmful. In 
general, this lack of information results in higher risks for children and 
adolescents from being exposed to interventions where little is known 
about their specific effects or safety in this population. Therefore, it is 
imperative to involve children.5 
Nevertheless, minors’ involvement in clinical research is not advised 
if trials can be carried out on adult subjects: research should be carried 
out first among less vulnerable subjects.6 About the order of involvement 
in research, it is often preferable to experiment on adults before children. 
Nonetheless, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sci-
ences (CIOMS) does not establish such a strict requirement because chil-
dren may face different health issues, and their specific conditions may have 
been considered. However, older children with greater capacity to consent 
should be involved before younger children, except for special scientific 
reasons.7 
Trials involving minors are essential to test the effects of therapies and 
interventions or develop observational studies.8 To offer tailored and better 
healthcare for children, paediatric clinical trials are necessary to understand 
their particular physiological characteristics and health needs. CIOMS 
states that “children and adolescents must be included in health-related 
research unless a good scientific reason justifies their exclusion.”9 Minors’
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cannot consent. However, their exclusion from trials needs to have a sound 
scientific basis concerning the risks and benefits of their involvement. 
In line with this, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics affirms that children’s 
welfare is an essential aspect to consider. However, this welfare should 
encompass possible scientific contributions that could benefit all children 
in the future.10 It does not imply a moral duty for children and parents to 
consent, but an aspect to determine what is good for children. 
What are the risks and benefits for minors? 
Clinical research on human subjects has allowed a significant increase in 
therapeutic and diagnostic opportunities. However, it is structurally uncer-
tain because it is built on a scientific hypothesis that must be confirmed 
through investigation. Parents and society oversee children’s protection, 
which requires risk and burden minimization and benefit calculation.11 
Hence, researchers must minimize risks and burdens, balancing them with 
expected benefits for subjects and improvement of knowledge. 
Risk assessment is a fundamental aspect of a research protocol. In paedi-
atric clinical trials, it requires strict control: 
Risk assessment includes the evaluation of the risk of the medicinal 
product tested or the control, the risk of withholding active treatment 
in some cases, the risk of the disease itself. Potential harms would 
include invasiveness and intrusiveness of research, the severity as well 
as seriousness of potential harms, the reversibility of adverse effects 
and reactions, and their preventability. The accumulation of research 
projects in the same population (over-studied population) is another 
potential harm. Multiple clinical trials in an individual should be 
discouraged.12 
Significant risks in clinical trials are related to the health of the subjects 
and data reliability. Health-related risks depend on prior experiences with 
the intervention/product to be tested and their nature. If the risk is minimal, 
we can involve children, considering the benefits they may get compared 
to standard clinical treatment. These benefits can be direct or indirect. The 
direct benefit is health recovery by treating the patient’s condition. The indi-
rect benefit comes from general medical knowledge about the condition of 
the patient and others who are similarly affected or general knowledge that 
can benefit society. 13 Having direct benefits is essential to justify therapeu-
tic interventions. It is also important in clinical trials, “In scientific research 
projects, a potential direct benefit also plays a key role in the ethical evalu-
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CIOMS adds: “When the social value of the studies with such research 
interventions and procedures is compelling, and these studies cannot be con-
ducted in adults, a research ethics committee may permit a minor increase 
above minimal risk.”15 
Usually, “minimal risk” means that the probability and magnitude of 
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of 
themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the per-
formance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. How-
ever, this definition also lends itself to ambiguous interpretations. 
In addition to risks, the burden of minors involved in research is more 
significant than adults. There could be anxieties, pain or interference in 
children’s daily activities, such as separations from parents during the clini-
cal trials, frequent invasive procedures or burdensome side effects. Parents 
are usually more focused on their children’s life and health risks, but we 
must also consider the harmful effects of different burdens. 
Healthy children should not be involved in clinical trials because they 
cannot provide proper informed consent. Prevention trials or vaccine trials 
are justified exceptions because, in these cases, they are preventive mea-
sures with a good risk/benefit ratio both for individuals and for society. 
However, they must be carried out following high standards of safety. 
Research integrity, ethics review and undue inducement 
The exploitation of people unable to consent is unacceptable, and a manda-
tory review by ethics committees is essential.16 We need to ensure research 
integrity by compliance with ethical principles and professional standards.17 
Research ethics committees have an essential role in reviewing proto-
cols and ensuring the “ethical acceptability” of the research.18 In paediatric 
trials, research ethics committees will need to involve children’s health-
care specialists to assess the risks and burdens of envisaged procedures 
adequately. They need to scrutinize both the scientific and ethical aspects 
with ethical and peer reviews. The ethics committee or competent authori-
ties should not allow the trial to proceed when ethical guidelines are not 
followed. 
Parents may consult their child’s physician about participating in a clini-
cal trial. If the physician is the investigator, we need to make sure there 
is no undue influence and conflict of interests. Concerns about access to 
regular care should not influence the desire to participate in a clinical trial. 
If the researcher oversees the caring of minors involved in clinical trials, 
commitment to investigate cannot override the duty to care. The desire for 















22 Mirko Daniel Garasic and Fabio Macioce 
Children and family autonomy in a multicultural society 
When research involves ethnic minorities, informed consent and autonomy 
may even be more challenging and complicated. In its Report on Traditional 
Medicine Systems and their Ethical Implications, UNESCO’s International 
Bioethics Committee addresses the challenge of cultural diversity in health-
care and medicine. It emphasizes that non-Western traditions may have a dif-
ferent approach to life, death, health and illness and so entail a different view 
regarding the patient, practitioner, patient/practitioner relationship, health 
services, and risk factors.20 In other words, it recognizes that Western medi-
cine is grounded on a specific view of the human being and reflects a specific 
understanding of human life which may be different from that of the patient. 
This difference must not be overestimated, of course. For instance, the 
relationship between health conceptions and ethnic identities is not com-
pletely clear. The definition of ethnic minority is problematic,21 and it may 
even be more arduous when we look at health-related issues. If we consider 
characteristics of culture, religion, language and traditions that make eth-
nic members different from the rest of the population, they also preserve 
a sense of solidarity of these groups.22 The relevance of some health tradi-
tions and conceptions that preserve ethnic identity is not easy to understand. 
Health conceptions, more than other issues, transcend the minorities’ limits. 
When a specific health tradition is relevant for the minority’s identity, the 
balance between recognizing such a tradition and the defence of individual 
freedom and rights is highly problematic. While this question is of general 
relevance concerning subgroups, it becomes even more complicated when 
it relates to health challenges.23 This is because Western health laws (we 
may consider both U.S. and E.U.) are rooted in a few principles: patient 
autonomy, freedom of treatment, informed consent, giving a clear priority 
to the single individual and his/her rights over the group.24 
Some barriers may become evident when ethnic subgroups take part in 
clinical trials.25 They include language barriers and limits to the compre-
hensibility of information concerning different linguistic uses, concepts of 
disease or ways of expressing sensations and attitudes regarding disease and 
well-being. Second, barriers may come from the individuals’ different roles 
within the community, the group they belong to and the family. Finally, bar-
riers may derive from a limited knowledge of research practices, procedures 
and ethical and legal constraints. 
When we conceptualize the idea of preserving a young patient’s “best 
interest,” we tend to have an idealized version of what that patient would 
do or want us to do, which amounts to preserving; defending or increas-
ing their values, priorities and autonomy. Indeed, there is a tendency to 
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uneasiness to associate the patient’s interest with a non-individualistic ver-
sion of autonomy. We need to pay attention to how it can create frictions in 
the healthcare system. We have discussed elsewhere the distinction between 
relational and individual autonomy. 26 Here, we want to question some of the 
main legislative tools used in clinical research involving minors based on an 
individualistic understanding of autonomy. 
According to O’Neill,27 the limits of the moral validity of individual 
autonomy lie in the implicit acceptance of independence as the most critical 
value among others to shape human beings. Relational autonomy grants an 
alternative conceptualization of freedom and self-government in a socially 
constituted agent who is equally committed to personal preferences, inter-
personal relations and mutual dependencies. Accordingly, the exercise of 
patient autonomy largely depends on the resources available for the indi-
vidual, institutional facilities and legal instruments. 
Among these facilities and instruments, social rights are of primary 
importance. They provide the subject with goods and resources which make 
autonomy possible: education, healthcare assistance, welfare and participa-
tion of one’s cultural and religious life. 28 Moreover, autonomy requires the 
subject to be inserted in a relational context suitable for the exercise of free-
dom and characterized by positive relations of recognition. Autonomous 
choices, recognized by the subject as their own and correspond to their 
goals, depend on a series of supporting conditions that are normative, insti-
tutional and social (or more generically relational).29 Due to this complex 
interplay between personal capacities, institutional context and relational 
resources, autonomy is a concept that has variance in degrees. Conditions 
that support autonomy can strengthen or weaken it. 
For example, in paediatric clinical trials, the subjects do not have full 
individual autonomy to become involved. This vulnerable group (minors 
and their families) needs to decide in a context of uncertainty. Hence, minors 
need appropriate support from adults, first from parents, but also research-
ers and society. As a result, specific protections are required. CIOMS states 
that before starting a paediatric clinical trial, researchers and ethics commit-
tees should safeguard that 
1) a parent or a legally authorized representative of the child or adoles-
cent has given permission; and 2) the agreement (assent) of the child or 
adolescent has been obtained in keeping with the child’s or adolescent’s 
capacity, after having been provided with adequate information about 
the research tailored to the child’s or adolescent’s level of maturity. 30
 Most official documents accept vulnerability as a significant concern. Vul-
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participate in decision-making and obtain benefits from clinical trials. There 
is a tension between the need to avoid harm and the right to be informed and 
make choices. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics challenges the correlation 
between vulnerability and childhood. It invites researchers to work in part-
nership with children and parents and not to only protect children “from” 
research.31 It means that minors must be encouraged to participate and 
make decisions. Their autonomy and integrity must be respected by giving 
importance to their views, listening to them and allowing their participation 
in decision-making. Once again, not everyone would necessarily agree on 
what their “autonomy” comprises and how to respect it genuinely. Crucial 
to this assessment are the roles of parents, which we will now investigate. 
The roles of parents 
Parental involvements are vital, from both legal and ethical points of view. 
They not only have the right to decide or duty to protect, but also assist and 
support their children’s evolving autonomy. Parents should evaluate their 
“children’s best interests,” a complex concept decided on a case-by-case 
basis, considering their needs and rights. In the field of research involving 
minors, the notion of “avoidance of harm” may be more objective than that 
of “best interest.” The “best interest” approach generally weighs each case’s 
potential benefits and burdens. However, in clinical research, it is consid-
ered too generic, lending itself to ambiguous interpretations. 
Since the participant’s interest is not the only focus of clinical trials, the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics sustains that parental consent to research 
“should be based on their confidence that participation in the proposed 
research is compatible with their child’s immediate and longer-term inter-
ests.”32 Thus, the minors’ “best interest,” which is fundamental in clinical 
practice, does not become the only consideration in decision-making, over-
riding other ethical values. 
Nevertheless, parents need decision-making support. In difficult situa-
tions, clinical trials involve burdens or risks. When parents need to deal 
with their children’s illness which can be severe, the distress could com-
promise their judgement capacity. In chronic illnesses, children may have 
greater experience and capacity to understand the risks, burdens and ben-
efits of a clinical trial than their parents. 
Suppose that it is impossible to obtain parental permission in an emer-
gency. In that case, the ethical review board can grant approval and then 
inform and involve parents as soon as possible. If the children can under-
stand and decide in these circumstances, their decision should be respected.33 
According to the U.S. Institute of Medicine, ethical review committees 
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research is essential to the health and well-being of adolescents and cannot 
reasonably or practically be carried out without the waiver; 2) the research 
involves treatments that State laws permit adolescents to receive without 
parental permission; 3) when the investigator has presented evidence that 
the adolescents are capable of understanding the research and their rights 
as research participants and 4) the research protocol includes appropriate 
safeguards to protect the adolescent’s interests consistent with the risks of 
the trial.34 
Parents cannot ask their children to become involved in clinical research 
without sound scientific evidence adequately evaluated by researchers and 
ethics committees. Even here, some axioms are not as simple as they might 
first appear. We mention only one example. The standard of bodily integrity, 
required by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, is challenged by a substan-
tial portion of the world with the practice of male circumcision. We cannot 
dwell on this very delicate matter here.35 Suffice it to say that this standard 
is not defended as vigorously or convincingly when applied in different 
contexts. 
Children and mature minors: different age, different issues 
As children mature in age, their capacity to understand takes on greater 
validity, and individual autonomy becomes important. To be a “minor” is 
a legal status, as the law fixes the age of adulthood conventionally. None-
theless, to be a child or a young person is foremost an existential condi-
tion. The minors’ continuous development becomes an ethical issue since 
there are significant differences between infants, children and youth. “What 
is more difficult and especially deserves ‘ethical weighing’ is research on 
children as children continually develop their ability to give consent as they 
grow older.” 36 
Some groups have proposed an age-based classification. ICH distin-
guishes between newborns (0–27 days), infants and toddlers (28 days–23 
months), children (2–11 years) and adolescents (12–18 years). In the same 
document, ICH states that “any classification of the paediatric population 
into age categories is to some extent arbitrary,” but still useful for study 
design.37 EMA makes no distinction between minors and children, using 
these terms synonymously. 38 Nevertheless, they consider consent and its 
value according to age groups and the subjects’ maturity. It is impossible to 
obtain valid assent from children between birth and three years of age. 
There is no specific indication for 3–6-years-old. For children of school age 
(from 6 years of age onwards), providing information and obtaining assent 
are recommended. From the age of 9, children are considered capable of 
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respect and not only protection of their autonomy. “Assent from an ado-
lescent who is a minor should be sought, and, where possible respected.”39 
Researchers must, however, evaluate if adolescents have understood the 
information provided. 
If clinical research implies minimal risks and burden for minors, the Aus-
trian Bioethics Commission requires parental permission only for children 
under 14. 
For minors aged 14 or older (mature minors), the Bioethics Com-
mission does not envisage such a requirement as mature minors are 
allowed to act independently also in the case of other comparable medi-
cal measures. Group benefit research shall be enabled for this group of 
persons beyond the scope of the special laws.40 
Without fixing a rigid age threshold, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
distinguishes three different situations when dealing with the broad concept 
of “childhood”:41 
Case One: children who cannot give an opinion if they should take 
part in the research. They could be babies and very young children, 
or children who are temporarily unable to opine because they are 
unwell or unconscious. 
Case Two: children who can form views and express wishes but cannot 
yet make independent decisions about research involvement. 
Case Three: children and young people who potentially have the intel-
lectual capacity and maturity to make decisions about participation 
in research but are considered minors in their local legal system. 
Case One includes all children at the beginning of life. For children in Case 
Three, their assent is as good as informed consent. 
We recommend that, where children and young people have sufficient 
maturity and understanding but are not yet treated as fully ‘adult’ by 
the law of their country, professionals should, wherever possible, seek 
consent from both the children or young people concerned, and from 
their parents.42 
According to CIOMS: 
As adolescents near the age of majority, their agreement to participate 
in research may be ethically (though not legally) equivalent to con-
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‘co-consent’ but legally, the adolescent’s agreement remains assent. If 
child or adolescent participants reach the legal age of majority accord-
ing to applicable law and become capable of independent informed 
consent during the research, their written informed consent to contin-
ued participation must be sought and their decision respected.43 
The International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO states that the “criteria
for the capacity to consent have included the ability to understand the issues
involved in the decisions at stake, the ability to evaluate these rationally, a
reasonable outcome of the decision and evidence of a decision being made.”44 
Some jurisdictions recognize the status of “emancipated” minors who are 
not living with their parents and eventually have their own families. Eman-
cipated minors can be married or parents themselves, so they can request 
the involvement of adults who are not their parents. “If an adolescent aged 
16 to 18 is no longer a minor as defined in national law, or is an ‘emanci-
pated minor,’ then written informed consent is required from these indi-
viduals as for any adult capable of giving consent. Under these conditions, 
informed consent is no longer required from the parents/legal representa-
tive, although an adolescent is still vulnerable and may require additional 
discussions and explanations.”45 
In long-term clinical trials, investigators should periodically check the 
minors’ maturity and their capacity to consent. They should seek their 
assent or informed consent when appropriate or once the research subjects 
have reached the legal age.46 
The example of emancipated minors highlights yet another evolution of 
individual/relational autonomy that requires greater attention. It is peculiar 
that the decisive factor in “elevating” emancipated minors to fully compe-
tent adults is when they have formed their own families. In other words, we 
give as much importance to the role of relationships (becoming account-
able and responsible adults through parenthood) as the personal capacity to 
process information. On balance, we have consigned relational autonomy a 
more significant role than we might have realized. 
Conclusion 
Through documents of eminent health and bioethical organizations in the 
world, we have seen how the current conceptualization of autonomy is 
biased towards individualism. In the light of the increasingly multicultural 
societies we live in, these assumptions should not go unchallenged. We
have seen some legal shortcomings of informed consent in clinical research, 
especially in minors. We call for further analysis and research on this topic 
that has made progress but still requires improvements. 
 
   
  
 
   
























28 Mirko Daniel Garasic and Fabio Macioce 
Notes 
1 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (as Amended) (2013), art. 
8, www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-
for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/ . 
2 Austrian Bioethics Commission, Research on Persons without the Capacity to 
Consent-with Special Consideration of the Concept of Risk (2013), 34, www. 
oeaw.ac.at/resources/Record/990002754000504498. 
3 European Medicines Agency (EMA), Guideline for Good Clinical Practice
(2016),  www.ema.europa.eu/en/ich-e6-r2-good-clinical-practice . 
4 European Medicines Agency, Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on Medici-
nal Products Conducted with Paediatric Population (2008), 4, https://ec.europa. 
eu/health//sites/health/files/files/eudralex/vol-10/ethical_considerations_en.pdf. 
5 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS),  Inter-
national Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans, 
Commentary on Guideline, (2016), 17, https://cioms.ch/publications/product/ 
international-ethical-guidelines-for-health-related-research-involving-humans/. 
6 EMA (2008), 5. 
7 CIOMS (2016). 
8 Austrian Bioethics Commission (2013), 36. 
9 CIOMS (2016). 
10 Nuffield Council on Bioethics,  Children and Clinical Research: Ethical Issues (2015),
para 4.28, www.nuffieldbioethics.org/publications/children-and-clinical-research
11 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Reg-
istration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use-ICH, E 11: Clinical Investigation 
of Medicinal Products in the Paediatric Population (2000), www.ema.europa. 
eu/en/documents/scientific-guideline/international-conference-harmonisation-
technical-requirements-registration-pharmaceuticals-human-use_en-1.pdf;
World Health Organization (WHO),  Standards and Operational Guidance for 
Ethics Review of Health-Related Research with Human Participants (2011), 
 www.who.int/ethics/publications/9789241502948/en/; European Commission, 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Better 
Medicines for Children:—From Concept to Reality (2013), https://ec.europa. 
eu/health/sites/health/files/files/paediatrics/2013_com443/paediatric_report-
com%282013%29443_en.pdf; CIOMS (2016). 
12 EMA (2008), 17. 
13 French National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences, 
Ethical Issues Raised by Collections of Biological Material and Associated 
Information Data: “Biobanks,” “Libraries,” (2003), 3–5, www.ccne-ethique.fr/ 
sites/default/files/publications/avis077en.pdf. 
14 Austrian Bioethics Commission (2013), 39. 
15 CIOMS (2016). 
16 Council of Europe, Committee on Bioethics-DH-BIO, Guide for Research Ethics
Committee Members (2012), 40, www.coe.int/en/web/bioethics/guide-for-research-
ethics-committees-members. 
17 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies,  Statement on the 
Formulation of a Code of Conduct for Research Integrity for Projects Funded by 
the European Commission (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/ 
research_and_innovation/ege/research_integrity_ege_statement.pdf. 




































Informed consent and minors in a multicultural society 29 
19 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2015), xxxiii. 
20 UNESCO (IBC), Report of the IBC on Traditional Medicine Systems and 
Their Ethical Implications (2013), 12, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ 
pf0000217457_eng. 
21 Jennifer Jackson-Preece, “Beyond the (Non) Definition of Minority,”  European 
Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Brief (2014), 30, www.ecmi.de/publications/ 
issue-briefs/beyond-the-non-definition-of-minority . 
22 Francesco Capotorti, Study of the Rights of the Persons Belonging to Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (New York: UN, E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, 
1979),  https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/10387 . 
23 Leslie Green, “Internal Minorities and Their Rights,” in  Group Rights, ed. Judith 
Baker (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 71; Avigail Eisenberg, 
Reasons of Identity: A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment 
of Identity Claims (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Avigail Eisen-
berg and Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Introduction,” in  Minorities within Minorities: 
Equality, Rights and Diversity, ed. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–15. 
24 Raanan Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles:—Four Can Encompass the Rest:— 
And Respect for Autonomy Should Be ‘First among Equals’,”  Journal of Medical 
Ethics 29, no. 5 (2003): 307–312. 
25 Simon Dein and Kamaldeep Bhui, “Issues Concerning Informed Consent for 
Medical Research among Non-Westernized Ethnic Minority Patients in the 
UK,” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 98, no. 8 (2005): 354–356. 
26 Mirko Daniel Garasic, Guantanamo and Other Cases of Enforced Medical 
Treatment:—A Biopolitical Analysis (New York: Springer, 2015); Fabio
Macioce, “Between Autonomy and Vulnerability: Rethinking Informed Consent 
in a Relational Perspective,” Notizie di POLITEIA 35, no. 134 (2019): 111–128. 
27 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002). 
28 Robert Young, Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1986); Joseph Raz,  The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1986); Marina Oshana, “Personal Autonomy and Society,”  The 
Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (1998): 81–102; Amartya Sen,  Development as 
Freedom (New York: Knopf. A., 1999). 
29 Joel Anderson, “Disputing Autonomy: Second-Order Desires and the Dynamics 
of Ascribing Autonomy,” Sats:—Nordic Journal of Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2008): 
7–26. 
30 CIOMS (2016). 
31 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2015), para 4.5. 
32 Ibid., para 4.33. 
33 Ibid., para 6.35. 
34 Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences,  Ethical Conduct 
of Clinical Research Involving Children (Washington, DC: The National Acad-
emies Press, 2004), 201. https://doi.org/10.17226/10958 . 
35 For further information on this, see Mirko Daniel Garasic, “In Defence of Male 
Circumcision,” Monash Bioethics Review 31, no. 1 (2013): 60–69. 
36 Austrian Bioethics Commission (2013), 44. 
37 ICH (2000), 7. 
38 EMA (2008), 7. 












30 Mirko Daniel Garasic and Fabio Macioce 
40 Austrian Bioethics Commission (2013), 46. 
41 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2015), para 4.5. 
42 Ibid., recommendation 13. 
43 CIOMS (2016). 
44 UNESCO (IBC), Report of the IBC on Consent, no. 79 (2008), https://ethics. 
iarc.fr/Documents/IBC_consent.pdf. 
45 EMA (2008), 10. 
46 Ibid.; International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), Addendum to E 11: Clinical
Investigation of Medicinal Products in the Paediatric Population (2016), 5, www. 
ema.europa.eu/en/ich-e11r1-step-5-guideline-clinical-investigation-medicinal-
products-pediatric-population; Italian Committee for Bioethics, Clinical Trials 
in Adult or Minor Patients Who Are Unable to Give Informed Consent in Emergen-
cies (2012), http://bioetica.governo.it/en/opinions/opinions-responses/clinical-
trials-in-adult-or-minor-patients-who-are-unable-to-give-informed-consent-in-
emergency-situations/; Italian Committee for Bioethics, Paediatric Biobanks











 3 Community engagement in the 
informed consent process in 
global clinical research 
 International recommendations 
and guidelines 
 Margherita Daverio 
Challenges to informed consent in global clinical 
research and the need for community involvement 
Informed consent is not only a written form or a bureaucratic procedure but 
also, above all, an essential communication process between the participant 
and the researcher in clinical research. In many cases, obtaining informed 
consent may be difficult with people from diverse cultural backgrounds. It 
could happen in the context of global clinical research, particularly in the 
case of international multicentre studies where researchers and the potential 
participants belong to different cultural contexts. 1 
To overcome communication barriers and avoid misconceptions and 
misunderstandings, interaction in a multicultural setting cannot overlook 
cultural diversity, as it contributes to shaping subjective identities. Thus, cul-
tural diversity affects the way people process and understand information. 
Cultural differences between researchers and potential participants in 
clinical trials could result in communication barriers which are likely to 
hinder awareness and pose challenges to the informed consent process.2 In 
2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) emphasized that “a challenge 
in global health ethics concerns international research, especially where 
investigators from wealthy countries conduct research in impoverished set-
tings where participants are especially vulnerable or where language and 
cultural barriers make informed consent difficult.” 3 In addition, in cross-
cultural communication—as in the case of specific international multicentre 
clinical trials in the context of global health-related research—special care 
is generally recommended in collecting informed consent to avoid the risk 
of possible poor communication due to language differences. 4 Moreover, 
sound comprehension of information becomes complex when those who 
intervene do not use the same references in approaching health problems. 
For example, the scientific approach of a research team is different from a 
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mystical, supernatural approach to health which could be found in some 
communities.5 
We can identify as follows three major areas of barriers in cross-cultural 
communication: 
a) language barriers; 6 in some communities, there could not even be the 
word to express some scientific concepts related to research, for exam-
ple, for the term “randomization”;7 a study from the United Kingdom 
about the inclusion of non-English-speaking patients in the research-
reported language barriers and the unavailability of translators for dif-
ferent reasons;8 
b) lack of awareness about trials and shallow understanding of the con-
cept of research, which may be confused with the direct health services 
provision; in general, difficulties in understanding research process; 9 
c) lack of trust in researchers and low health literacy regarding immu-
nization; concern about adverse events and fears about exploitation 
(especially in the case of healthy volunteers, as it is in the case of 
experimental vaccines).10 
A scientific paper highlighted several issues in the considered area 
(Kenya and sub-Saharan Africa) that undermined informed consent pro-
cesses.11 These include limited exposure to research concepts and proce-
dures, a lack of local terms for critical elements of research, rumours about 
research activities and their purposes, such as taking blood samples from 
healthy children. In addition, there could be difficulties for potential par-
ticipants in understanding large volumes of research-related information, 
especially when children are sick and consenting processes are deemed to 
be delaying initiation of treatment. Finally, perceptions that research proce-
dures are part of standard care (therapeutic misconceptions) or vice versa 
and lack of in-depth understanding of research or research ethics among 
those responsible for explaining research activities can hinder proper com-
munication in the informed consent process. To respond to these challenges, 
researchers implemented informed consent forms prepared directly in the 
local language with the help of community members.12 
Therefore, community engagement in research has gained consider-
ation as an approach “helping ensure that community concerns are taken 
into account and to informing ethical decision-making when research is 
conducted in context of vulnerability.” 13 During the whole informed con-
sent process, community collaboration is essential to prevent researchers 
who are not local to a community from making assumptions about how 
to research and giving advice for conducting the process for seeking con-
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researchers can take different forms, ranging from community consultation 
in specific stages of the research to community representation during the 
whole research process and even to a long-term and more complex partner-
ship. Different types of community involvement could be appropriate in 
different situations; for example, informal consultations could be enough 
for some studies, but in others, especially when vulnerable populations are 
involved, there could be a need for a formal consultation or partnership.15 
In this perspective, community engagement becomes an essential part of 
research to meet each community’s needs and priorities and overcome cul-
tural challenges and communication barriers. 
Ethical goals of community engagement in collaborative 
research 
Community engagement is a recognized ethical requirement in health-
related research.16 A community consists not only of people living in the 
geographic area where research is to be carried out, but it also comprises 
“different sectors of society that have a stake in the proposed research, as well 
as sub-populations from which research participants will be recruited.”17 
Engagement has ethical implications—ethics does not stop when commu-
nity engagement takes place: “Engagement is about ‘exchange.’ It is not 
about providing information or disseminating ideas or results. Communi-
ties can also drive the engagement process, holding scientists and science 
accountable for their ethics. Suppose a good relationship is already estab-
lished between scientists and communities. In that case, it is possible to do 
a short piece of research that also engages the community as a matter of 
principle.”18 In addition, community engagement is a form of patient and 
public involvement (PPI). PPI in research can potentially help researchers 
make sure that their research design is relevant that is participant friendly 
and ethically sound.19 Community engagement could then be described as a 
double-way process, a mutual aid between the community and the research 
team and vice versa.20 
To overcome the most frequent challenges to the informed consent pro-
cess in the context of global health-related research, community engage-
ment practices can promote a significant involvement of local people. 
Notably, community members should be invited to develop the informed 
consent process and documents to ensure that they are understandable 
and appropriate for potential participants. To face language barriers, the 
involvement of community members in the preparation of informed con-
sent materials can help. For example, they can suggest how to explain to 
potential participants concepts that could be difficult to understand, such 
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in a culturally sensitive way. 21 To prevent from possible cultural barriers, 
potential cultural sensitivities should be explored in advance of biomedical 
research with the help of local communities. The contribution of poten-
tial local participants and local researchers can prevent violating customary 
practices.22 This contribution often can come through the contribution of the 
local trusted “spokesperson,” persons who not only can translate but also 
help understand cultural values and perceptions; one of these persons could 
be a contact person between the community and the research team. 
Three main arguments supporting community engagement could be iden-
tified.23 They reflect the main ethical goals of community engagement: 
1 Protecting communities. Informing and consulting members of the 
broader community on the ongoing research is seen as additional pro-
tection for the ethical conduct of the research besides that provided by 
ethics committee approvals and informed;24 
2 Improving research quality. Community involvement has the potential 
to increase study efficiency in several steps: the better informed a com-
munity is about a study, the easier it will be to improve the recruitment 
process; research could benefit from a paradigm shift in which commu-
nity involvement is seen as a way to achieve higher research quality;25 
3 Building trust. Involving the community in the research is one way to 
build mutual trust with the population and show respect to all affected 
by the research, beyond the study participants. Building trust involves 
the commitment to the well-being of communities and the protection of 
their interests.26 
Collaborative research views all stakeholders as equals, and even if the 
needs and priorities of the community and the researchers are not the same, 
they should be reciprocal. Increasingly, “international collaborative research 
is being asked to consider the local interests of resource-constrained partners 
and the responsibility of collaborations to safeguard against the potential for 
structural exploitation when operating in resource-constrained settings.”27 
Community engagement can set the basis for good collaborative research, 
which international recommendations and guidelines require, mainly through 
protecting communities, providing benefits for the community, research 
quality and building trust and equitable partnership among stakeholders.28 
Towards a meaningful participatory process. International 
recommendations and guidelines on community engagement 
Community engagement is central to any public health intervention. In 
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“a process of developing relationships that enable stakeholders to work 
together to address health-related issues and promote well-being to achieve 
positive health impact and outcomes.”29 
In global clinical research, research can take place also in developing coun-
tries. Regarding this specific case, in 2003, the European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies (EGE) reminded that “the legitimacy of the
objectives of research is related to the analysis of its relevance regarding health
priorities of the partners, the risk/benefits balance for individuals and the com-
munities, and the potential impact on healthcare of the host country.” 30 To 
reach this ethical goal, researchers have an additional responsibility towards
the community where the clinical trial takes place and should seek agreement
as appropriate from people representative of or invested with certain authority
in the community. Community engagement is a crucial means to tailor research
and particularly informed consent process to the community needs and values.
“The application of general ethical standards of clinical trials to the different
cultural context, in particular to developing countries, needs in fact an activity
of interpretation and specification: this process might be helped by a commu-
nity consultation to acquire better knowledge of local culture and involving
community representatives in the elaboration of research projects.”31 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) guidelines in the revised 2016 version include a brand-new guide-
line devoted explicitly to community engagement. To this aim, Guideline 7 
recommends the inclusion of communities in global collaborative research 
through a “meaningful participatory process, that involves them in an early 
and sustained manner in the design, development, implementation, design 
of the informed consent process and monitoring of the research, and in the 
dissemination of its results.”32 
First, proactive and sustained engagement of communities from which 
individuals are invited to participate shows respect towards the communi-
ties and their traditions and norms.33 Second, besides successful conduct 
of research, community engagement is a means of ensuring the relevance 
of proposed research to the affected community and ensures the ethical 
and social value and outcome of the proposed research. Third, community 
engagement is a double-way ongoing process, which promotes recipro-
cal trust and confidence between researchers and community members. 
“Active engagement with community members is a mutually educative pro-
cess, which both enables researchers to learn about communities’ cultures 
and understanding of research-related concepts and contributes to research 
literacy by educating the community about key concepts critical for under-
standing the purpose and procedures of the research.”34 
Community engagement implies mutual and reciprocal relationships 














36 Margherita Daverio 
guideline 7 reminds that engaging the community strengthens local owner-
ship of the research and builds confidence in the ability of leaders to nego-
tiate various aspects of the research (recruitment strategies, care for the 
health needs of study participants, site selection, data collection and sharing 
and so on). 
Engagement is recommended, “at the earliest opportunity.” Engaging at 
the earliest stage promotes smooth study functioning. It contributes to the 
community’s capacity to understand the research process—and by design, 
as research protocol to be submitted to the research ethics committee should 
include a detailed description of the plan for community engagement. 
Although strategies could be different, community engagement should have 
an established forum for communication between researchers and commu-
nity members. 
According to CIOMS Guideline 8, Collaborative partnership and capac-
ity building for research and research review, local capacity building is 
identified as an ethical aspect. The collaborative partnership helps ensure 
the social value of research by engaging the communities, thereby focusing 
on aspects the community considers valuable. The act of entering a part-
nership in collaborative research has accompanying ethical responsibilities. 
This marks the need for collaborative research partnerships to contribute 
to sustainable capacity-building activities that bring structured changes to 
local skills, knowledge and systems.35 
Community’s permission under no circumstance can substitute individ-
ual informed consent.36 Community consent cannot substitute individual 
informed consent according to international ethical requirements.37 On the 
issue of community consent, it has been emphasized that recognizing the 
potential for community protection offered by deliberately reflexive ethical 
review boards, including community consultations, would avoid the prob-
lematic notion of “community consent,” which on the other side would 
imply that “communities” can consent to ethical, legally valid and socially 
meaningful research.38 As an effective strategy, “both forms of protections— 
individual informed consent and ethical review of research protocols— 
should work together in promoting, strengthening, and reinforcing the
protection of communities and their individual members involved in bio-
medical research.”39 
Leading strategies for community involvement 
in global clinical research 
As considered in the previous paragraph, community engagement is an 
ongoing and continuing process. Specific strategies and approaches should 
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In this perspective, choosing the most appropriate form of engagement is 
a delicate commitment. The best methods of engagement are those which 
are chosen by the community. 41 A general principle is that to achieve suc-
cessful collaboration with a community, all parties involved need to strive 
to understand the point of view of “insiders” of the community. In addition 
to ample information about community engagement, best practices and case 
studies, the report called “Principles of community engagement” provides 
nine community engagement principles, which help identify community 
engagement strategies.42 Among these principles are researchers should 
be clear with the community about purposes and goals of engagement; 
researchers should know as much as possible the local culture they will be 
going to interact with; direct interaction with members of the community 
should be promoted; research teams should foster partnerships and col-
laborative research; researchers should have and show respect for cultural 
values and belief and the community self-determination; capacity building 
should be implemented; flexibility should be promoted to meet the com-
munity changing needs and research teams should be available to long-term 
commitment in building trust. 
An active community engagement is, therefore, recommended, and strat-
egies and practical advice could be identified as follows:43 
a) the inclusion of members of the community involved in the clinical 
trial in the Institutional Review Board, to include community views 
and perspectives in the ethical review of the study;44 
b) to build long-term, mutually beneficial relationships between the com-
munity and the research team, to be applied before, during and after 
research studies with different strategies according to different phases 
of the research study, for example: engaging in full and frank discus-
sions about the potential benefits and harms that the participants and 
the community might encounter; ensuring the alignment of the research 
to local needs; paying the due attention to the impact of the study and 
the study team upon the participants, their families, the local commu-
nity and the environment; taking the time to ensure that the implica-
tions of the study have been fully understood by participants and the 
community;45 
c) the consultation with community members,46 in particular on how to 
work with the community, for example, providing a forum for discuss-
ing and addressing issues arising from participants and community rep-
resentatives;47 an ongoing “dialogue” between the researchers and the 
community about the proposed study and its potential implications, or 
a more structured consultation that would document the concerns of a 
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d) periodical meetings with local health teams to inform them of potential 
studies, including meeting in the local languages with the key lead-
ers in the community, including the village head, the religious leaders; 
community feedback meetings at the end of the trials also proved help-
ful in informing participants that studies had ended and for sharing
study results;48 collaborative efforts revealed insights about how to con-
vey information about clinical trial participation; 
e) In disease outbreaks, community engagement should be reached 
through social media,49 particularly as far as preparedness and risk 
communication is concerned.50 
To reach community engagement ethical goals, researchers need to be spe-
cifically trained.51 
Could community engagement be a step more towards 
a relational view of autonomy? 
Community engagement in the informed consent process in global clini-
cal research recognizes and considers the value of relational and cultural 
dimensions of everyone. Community engagement practices respect these 
dimensions and drive their contributions into the decision-making process, 
fostering the exercise of autonomy without undermining it. 
We suggest that community engagement practices and the involvement of
community members in the informed consent process could be thought of as
a way of moving towards a relational view of autonomy. This view can be
achieved considering the need for community involvement in the research
process and decision-making. Accordingly, they consider the cultural and 
relational dimensions of everyone as described in the previous paragraphs— 
never overcoming personal autonomy, always protecting and safeguard-
ing individual and free decision-making. This is because the challenge of 
respecting the autonomy of persons is not to avoid relational dimensions but
to include meaningful forms of relationship in the decision-making process.52 
A growing number of bioethicists and social scientists invoke a “relational
turn” in bioethics that moves beyond individualistic towards more rela-
tional perspectives.53 They are sketching a reconfiguration of the principle 
of autonomy. A relational view of autonomy includes the autonomy of the 
individual and the reference to the dialogue with the researcher/physician 
and wife/husband/relatives and members of the community. 54 This approach
can provide solutions to ethical and practical problems in clinical practice 
and research. 
A “relational turn” of autonomy should not be confused with collectiv-
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clinical research and the informed consent process, individual informed 
consent should not be overwhelmed by community consent, as stated in 
international recommendations and above-recalled guidelines. However, 
concerning the autonomy principle, clear emphasis should be devoted to 
the situated and communal aspects of relational life and interdependence. 
A person’s interests are connected to other people and groups. They could, 
thus, be read as a call for a degree of relational autonomy. “Not indepen-
dence, but interdependence, is at the heart of relational notions of autonomy: 
social surroundings and relationships enable us to flourish and develop a 
robust capacity for self-determination and identity formation. Relational 
autonomy can be viewed as a conception of autonomy that places the indi-
vidual in a socially embedded network of others. Relationships (with fam-
ily, community, and society), responsibility, care and interdependence are 
key attributes of relational autonomy: people develop their sense of self 
and form capacities and life plans through the relationships they forge on a 
daily and long-term basis. Therefore, relational autonomy asserts that social 
surroundings and relationships are crucial for developing autonomy and 
encourages us to act in ways guided by an ethic of trust and care.”56 
In addition, relational autonomy can provide a broader moral framework 
for the informed consent process, as the individual is, indeed, autonomous, 
but at the same time, community-oriented and not self-sufficient and inde-
pendent of others. According to relational autonomy, informed consent can 
be a process and a non-static concept. In the case of community engagement 
practices, the process of consultation gives substantive weight to the con-
siderations of relationships, patients as relational beings who are socially 
embedded.57 Therefore, a relational concept of autonomy is a precious 
concept to appeal to in biomedical research and clinical practice to protect 
rights and dignity. 
In this perspective, community engagement intended as a “meaning-
ful participatory process,” involving communities, considering relational 
dimensions, respecting cultural values and always safeguarding personal 
autonomy could be inserted in the ethical framework of a relational view 
of autonomy. This view could be deepened, indeed, more than in the space 
of this chapter. 
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 4  Healthcare decision-making 
Cross-cultural analysis of the shift 
from the autonomous to 
the relational self 
Joseph Tham and Marie Catherine Letendre
 Introduction 
Important healthcare decisions in life focus our attention on questions like: 
Who should I consult? What shall I do? Since health is prized as a prime 
value, healthcare decision-making necessarily involves consultation and a 
course of action that offers benefit and reduces harm. In the West, the physi-
cian has traditionally exercised the role of principal medical decision-maker. 
Yet, before the significant medical and scientific advances of the twentieth 
century, clinical medicine had limited powers to change the health status of 
individuals with chronic or incurable conditions. Paradoxically, therefore, 
patient participation in medical decision-making became a greater reality as 
medicine’s powers and scope expanded exponentially, with greater attention 
now focused on providing information and gaining the patient’s consent. 
Re-conceptualizing the physician–patient relationship 
We can attempt only a very brief historical summary of the events that led 
to greater patient autonomy here. Various authors have already written dif-
fering accounts of how this phenomenon developed as medical ethics took 
on a new scrutiny, and the multidisciplinary field termed bioethics emerged 
to deal with moral problems linked to implementing medical, biological and 
technological advances.1 
The decisive event following World War II was the Nuremberg trial of 23 
Nazi physicians who had conducted experiments on non-consenting prison-
ers. The resulting Nuremburg Code of 1947 required medical professionals 
to gain voluntary consent from persons involved in scientific research as 
well as to adequately inform them of risks and harms. 
In the 1950s, before informed consent became known, Szasz and Hollen-
der proposed three models for a more mobile physician–patient relationship 
that included a range of possibilities to fit the clinical situation and included 










   
 
Healthcare decision-making 45 
participation in healthcare decisions.2 This may be considered a significant 
aspect of the discernible shift occurring in clinical medicine in regard to 
patients being granted a decision-making status. Szasz and Hollender’s
model of mutual participation acknowledged that “the patient’s own expe-
riences provide reliable and important clues for therapy.” This model of 
the doctor–patient relationship involved a process of change the physician 
had to undergo to have a mutually constructive experience with the patient. 
Their analysis highlights certain necessary characteristics for a more highly 
developed relationship in the modern clinical context. 
Spurred on by the rights movements of the 1960s, changes in medical 
decision-making characterized a decade animated by political, religious 
and social unrest. Scholars from several fields, namely, moral theology and 
religious studies as well as medicine, law and biology, became increasingly 
involved in medical ethical issues. Henry K. Beecher published a paper 
in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Ethics and Clinical Research” 
(1966) in which he outlined 22 real cases of unethical human experimen-
tation.3 This and other scandals generated a great deal of uproar among 
the public and the government reacted by commissioning specialists in eth-
ics to come up with guidelines which eventually included the standards of 
informed consent. 
By the 1970s, bioethics emerged to seriously address a number of critical 
issues brought on by technology and human experimentation. The Belmont 
Report resulted from an examination of ethical principles and intended to 
apply guidelines for informed consent, risk–benefit assessment and selec-
tions of subjects. The four principles of biomedical ethics, autonomy, benef-
icence, non-maleficence and justice, provided a theoretical framework for 
practical decision-making.4 Principlism, as it came to be known, was rou-
tinely praised as often as it was thoroughly criticized. Despite the intent of 
the four principles to carry equal ethical importance in balancing judge-
ments, autonomy appeared to triumph over the other principles.5 
The paternalistic perspective of deciding for patients and assuming a 
decision in their best interest gave way to the “contractual” perspective of 
discussing with the patient.6 Informing the patient adequately and gaining 
his consent for treatment in the end often meant accepting his decisions 
without questions as if it were only a business contract. In bioethical prac-
tice, patient autonomy received great applause for respecting individual 
rights and subsequently important legal support (Patient Self-determination 
Act 1990). The intent to involve patients and respect their autonomy became 
new terrain for both physicians and patients. Informing and not informing 
were two sides of the same coin minted as autonomy. 
However, there have been conceptual problems with informed con-
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example, if the patient does not want to be involved in decision-making, 
it is unfair to coerce him/her to make decisions regarding medical care.7 
Moreover, Howard Brody points out that even the contractual model that 
included the idea of patient autonomy was flawed and incomplete since 
“what does patient autonomy actually require of a physician?”8 
To supplant the deficiencies of principlism, physicians, medical ethicists 
and philosophers offered alternative models that expanded the four prin-
ciples giving some of the different names. 9 
John Evans noted that the rationalization of bioethical discourse has made 
it impossible to question what constitutes human good or the ends of medi-
cine. The good of medicine has too often been transformed into meaning 
the enhancement of self-determination and the pursuit of individual choice. 
Yet, is ethics possible without the idea of the good? Insofar as bioethics 
gives its primary attention to crisis issues and the resolution of dilemmas, 
it undermines the basic presuppositions of medical practice and care. As a 
result, principlism and its contenders are prone to ever greater moral per-
missiveness precisely due to the failure of consensus and the employment 
of secular methodologies.10 
In the most widely discussed analysis of physician–patient relationships, 
Emanuel and Emanuel elaborated four models: paternalistic, informative, 
interpretative and deliberative.11 As thorough as they may seem, these mod-
els do not correspond well with clinical experience since further analysis 
reveals a pattern of inconsistency in patients’ attitudes and behaviours. The 
search for a model or a set of models to address the complexity of the con-
temporary patient–physician relationship became historically untenable. 
The answer to dilemmas involving informed consent, truth-telling or confi-
dentiality does not lie simply with having a workable model.12 An integra-
tive approach and new communication skills provide a better basis. 
In recent years, new treatments for cancer patients necessitated talking 
with the patient, gaining their consent and assisting the patient in the pursuit 
of his/her understanding of their best interest. Though patients want to and 
need to receive information to give consent, the actual choice could always 
be that they may hand over the decision-making to the physician and/or to 
their family. Thus, fully informing may result in carefully delegating. 
The focus on patient–physician communication, one of the key attributes 
of patient-centred care,13 involves breaking bad news better, 14 finding a bal-
ance between physician power and patient choice15 and becoming culturally 
competent to provide appropriate healthcare.16 The large influx of immi-
grants to the United States in the 1980s and 1990s also precipitated a more 
substantial shift in practice: a set of skills termed cultural competency. At 
the same time, there was a demographic change in the medical profession 
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with significant numbers of men and women from racial minorities.17 All 
these factors provide fertile ground to re-examine the role of autonomy in 
patient’s decision-making and informed consent. 
Enhanced autonomy as patient participation 
In his book, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Gerald Dworkin 
describes personal autonomy as self-rule that is free from both the control-
ling interference by others and from limitations, such as inadequate under-
standing, that prevent meaningful choice.18 Acting freely is the essential 
element of autonomy. However, a construct of respect for autonomy needs 
neither to be overly individualistic and excessively focused on reason nor 
unduly legalistic.19 In applying this construct of respect for the patient’s 
autonomy, the contemporary clinical dialogue necessarily focuses on the 
significance of talk. The past decade has witnessed a shift in application 
towards patient-centred approaches to healthcare delivery. A patient-centred 
approach is basically humanistic and “puts a strong focus on patient partici-
pation in clinical decision-making by taking into account the patients’ per-
spective, and tuning medical care to the patients’ needs and preferences.” 20 
The exponential growth in research addressing the nature, dynamics, con-
texts and consequences of the medical dialogue indicates a twofold benefit: 
personally rewarding since it is relationship-centred and optimally effective 
due to importance given to the value of human relationships.21 
Since free will is an attribute of rational human beings, the notion of 
autonomy is universally valid. Both internal and external experiences and 
resources contribute to one’s autonomy since from the beginning of our 
lives, all of us are embedded in a context of social relations that sustain and 
shape us. The majority of physicians now agree that patient autonomy is 
actually a complex concept referring to both one’s capacity to choose and 
one’s ability to implement one’s choices. 22 A person may not always be 
able to exercise one or both of these aspects. Conditions can and do arise 
that necessitate delegating another, that is, family member, friend or even a 
physician, to be the decision-maker. 
In this context, autonomy is more correctly described as relational, rather 
than merely a matter of individual choice. The term  relational autonomy
does not refer to a single unified conception of autonomy, but it is rather an 
umbrella term designating a range of related perspectives.23 These perspec-
tives are based on a shared conviction that persons are socially embedded, 
and their identities are formed by social relationships and shaped by com-
plex social determinants such as race, class, gender and ethnicity. An under-
standing of the notion of relational self serves to frame the ethics of both 
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is to begin from a basis of unity (i.e. realizing that the person is embedded 
in a network of intimate relationships) and move outward to understand 
different approaches that reflect the same reality (i.e. eliciting personal wor-
ries and negotiating a decision-making process). The beneficent intention 
of deciding in favour of the good can be represented in a variety of ways 
based on the medium of cultural norms and different medical traditions. 24 
The physician, the individual patient and the family now all share, in vary-
ing degrees, the decisional aspects of healthcare. For medical professionals 
as well as families, this discernible shift in practice signifies both challenge 
and opportunity. 
This new modality is linked to a strong emphasis on patient autonomy 
in the doctor–patient relationship and the overwhelming lack of data that 
receiving bad news significantly impacts patient outcomes in treatment. 
The bioethical norm of respect for persons is embodied in the notion of 
autonomy. Drs. Back and Curtis noted in their study that the determination 
of the type of news that is judged to be bad constitutes a subjective judge-
ment in the mind of the receiver, so when physicians assume that they are 
delivering bad news, they may influence patients’ responses. 25 Several stud-
ies have documented that a large majority of both healthy adults and cancer 
patients from different countries want to be told about their diagnosis and 
prognosis.26 Skilled use of cross-cultural understanding and communication 
techniques increases the likelihood that both the process and outcomes of 
care are satisfactory for all involved. Studies in truth-telling and cultural 
differences reveal another important aspect, namely, dealing with culturally 
relevant bioethics.27 The move towards an interpretative cross-cultural bio-
ethics indicates that plurality of reasonable decision-making possibilities 
does exist alongside each other. 28 
Cross-cultural aspects of healthcare 
Culture, which encompasses beliefs and behaviours that are learned and 
shared by members of a social group, fundamentally shapes how individu-
als construct meaning out of particular life events. Explanations for disease, 
illness, suffering and dying contribute to the cultural basis for confronting 
these events. The power of cultural identity can hardly be overestimated. 
With increased diversity in the United States, many European countries and 
Australia, encounters between patients and physicians of different back-
grounds are becoming more common. Cultural diversity is on the increase 
worldwide as immigration, travel and the global economy make national 
borders more permeable. It is estimated that in the United States by the year 
2050, minorities will make up 47% of the population.29 The challenge for 
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cultural factors that influence patients’ responses to such issues as heal-
ing, suffering, chemically-based medications, genetic predispositions, the 
stigma associated with certain conditions and life-threatening ailments. 
Thus, the risk for cross-cultural misunderstandings surrounding care at 
the end of life is also increasing.30 Studies have shown significant cultural 
differences in attitudes towards truth-telling, life-prolonging technology 
and decision-making styles at the end of life. A new set of skills in cultural 
competency has been developed as an effort to improve health outcomes. 31 
Cultural competence for the physician would involve learning about the 
patient’s preferences and ethnic background. However, this is easier said 
than done. For instance, implementing procedures that require informed 
consent, a tangible proof of respecting individual choice, proved very dif-
ficult due to the patient or the family’s expectations of being shielded from 
the truth of an incurable condition.32 In other cases, the notion of signing a 
piece of paper for healthcare services could be foreign and disrespectful.33 
Ethnicity shades the attitudes of many patients and, therefore, re-shapes 
patient autonomy and consent.34 Ethnic groups brought with them cultural 
views of healthcare and a paradigm of the physician/patient relationship 
that frequently called in question the notion of universality of the four bio-
ethical principles. 
The ethical concerns and experiences of clinical practice tested bioethics 
as it met diverse cultural perspectives at the crossroads of the twentieth-
century biomedicine. Multiculturalists state that physicians, patients and 
their families can inhabit distinctively different social worlds and may be 
guided by diverse understandings of moral practice.35 The concepts of med-
icine and healing have definitions rooted in a myriad of cultural aspects: 
accumulated observation and writings, attitudes about health and illness, 
diverse medicinal approaches that are either natural or chemical and most 
recently in scientific-technological advances.36 Communication between 
patient and physician is more aptly associated with patients’ perceptions of 
finding common ground with their physicians and trusting them and with 
improved health outcomes.37 Therefore, the enormous force of cultural 
viewpoints and the contemporary transformation of the physician/patient 
relationship in accommodating bioethical principles and gaining cultural 
competence mark a new step in shared decision-making.38 Cultural compe-
tency in the clinician’s skill set becomes an asset in dealing with the aspects 
of care rooted in cultural differences and knowledge of the fact that a per-
son of a particular ethnic background may not subscribe to his/her cultural 
medical tradition is foundational. 
The important factor in becoming culturally competent is the under-
standing of how culture does influence a clinical relationship and not to 
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if the cultural root of the problem can be identified then the problem will 
be solved. The situation will always be more much complicated. 39 In the 
United States, the socio-cultural differences between patient and physician 
influence communication and clinical decision-making. Language profi-
ciency, the probable need for interpreters, acknowledging possible issues of 
mistrust and the impact of culture on discussing negative information form a 
significant part of mastering cultural competency. 40 The downstream effect 
of such competency would be greater trust, fewer gaps, “moral growth, and 
a strengthening of fundamental professional commitments.”41 
Cultural norms specify behaviour. “Honesty is an ideal value for most 
Americans, but it varies in strength as a real value for other cultures.”42 
Honour is highly prized in the Japanese culture as is female purity in the 
Islamic world. Direct eye contact is avoided in several cultures, notably 
Asian and the Middle Eastern culture; the Navaho use silence to formulate 
their thoughts to give the most complete answer. Trust is given only to fam-
ily members in the Gypsy culture. Masculine and feminine pronouns do not 
exist in Asian languages, and “yes” does not always mean the affirmative 
since many cultures use the “yes” as a way of avoiding an embarrassing 
“no.” This is just a shortlist of cultural variables that inform and form com-
munication styles. A cross-cultural healthcare ethic combines the tenets of 
patient- and family-centred care with an understanding of the social and 
cultural influences that affect the quality of medical services and treatment. 
Developing sensitivity to different cultures can make healthcare programs 
and activities attractive and interesting for a broader population base. In 
contrast, a lack of cultural sensitivity can deter people from using healthcare 
services. 
The task of developing a richer understanding of the patient’s preferences 
becomes the fulcrum for integrating responsible choices in healthcare. In 
short, cultural competency on the part of the physician becomes capacity 
building for the patient. Knowledge of another’s cultural context is expe-
rienced as respect. This is human service of the highest order. Intercultural 
respect, therefore, has direct relevance for healthcare ethics since in the 
healthcare setting personal decisions and actions need to be consistent with 
values, beliefs and decision-making customs.43 Oftentimes, the family’s 
role does, indeed, favour the best interests of the patient. The patient needs 
the information to make plans, select treatment options and include the fam-
ily in providing and sustaining care as is traditionally done in communitar-
ian societies such as China.44 
Clinicians, who possess a skilful use of patient-centred questions, dem-
onstrate an interest in cultural heritage and are able to appraise the family’s 
role in decision-making assist effectively in shared decision-making. While 
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decisions displaying “a relational self” are simultaneously acknowledged. 
The patient who refuses diagnostic information and prefers family- and 
physician-centred decision-making has made a clear, voluntary choice. 45 
Physicians who care for patients with life-threatening conditions should 
discuss with them the extent to which they wish to involve their families 
in decisions at the end of life. To practice medicine according to a shared 
decision-making model, physicians need to offer more explicit information, 
explore patients’ values and beliefs regarding serious illnesses and respect 
their wishes throughout treatment.46 
Even though a patient desires a shared decision-making style that includes
the family, a family member may fear being blamed for providing inadequate
care by other family members: in this instance, the physician’s role in provid-
ing care will be to mediate the conflict.47 Further study will be needed as the
occurrence of a patient’s view of the relational self intersects with concor-
dance in family participation in decision-making generally and in particular
at the end of life. Further research is needed to design a communitarian para-
digm of patient and family with the physician that helps patients make free
decisions despite the burdens that their illnesses may bring.48 In the case of
surrogate decision-makers, research indicates that most surrogates of criti-
cally ill patients do not view withholding prognostic information as an accept-
able way to maintain hope.49 Timely discussions help all members to prepare
emotionally and existentially for the possibility of death. As the current trend
in shared decision-making represents, the shift from individual to relational
self marks a significant step in the journey towards a richer understanding of
the self both in relation to the preferred role and in the level of involvement.
 Conclusion 
A considerable distance has been covered in the past 40 years of medical 
decision-making. The so-called doctor knows best approach was abandoned 
in favour of a newer approach that respected the patient’s autonomy to con-
sent for treatment and therapies through dialogue. However, an excessive 
emphasis on individual self-determination and autonomy was also consid-
ered inhuman and unsatisfactory. As soon as the patient was involved in 
medical decision-making, the importance of sharing those decisions with 
family or deferring to the physician also became a reality. 50 
Lately, cultural diversity has challenged the assumption of common 
meaning. More importantly, it highlighted the need for broad understand-
ing since a narrowly defined view of patient autonomy and a restricting 
application of the principle of informed consent in a cultural context pro-
duce adverse effects. 51 The prevailing evidence of research brings to light a 
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decision-making.52 A culturally relevant approach advocated by bioethicists 
for medical decision-making relies on seeking an understanding of cultural 
diversity and exploring its complexity;53 in fact, medical practice has spe-
cific cultural paradigms.54 
Simply deciding in the best interests of the patient has developed into a 
complex field of choices: the preferred role, the degree of participation, the 
varying stages of seeking help and the ability to determine the appropri-
ate timing for shared decision-making. Responsibility and deliberation bear 
especially on professional doctoring since situations of conflict may accom-
pany decision-making and consent gaining in biomedicine.55 
The shift in the West from individual autonomy to relational autonomy 
in medical decision-making invites new reflections on respecting personal 
dignity and identity. The words of Michelangelo, after he had already 
accomplished so much, “Sto ancora imparando” (And still I am learn-
ing), captures the momentum and focuses our attention on the needs of the 
human person as a relational self. It is not possible to equalize the ability to 
decide autonomously and the reality of implementing a healthcare decision 
that, of necessity, involves others. The objectivity of early conceptions of 
autonomy conflicts with the “subjective” dimensions currently experienced 
as the patients’ opinions on treatment, the effects a disease process has on 
the context of relationships and the numerous issues related to this framing 
of individual and collective experiences. 
Admittedly, the indisputable achievement of the principle of autonomy 
gave shape to human identity. However, without the notion of relational 
autonomy, the design of human identity is incomplete. Relational autonomy 
affords both objectivity and subjectivity since it responds to and interprets 
the deeper sensibilities of the human person. The next step in achieving 
the shift would require a change of point of view, and not of language. To
embrace the model of the relational self would improve practice and move 
the issue of shared decision-making to a broader and important context. 
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 5  Informed consent 
A critical response from a Buddhist 
perspective 
 Ellen Y. Zhang 
 Introduction 
According to UNESCO Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights
(UDBHR), informed consent process requires four characteristics to be valid:
voluntariness, disclosure, understanding and capacity. Whenever one of these
elements is missing, informed consent can be compromised. In their Principle
of Biomedical Ethics, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress claim that
informed consent is an individual’s autonomous authorization. They postu-
late seven structural elements, including threshold elements (competence to
understand and decide; voluntariness in deciding), information elements (dis-
closure of material information; recommendation of a plan; understanding
of the information and recommended plan) and consent elements (decision
in favour of the plan; authorization of the chosen plan). In this chapter, I will
first look at these four characteristics and then discuss their ethical impli-
cations (e.g. individual autonomy and human rights), followed by a critical
response of these implications from a perspective of Buddhism.
 Voluntariness 
Beauchamp and Childress argue that virtually all codes of medical ethics 
and institutional regulations should require physicians to obtain informed 
consent from patients before substantial interventions, with the protec-
tion of patient autonomy as the primary justification for this requirement. 
Voluntariness is usually seen as a choice being made from a person’s free 
will instead of coercion or duress. Voluntariness is, as such, closely associ-
ated with the protection of a person’s autonomy. Such an idea in history 
can be traced back to the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki
regarding permissible medical experiments.1 Nowadays, informed consent 
focuses on both medical treatments and [medical] research projects.2 
The word “autonomy” is etymologically derived from old Greek and is 
a compound of the word autos, which means “self,” and the word nomos, 
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which means “rule” or “governance.” Today the word is used in quite diverse 
meanings. It, thus, does not refer to a univocal concept, as Beauchamp 
and Childress have put it, “like many philosophical concepts, ‘autonomy’
acquires a more specific meaning in the context of a theory.” 3 Neverthe-
less, two conditions are essential in terms of the concept of autonomy: (1) 
liberty (i.e. independence from controlling influences) and (2) agency (i.e. 
capacity for intentional action). It follows that the idea of “voluntariness” 
implies that the patient, as an autonomous individual, should be absent 
from any substantial control by others and that the patient acts intentionally. 
In addition, Beauchamp and Childress add the third condition, that is, an 
autonomous agent should have a complete understanding of his/her action. 
Therefore, voluntariness needs to meet three conditions: liberty, agency and 
understanding. The basic idea is to respect self-determination concerning 
the patient’s health. 
Disclosure 
What must a physician disclose to the patient? What does it mean by 
“permission to disclose”? Disclosure means that the medical professional 
is obligated to disclose a core set of information to the patient or subject 
regarding the treatment or research. According to the UDBHR document, 
“Disclosure means giving subjects all the relevant and right information 
about the research, including the risks, potential benefits, nature and other 
therapeutic alternatives. . . . The principle of autonomy and obligation truth-
telling, places disclosure on always providing the complete information to 
every patient.” However, at the same time, the document indicates that 
based on the principle of beneficence and the principle of non-maleficence, 
the information disclosed to the patient can be partial. However, the ques-
tion of “standards of disclosure” or the need for “intentional or deliberate 
nondisclosure” has by no means been answered without further qualifica-
tions. Regarding nondisclosure, for example, Beauchamp and Childress 
assert four conditions that are essential to justify the use of intentional non-
disclosure in medical research: (1) it is essential to obtain vital informa-
tion; (2) no substantial risk is involved; (3) the subjects are informed that 
deception is a part of the study and (4) the subjects give their consent to 
participate under these conditions.4
 Understanding 
Since informed consent emphasizes the autonomous choice as mentioned 
in the idea of voluntariness, informed consent in this sense “occurs if and 








Informed consent 61 
absence of control by others, intentionally authorizes a professional to do 
something.”5 Nevertheless, without understanding the patient’s part, or the 
autonomous subject, information disclosure has no real meaning. However, 
the idea of “substantial understanding” is a tricky one even if he or she is 
adequately informed since it has a lot to do with the capacity for intentional 
action and the capacity for grasping the [highly professional] information 
being disclosed. Therefore, the UDBHR document states that “appropriate, 
precise and relevant information should be provided in a language and for-
mat that patients fully understand (UNESCO 2005).” 
Capacity 
Capacity is essential in terms of voluntariness and understanding. A patient 
needs to have the capacity of self-determination to reflect, decide and con-
sider when deciding to participate in a clinical trial or receiving medical 
treatment. It is also true that “(a)s the importance of the decision increases, 
and the information given is more specific and accurate, the threshold for 
considering a patient capable, is also higher.” The patient’s health literacy 
level will influence his/her capacity for understanding. 
The four characteristics described earlier indicate several key compo-
nents that link with ethical implications: individual autonomy, the virtue 
of rationality, human rights and equality, and the latter two are especially 
implied in the idea of “improving the readability, design and obtaining pro-
cess of consent forms taking into account the conscious and unconscious 
bias by the investigator.” 
 Critical responses 
A critical response from multiculturalism and interreligious 
perspectives 
Whenever we deal with a dynamic interaction between universal prin-
ciples and multiculturalism or and interreligious perspectives, we need to 
acknowledge the complexity of cultural, societal and religious differences. 
At the same time, we should also recognize the importance of generaliza-
tion as a tool to understand the existing common ground or overlapping 
consensus among different cultures, societies and religions. 
As a universal principle, informed consent is generally acknowledged as 
an ethical ideal. Universal recognition of the merits of the principle has in 
no way been accompanied by a universally accepted definition of it. Take 
the four characteristics of informed consent, for example. Different cul-
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differently. Another example, in Japan, informed consent is understood as 
“explanation and agreement” (setsumei to doi), which may not be the same 
as giving individuals clear information about alternative treatments and 
potential risks and benefits, or the patient can make an informed choice. The 
Chinese translation is “knowing the information and consent” (知情同意), 
but in its application, both “informed disclosed” and “consent” entail more 
complex meanings other than what is indicated in the general principle. In 
China, informed consent sometimes becomes legal protection of the medi-
cal professionals rather than one for patients, thus creating arbitrariness of 
physicians’ relation to patients. 
Moreover, there are two questions to be considered: 1) the “thin princi-
ple” (harm principle or restraining human experiments in medical research, 
all patients are equal in terms of informed consent) is more likely to be 
accepted than the “thick principle” (like self-determination, individual’s 
specific rights). 2) The implied cultural clashes (like individualism vs. 
familism or collectivism). As a result, informed consent is sometimes 
employed in non-Western cultural contexts without justifying or even spell-
ing out the definition and without selecting empirical measures that match 
the stipulated (or intended) definition. The thin principle of informed con-
sent comprises the formal or instrumental aspects of the principle. These 
instruments can be applied in any functioning medical system, regardless of 
its political or religious ideology, level of democracy or level of liberalism. 
The thick principle of informed consent, in contrast, incorporates economic 
systems, forms of traditional values, circumstances of religious faith and 
interpretations of human rights or duties. 
Informed consent has been accepted today as both an ethical and legal 
binding between medical professionals and patients, yet the clash between 
the principle of informed consent and traditional (or premodern) values 
remains—for example, the question of trust. Trust is traditionally favoured 
in China, which is subjective and often based on human relations. While 
local culture may shape people’s perception over time, people are more 
likely to trust experts that share a similar tradition with them. However, 
such trust is challenged by the modern style of hospitals where patients and 
their family members are often “at the mercy of a stranger.” It is a kind of 
situation many people do not feel comfortable if they are sceptical about the 
professionalism of their doctors (like the situation in China today). Alter-
natively, an ethical dilemma arises when (Western trained) medical pro-
fessionals seeking informed consent have very different values and belief 
systems from those (very often uneducated) whose consent is being sought. 
Ethical unity in the face of cultural diversity has been an issue that needs 
to be addressed. Globalization in past decades attempted to promote a uni-
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community. The idea of “a shared morality” has been accepted to a certain 
degree. The voice of cultural and religious particularism should be heard as 
well. Now, I will turn to Buddhism to address bioethical unity in the context 
of multiculturalism and religious pluralism. 
A critical response from Buddhism 
Respect for the dignity and autonomy of patients is a fundamental idea of 
ethical decision-making, which is well reflected in the principle of informed 
consent. However, such concepts as individual dignity and autonomy and 
human rights are not derived directly from Buddhist doctrines. Then, how 
do we understand informed consent from Buddhism? 
As my earlier essay on human dignity and human rights has submitted. 
However, the Buddhist tradition has no language equivalent to “human 
dignity” or “human rights.” It would have no problem accepting the thin 
concept of human rights, especially when the fundamental right to life is 
violated or threatened. In other words, human rights are necessary because 
they reflect certain moral standards of how humans should be treated and 
how a violation of such standards should be condemned. From this perspec-
tive, we can see that UDBHR uses the general concept of human rights “to 
underline the importance of biodiversity and its conservation as a common 
concern of humankind.”6 The rights talk implied in informed consent serves 
the same purpose in that the key idea of informed consent is to protect the 
patient’s interest (endorsed by the principle of beneficence and the principle 
of non-maleficence). That means Buddhism would accept a qualified notion 
of human rights as a protective mechanism. 
Buddhism would be very cautious about using the rights language since 
human rights suggested in informed consent is used as a means not only 
to protect individuals but also to affirm “moral individualism.” Although 
people talk about collective rights, that is, the rights of a particular group or 
community (such as children’s, women’s and gay rights), the idea of human 
rights, whether positive or negative, is based on free-standing individuals 
and individual autonomy. From the perspective of Buddhism, “invoking 
rights has the inevitable effect of emphasizing individuals and their status, 
thereby strengthening the illusion of self. While Buddhism has a holistic 
view of life, the rights perspective is essentially atomistic.”7 
As voluntariness is based on autonomy, it requires two conditions: lib-
erty or freedom to choose an agent’s capacity for intentional action. Nev-
ertheless, if we scrutinize these two conditions from Buddhism, we will 
find them somehow ambivalent. Autonomy means self-determination, self-
governance or choosing without the controlling influence of others. How-
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According to the Buddhist doctrine of (inter)dependent-origination, abso-
lute self-determination is impossible since “self ” is causally produced by 
“others,” particularly in cultures like China and Japan, where the self cannot 
be fully defined without an adequate understanding of the family dynam-
ics. In the case of informed consent, it is very often difficult for physicians 
(and patients) to determine if a patient’s deferral of decision-making is his/ 
her own choice or the result of formative influences of the family. It follows 
that the patient’s capacity for intentional action is also questionable. Vol-
untariness involves the idea of “free will,” which would be problematic for 
Buddhists, and medical decision-making based entirely on patient-centred 
orientation would be problematic for Buddhists. 
Autonomy is at the core of human agency in Western philosophy. Recon-
ceptualization of autonomy as “personal” autonomy” enables persons to 
be self-governing in their personal lives.8 Let us talk about autonomy as 
self-determination and self-governance first. The self in Buddhism can be 
understood in two ways: self in the ultimate reality (paramarthasa) and 
self in the conventional reality (samvrtisat). From the perspective of ulti-
mate reality, the self is an illusion and an impossibility due to the nature of 
impermanence. From the perspective of the conventional reality, the “self ” 
has no substance or “self-nature” due to the nature of dependent origina-
tion of all things. The Buddhist concept of  anatman (usually translated as 
“no-self ”) denies the notion of a unitary, unchanging self or the idea of self-
identification and self-sufficiency. In other words, Buddhism questions the 
ontological/epistemological reality of the self. 
According to the Buddhist tradition, what is conceived as an individual 
consists of five types of aggregates (skandhas) that serve as the bases of 
designating persons or personhood: (1) material form or body (rūpa ); (2) 
sensations (vedanā); (3) apperception or perception (saṃjña); (4) volitions 
or mental formations (saṃskāra) and (5) consciousness (vijñāna ). Although 
various Buddhist schools interpret the five aggregates in somewhat different 
ways, they all agree that the self has something to do with the phenomenon 
of self-consciousness and self-identification. The early Buddhist teaching 
on no-self is recorded in a well-known dialogue between Greco-Bactrian 
King Milinda and a Buddhist sage named Nagasena. The latter uses the 
metaphor of chariot to explicate the idea of self or personhood. Nagasena 
asked whether the collection of all these objects could be called the chariot 
(picture them piled up together). The king replied, “No.” Nagasena then 
asked whether the chariot could be found outside that collection of objects, 
and the answer was no. The dialogue then continued as follows: 
NAGASENA: “Then, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot at all. Just a mere 
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told a lie, has spoken a falsehood! There really is no chariot . . .” Mil-
inda: “I have not, Nagasena, spoken a falsehood. For it is independence 
on the pole, the axle, the wheels, the framework, the flag-staff, etc., 
that there takes place this denomination ‘chariot,’ this designation, this 
conceptual term, a current appellation, and a mere name.” 
NAGASENA: “Your Majesty has spoken well about the chariot. It is just so 
with me. In dependence on the thirty-two parts of the body and the 
five aggregates (skandhas) there takes place this denomination ‘Nagas-
ena,’ this designation, this conceptual term, a current appellation, 
and a mere name. In ultimate reality, however, this person cannot be 
apprehended.”9 
The point here is not that there is no chariot, but there no chariot-hood, 
or totality of chariot outside that collection of objects, that is, the pole, the 
axle, the wheels, the framework, the flag-staff, yoke, reins and so on. Like-
wise, there is no “absolute,” “enduring” and “permanent” self that is per-
ceived as “personhood” that goes beyond the five principles components of 
a human being, that is, the interdependent aggregates which are not fixed 
and in constant change themselves. Therefore, we read: 
Nothing is permanent. The illusion of permanence causes suffering. 
The everlasting self is impermanent. 
Clinging to the false notion that an enduring self exists increases 
suffering. 10 
The question of “who or what am I” is, then, answered by the notion of 
a causally dependent self rather than an enduring self. It follows that “self ” 
in self-identification and self-determination cannot be absolutely atomic 
and autonomous. From a psychological perspective, an individual’s self-
consciousness is dependent on the “psychophysical continua” that form the 
momentary usage of the term “self.”11 What one has experienced that arrives 
at a sense of continuous self-awareness is nothing but “a bundle of succes-
sive impressions or perceptions” if we borrow an expression from David 
Hume. Nevertheless, the bundle of experiences one has is not, according to 
Buddhism, a random collection of experiences in any case; instead, one is 
in a particular kind of collection brought about by a particular set of causes 
and effects. As Nagasena’s metaphor demonstrates, there is a certain kind 
of reality to the “self,” just as there is a reality to a chariot. Along this line 
of thinking, voluntariness is determined by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances rather than an individual-centred reality or merely the idea 
of self-determination. What one considers the “I” is in actuality “certain 
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As for the patient’s capacity for intentional action, Buddhism promotes 
meditative practice that will enable the agent to understand his/herself fully. 
Buddhism pays special attention to intention as a mental designation, as any 
action is influenced by intentionality, which is determined by how the mind 
perceives things. For Buddhists, intentional action is a rational decision yet 
cannot be reduced to physical mechanisms. The Buddhist concept “karma” 
also means “intentional action.” As it said, “I am the owner of my actions 
(karma), heir to my actions, born of my actions, related through my actions, 
and have my actions as my arbitrator” (Aṅguttara Nikāya, 5, 57). The Bud-
dhist idea here is that one should take responsibility for one’s actions. 
Nevertheless, the question is whether the patient identified in informed 
consent has the capacity for intentional action. Let us not talk about external 
influences by others, but how about internal influences when the agent is 
confronting a life-and-death situation. Can we expect a patient to be always 
rational enough so that he/she can fully understand his/her intention? That 
is why the Buddhists recommend meditation, and the practice of meditation 
itself can be understood as a way of “cultivating the mind” (citta-bhāvana)
for developing the capacity for “autonomy.” According to the Buddhist 
doctrine of (inter)dependent-origination, however, autonomy is always 
relational autonomy. In informed consent, the patient autonomy cannot be 
separated from physicians, family members or communities. Buddhists are 
also concerned with the patient’s psychological maturity to handle the lan-
guage used when disclosing information about risks of medical treatment. 
In his article “Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous 
Agency,” Paul Benson points out that very often, autonomous preferences 
or values are subject to “direct normative constraints.”13 Some preferences 
are non-autonomous because of the content, so it is called a “strong sub-
stantive account” of autonomy. For example, a patient’s position in his/her 
family would have a strong influence on his/her decision-making, even if 
consent is an exercise of autonomy. Meanwhile, Benson also discusses what 
he called a “weak substantive account” of autonomy, subject to some “nor-
mative content.” Yet, it does not directly constrain the content of preferences 
or values. Compared with the strong account, the weak account recognizes 
the role of autonomy while acknowledging the nature of relationality and 
the nature of self-limitation. It is crucial to acknowledge the formation of 
individual reflections, the development of competencies and the capacity to 
bring one’s reflections into action. 
Similar to this view, Buddhism maintains that “I” exist is true only as a 
“convention.” Buddhist scholar Jay L. Garfield speaks of synchronic unity 
rather than diachronic unity, contending that as long as autonomy is con-
sidered central to human agency, it requires a notion of “constructed self ” 
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as an enduring entity is, for Buddhists, predicated on “greed, desire, and 
attachment,” ultimately leading to suffering. Also, the desire to construct 
“self-determination” inevitably leads to “selfish” concerns. Therefore, the 
“aim of Buddhism is . . . to realize selflessness, both metaphysically and 
ethically.” 15 
While Buddhism challenges an individual-oriented approach to auton-
omy, it also challenges an individual-oriented approach to rights. Buddhism 
would accept “negative rights” as a protective means for the patient’s inter-
ests and yet have problems with using the language of rights without quali-
fication to grapple with every moral issue. In addition, Buddhism would 
also speak of the importance of duty along with the right talk. For example, 
in the case of vaccination, Buddhism will use duty rather than right to argue 
for it. In other words, it is not someone’s right (i.e. individual’s autonomy) 
to have or not have vaccination; instead, it is someone’s duty to protect 
oneself and others in society through proper prevention of the infection and 
its respective immunization. Since vaccination concerns public health, Bud-
dhists today will generally use vaccines to ensure their health is protected. 
However, according to some Buddhists, if the vaccine is derived from any 
life form (e.g. animal by-products, tested on animals), its use is debatable.16 
Those who reject using vaccines argue that treatments like antibiotics and 
vaccines that depend on animal experiments would generate bad karma that 
causes diseases.17 However, I do not think that any Buddhist texts either 
support such kind of position. Given that Buddhism is not a religion con-
fined to dogmas and one that emphasizes consequentialist considerations. 
Buddhism would be more acceptable to vaccination that concerns public 
health. One example to support this argument is vegetarianism. Despite that 
Buddhists practice vegetarianism in general, they can eat meat when there 
is no choice. 
Some problems of implementing informed consent in China 
There seem several potential barriers to informed consent in contemporary 
Chinese medical/clinical practice. In the Chinese medical or clinical set-
ting, informed consent has not been well adopted although the idea is no 
longer novel. There are several problems in implementing informed con-
sent: (1) Many people perceive informed consent due to a lack of trust due 
to the misunderstanding of the concept by physicians and patients.18 (2) 
The ethical principle of patient autonomy and self-determination is viewed 
as “un-Chinese.” (3) Paternalistic physicians and protective family mem-
bers would counteract informed consent and very often try to make medical 
decisions to promote their patients’ well-being independent of their wishes 
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and persistence in obtaining consent. Treatment decisions for incompetent 
patients, the HIV and AIDS endemics, or minors (the vulnerable group) are 
another issue that required further consideration. As indicated in the docu-
ment, vulnerable groups are especially susceptible to being unduly influ-
enced into providing consent. They have a “compromised ability to protect 
their interests and provide informed consent” and, therefore, have a rightful 
claim to special consideration or protection. 
In some situations, informed consent is simply a formality obtained 
without the patient’s understanding of the physician’s recommendations or 
adequate time to think and reflect on the recommendations. In terms of 
information disclosure, the physician sometimes prefers to release the infor-
mation to the patient’s family members rather than the patient. Some schol-
ars in China argue that informed consent has failed to describe the role of 
family members in decision-making and may not work with a culture like Chi-
nese where a physician–patient relationship becomes a physician–family– 
patient relationship. In some situations, excessive protection of a patient 
by the patient’s family may also counteract informed consent. The family– 
patient relationship sometimes takes on a more decisive and influential role 
in making medical decisions than the physician–patient relationship.19 
Many patients and family members in China (especially those from small 
towns and countryside) are more comfortable with the paternalistic model 
of the physician–patient relationship. It is still not uncommon for physi-
cians to make unilateral decisions in the clinical setting. From a Buddhist 
perspective, the paternalistic model of the physician–patient relationship 
is sometimes necessary and, thus, should not be perceived as something 
consistently disruptive to informed consent. The Buddhist idea of “skilful 
means” (upāya) suggests that one should not be confined to a particular 
doctrine or principle; instead, one should look at a specific case in a specific 
context and decide accordingly. 
In sum, informed consent is a complicated concept and may have desir-
able and undesirable effects on medical/clinical practice. Nevertheless, it is 
better to have it. 
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 6 A Confucian view of informed 
consent in biomedical practice 
 Ruiping Fan 
 Introduction 
To explore a Confucian view of informed consent in biomedical practice, 
one will first need to understand the general moral nature of Confucian 
tradition. Confucian tradition is not utilitarian. Neither is it grounded in a 
concept of individual liberty or rights. Instead, the Confucian tradition car-
ries with it a virtue-based and virtue-oriented moral system. It takes the 
concept of virtue (de), rather than the concept of individual rights, liberty 
or equality, as the foundation of morality. 1 In other words, Confucianism 
would link human dignity with virtue, not with individual rights, liberty or 
equality. 2 The ultimate dignity or nobility (gui) of human life does not lie in 
enjoying rights but pursuing virtue. In short, virtue is a stable moral charac-
ter by which individuals can do the right thing at the right time in the right 
way. Basic Confucian virtues include  ren (humanity), yi (appropriateness), 
li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), xin (fidelity), xiao (filial piety), he (harmony) 
and so forth. 
Nevertheless, human virtue is not the only intrinsic value that Confu-
cianism pursues. Instead, Confucian tradition sees a comprehensive good
human life, as it is implicit in the Confucian concept of zhishan (the
highest good), to be a complete moral ideal at which individuals, families
and governments all aim and ought to aim through personal activities and
governance measures. Achieving a comprehensive good human life is
comparatively similar to achieving Eudaimonia, or human flourishing, in
the Greek Aristotelian sense. Importantly, pursuing the  zhishan of human
life in a properly developed Confucian tradition requires not only hon-
ouring human dignity by individuals through their exercise of the virtues
but also protecting legitimate individual interests by the government. The
latter can be done only through safeguarding a list of individual rights,
basic liberties and equality in the state.
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Although one may still be a virtuous, dignified person even when one’s 
legitimate interests are violated or damaged, the state ought to protect one’s 
legitimate interests so that one may live a comprehensively good life. This is to 
say, to pursue the complete ideal of human flourishing, Confucian tradition 
should develop a Confucian conception of human rights that has not been pro-
posed in the tradition in the past. This conception, as well as a list of fundamental 
human rights covered in it, can be derived from the moral requirements of the 
basic Confucian virtues, such as ren (humanity) and yi (appropriateness), of 
which there is still general acceptance in contemporary Confucian-influenced 
societies.3 However, this conception must differ from a full-brown liberal 
conception of human rights that imposes excessive individualistic values 
on other non-liberal traditions.4 Briefly put, from a Confucian perspective, 
individual interest is legitimate only if it does not gravely conflict with the 
requirement of any basic Confucian virtue. Confucian society may tolerate 
certain illegitimate interests (in the sense that they may not be prohibited or 
punished by law) due to suitable ethical or societal concerns. However, it 
should not establish them (such as prostitution or gambling) as human rights 
or fundamental liberties. In this sense, a Confucian conception of rights will 
inevitably be a virtue-based conception. 
Contemporary Confucian people may accept the following minimalis-
tic list of basic rights and liberties that John Rawls has come up with for 
international practices in his late work. “Among the human rights are the 
right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to free-
dom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient mea-
sure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); 
and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, 
that similar cases be treated similarly).”5 These rights and liberties can be 
worked out on the basis of the rationale of the Confucian zhishan and the 
virtues. They are implicit, if not explicit, in the fundamental requirements 
of the basic Confucian virtues regarding how individuals should treat each 
other and how their governments should treat them.6 These rights should 
be developed and emphasized to protect legitimate individual interests in 
Confucian-influenced societies. 
Finally, a right to informed consent for patients, subjects and their fami-
lies in biomedical contexts can be worked out of the general basic right to 
liberty for the good human life in the Confucian tradition. Given its concern 
with human flourishing and virtue cultivation, Confucian tradition must 
accept and safeguard this right for biomedical practice. In short, although 
the concept of rights, in general, and a right to informed consent, in par-
ticular, were not initiated in the tradition in the past, it is only logical and 
reasonable for contemporary Confucianism to develop and promote such a 
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Informed consent in Confucian medical practice 
As a virtue-based and virtue-oriented enterprise, Confucian medical ethics 
has traditionally accentuated the physician’s virtues and obligations rather 
than the patient’s autonomy or rights. Indeed, Confucian medicine has not 
had a strong tradition of practising informed consent in the past. 
Specifically, Confucianism sees medicine as “the art of  ren” (renshu ), in 
contrast to politics which is seen as “the governance of ren” (renzheng). Ren
(humanity) is the primary and complete virtue of Confucian tradition. These 
slogans indicate that both medicine and politics are taken to be the virtu-
ous causes of humanity, but politics is more important than medicine. This 
is, perhaps, because politics can generally be used to benefit more people 
than medicine in most situations. Indeed, in the Confucian tradition, medi-
cine has been termed “the little dao” (xiaodao), whereas politics “the great 
dao” (dadao).7 Meanwhile, both traditional Confucian politics and medi-
cine have a meritocratic and paternalistic tendency: only virtuous persons 
should become politicians or physicians, and they should make decisions 
to promote people’s welfare in light of their professional knowledge and 
judgements. In medicine, Confucian physician ethics has been similar to 
the Hippocratic Oath ethics in terms of medical professional obligations. 
It is the health and well-being of the patient that constitute the end of the 
art of medicine. But, the judgement of such health and well-being lies in 
the hands of the physician. Throughout the history of Chinese medicine, 
the physician’s virtue and obligation in performing the art of  ren in assist-
ing patients and their families have always been emphasized. It has never 
been required of the physician to provide sufficient information to patients 
or their families. In reality, Chinese physicians must have normally gained 
consent, either explicitly or implicitly, from their patients or families before 
administering medical treatment.8 Nevertheless, it is also clear that obtain-
ing such consent before conducting treatment has never been formally stip-
ulated in the tradition. 
However, such a lack of an explicit requirement of informed consent 
from the patient has been mixed with another prominent feature of Confu-
cian medical ethics: shared family decision-making for the medical matters 
of the patient. It is important not to lose sight of this remarkable Confucian 
familist feature in biomedical practice. 
As is well known, the Chinese character ren (as Confucian complete vir-
tue) is etymologically made up of the element “person” and the number 
“two,” meaning that one cannot become a virtuous (authentic) human being 
simply by oneself. By extension, it means that the dao (way) of the good life 
consists in forming appropriate human relationships in leading one’s life. 
Confucius (551–479 BCE) states that ren primarily requires loving humans 
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(Analects 12: 12).9 One must begin the practice of love from one’s family 
and extend it to other people. So the principle of love under the Confu-
cian virtue of ren is not only universal (namely, one should love all human 
beings) but also differentiated and non-egalitarian (namely, one should love 
one’s family members more than other people; so love is relevant to rela-
tions in ordinary situations). It is the family, rather than separate individuals, 
that constitutes the ultimately autonomous unit of decision-making from the 
rest of society. As Confucian people understand the unity of the family as 
modelling after the primordial unity of yin and yang, two basic types of qi
(as the fundamental elements of the universe), living united and harmonious 
family lives is precisely for Confucian people to follow the Dao of Heaven. 
The family plays a crucial role in taking care of the sick and making 
shared medical decisions for them in Confucian society. The patient is 
always taken to be a patient in the family, and a family member’s illness is 
taken to be the issue of the whole family. The family must undertake spe-
cial fiduciary obligations to care for the ill member. The Chinese physician 
typically discusses the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of a severely ill 
patient with his or her family members. Patients themselves should be left 
to relax and rest, not to be bothered by making serious communication with 
physicians. They are usually more than willing to be represented by their 
family members for their medical arrangements. The family has the final 
authority to accept or refuse the physician’s prescription for the patient. 
This familist pattern of medical decision-making is appreciated as remov-
ing unnecessary burdens from the patient in the medical process, such as 
listening to and discussing with the physician, unless the patient strongly 
wants to engage in the process. Confucian people take it for granted that 
families ought to undertake such burdens for their ill family members. If the 
family believes that the information of a fatal diagnosis or prognosis will 
harm the patient and discount the efficacy of treatment, they would ask the 
physician to hide the truth from the patient, and the physician would gen-
erally follow the request. Physicians generally take it unsympathetic (and 
unvirtuous) if they directly disclose such harsh information to the patient 
without obtaining the consent of the family in the first place. Instead of 
seeking a signature for surgery directly from the patient, Chinese physi-
cians usually obtain a signature from a family representative on behalf of 
the whole family, including the patient. In short, in the Confucian tradition, 
the family is responsible for every family member’s healthcare, financially, 
emotionally and morally. 
Contemporary Confucianism must explicitly reject physician paternal-
ism (namely, the physician should make medical decisions for the patient 
according to the physician’s judgement of the patient’s well-being) because 
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integrate. As discussed in the first section, individual rights, as a moral
and legal mechanism, are necessary to protect legitimate individual inter-
ests essential for living a comprehensive good human life, even if they are 
not essential for living a virtuous human life. For the sake of patients’ legit-
imate interests, physicians must be required to provide relevant medical 
information to patients and their families. It should be the patients and their 
families, rather than physicians, that have the final authority to decide about 
medical care issues for the patients. 
On the other hand, Confucian medical familism (in the sense that the 
entire family, the patient included, rather than a single patient him- or 
herself, should be the final authority to make healthcare decisions) should 
be maintained in contemporary society with specific qualifications.10 First, 
contemporary patients should be encouraged to engage in deliberations for 
their medical care decisions with their family members, and they should not 
leave all medical issues only to their family members as they did in the past. 
When patients are very passive in the medical process, it not only imposes 
unbearably heavy burdens on their family members to make decisions on 
their behalf but also not contributive to making the best possible decisions 
for their medical interests. However, for medical treatment, patients should 
not be granted an exclusive right to refuse medical treatment regardless of 
their families’ views in the Confucian tradition. If the patient’s immedi-
ate family members unanimously hold that the patient’s refusal of medical 
treatment is violating the patient’s medical best interests, and the physician 
supports this view, then the patient’s refusal should be overridden. On the 
other hand, for non-therapeutic medical experiments, the family does not 
have a right to require any family member to participate in a medical trial 
although the family can affirm or deny a member’s consent to become a 
research subject. This asymmetrical requirement is necessary for protecting 
the vital interests of family members in considering the likely benefits and 
risks of a medical experiment on the patient.11 For Confucians, the fam-
ily veto power in such circumstances is necessary to protect the patient’s 
legitimate medical interests. Finally, although the physician can generally 
follow a family’s decision to hide the truth from the patient to protect the 
patient, the physician must communicate directly with the patient and tell 
the patient the truth if the physician finds that either of the two following 
conditions has not been met. First, there is evidence of manifest mutual 
concern of the family members for the patient. Second, the family’s wishes 
are not egregiously in discord with the physician’s professional judgement 
regarding the medical best interests of the patient.12 
With these qualifications and specifications, the practice of a Confucian 
familist approach to informed consent should not be taken to be depriving 
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fiduciary obligation of the family to care for an ill family member and seek 
a comprehensive good life for the patient. Accordingly, although contem-
porary Confucian people must reject medical paternalism, they do not have 
to shift to an individualist approach to informed consent. “This shift has 
often taken place through the influence of Western advocates, who falsely 
portray their own morality as a set of universal ethical principles, regardless 
of cultural context.”13 The proper Confucian medical context should be one 
in which the patient is virtuously taken care of. 
Does this Confucian familist approach to informed consent violate the 
principle of autonomy? The answer depends on which principle of autonomy 
is referred to.14 It certainly conflicts with the liberal individualist principle 
of autonomy because this principle requires that one always act on one’s 
reasons or wishes to make decisions and never submit to another authority 
without losing autonomy. However, as Beauchamp and Childress point out, 
“no fundamental inconsistency exists between autonomy and authority if 
individuals exercise their autonomy in choosing to accept an institution, tra-
dition, or community that they view as a legitimate source of direction.”15 
People in the Confucian tradition have autonomously accepted the family’s 
authority (in which the patient is included as a member) for determining 
medical issues for family members. It is “autonomous” because this process 
of acceptance can arguably be understood to be intentional, with under-
standing, and without external controlling influences, to meet the three-con-
dition standard of autonomy that has been constructed by Beauchamp and 
Childress.16 From this Confucian familist approach to informed consent, 
individual autonomy and family autonomy can converge into a mutually-
cared process of deliberation in which family members communicate with 
each other and with the physician to make medical decisions for the patient 
to accomplish the best medical interests of the patient. Burden is on those 
individuals who do not accept this Confucian familist approach to informed 
consent in Confucian society to inform their physicians about their individ-
ualist preferences in the first place in order to to receive different treatment. 
 Concluding remarks 
In short, the Confucian account of informed consent for biomedical prac-
tice is not an individualist account, in which the individual is appreciated 
as possessing sole or exclusive decisional authority in biomedical matters 
independently of one’s family. Instead, the Confucian approach to informed 
consent is virtue-based and family-oriented. It accentuates the natural-
ness, usefulness and normalness of the engagement of family members in 
a patient’s biomedical decision-making, thus acknowledging a shared deci-
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and the immediate family members hold disagreement regarding biomedi-
cal issues, they need to work out a solution through reasonable discussion 
in light of the moral requirements of the virtues. Sometimes, the physician 
may play a crucial role in providing advice and standing on the patient’s 
or the family’s side to tip the scale. 18 As to a question regarding how this 
familist model of informed consent would imply for those patients who 
have no families, it should be left to another chance to discuss. 
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Medical Ethics,” in The Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics, ed. Robert 
Baker and Laurence McCullough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 195–201. 
8 As I will show subsequently, medical familism has been strong in Confucian 
tradition and set up the familist feature of informing family members rather than 
the patient in Chinese medicine. For example, a famous Han dynasty physician, 
Chun Yuyi (ca. 215–150 BCE), put it clearly: diagnosis of any severe disease 
should not be disclosed to the patient, but it should be told only to the family. For 
details, see Ruiping Fan and Benfu Li, “Truth Telling in Medicine: The Confu-
cian View,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2004): 179–193. 
9 Mencius (372–289 BEC), following Confucius, gives a further account of ren
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human heart that cannot bear the suffering of the other ( Mencius 2A: 6). Every 
human heart (xin) has this capacity of sympathy because it has been endowed 
by Heaven (tian) with refined qi, fundamental elements of the universe. This 
capacity of sympathy forms the potentials of the virtues for one to develop in the 
Confucian tradition. So a human heart naturally holds sympathetic reactions to 
the qi of other hearts. For Mencius, one must nourish and cultivate one’s vast, 
flowing qi to become virtuous (Mencius 2A: 2). 
10 In contemporary Confucian-influenced societies, the family typically includes a 
patient’s immediate family members, such as spouses, children, and biological 
parents. Sometimes the patient’s siblings are also included. 
11 Rui Deng, “The Informed Consent of Human Medical Research in Mainland 
China: A Family-Based Binary Decision Model,” in  Family Based Informed 
Consent: East Asian and American Perspectives, ed. Ruiping Fan (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2015), 201–218. 
12 Fan and Li, “Truth Telling in Medicine: The Confucian View.” 
13 Lin Bian, “Medical Individualism or Medical Familism? A Critical Analysis of 
China’s New Guidelines for Informed Consent: The Basic Norms of the Docu-
mentation of the Medical Record,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40, no. 
4 (2015): 371–386 at 372. 
14 Ruiping Fan, “Self-Determination vs. Family- Determination: Two Incommen-
surable Principles of Autonomy,”  Bioethics 11, no. 3–4 (1997): 309 -322. 
15 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress,  Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed. 
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 7 Hindu norms on human 
experimentation 
Parsing classical texts 
 John Lunstroth 
 Introduction 
The contemporary requirement that subjects of human experimentation 
give their informed or free consent to being an experimental subject was 
first enunciated as a universal norm in the military tribunals after World 
War Two. The United States brought charges against Karl Brandt, M.D. and 
22 others alleging they had committed war crimes by overseeing the Holo-
caust. In what was to become the Nuremberg Code, Judges Beals, Sebring 
and Crawford ruled that 
All agree, however, that certain basic principles must be observed in 
order to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts: 
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is essential . . . .1 
The Nuremberg Code, although pronounced as self-evident norms that 
already existed in the natural legal order, was not only not understood to 
be principles of international law, it was almost immediately widely seen as 
far too stringent to be of any use.2 That being said, in 1966, after 18 years of 
negotiation, the United Nations put up for signature the two covenants that 
would define the international human rights regime, the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.3 Article 7 of the ICCPR states, in 
its entirety, simply that 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected with-
out his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.4 
In 1976, the ICCPR came into force, and within a few years was understood 
to enunciate universal principles of international law. 5 That meant that not 
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only were signatories bound by the ICCPR, including India, but even non-
signatory states were by application of the principle of universality. 6 
Bioethicists in the global environment seek to understand whether norms 
such as this can be justified in, or supported by, the various religious tradi-
tions since the international human rights regime can be seen as secular, 
Eurocentric and echoing colonial sentiments.7 In comparing religions as 
sources of relevant norms, Hinduism is often queried. Although this query 
appears on its face to make sense, scholars of subcontinent traditions gen-
erally agree that Hinduism is not a religion in the sense of having either 
a central doctrine or a central authority. 8 It has neither. Prior to colonial 
influences, the word referred to the peoples of the subcontinent.9 Colonial 
institutions and authorities, for various political and economic reasons, used 
their notions of religion to order those peoples, in the process creating reli-
gion as a form of self-identity with political features in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.10 Hinduism came to be distinguished in the colo-
nial context, more or less, from [the religion of] Islam. One of the distin-
guishing features of this new colonial Hinduism was its foundation in Vedic 
and related ancient or classical Sanskrit texts.11 
I argue later that because bioethics is a function of the political order, 
only one class of ancient texts, those addressing political order/theory, can 
be potential justifications of or support for norms regarding bioethics. The 
central text of this textual tradition is Kautilya’s  Arthasastra.12 This text 
purports to give a king comprehensive advice about all aspects of adminis-
tering a kingdom. It is decidedly secular, treating those we might identify 
as the religious, including monks and renunciates, at best as potential spies 
and operatives, or treating religiosity as a good cover for them. Religion, 
to the extent it is recognized in the text, is entirely instrumentalized for the 
secular order. However, there is a textual basis for the kingdom’s interest 
in maintaining public health, and doctors of both men and horses are also 
recognized as having a special status. 
There are two ways the original query can be addressed in this context. 
One, the Arthasastra can be projected onto the Constitution of India. Like 
the ideal kingdom described in the Arthasastra, India is established by 
its constitution as a secular state. In that analysis, being a citizen of India 
would be read as the central case of what it means to be a Hindu,13 and the 
Constitution would be read as the fundamental source of bioethical norms. 
That would focus the query, for example, on the fundamental rights defined 
in the Constitution, including the rights of equality (Arts 14), freedom of 
speech (Art 19) and freedom of religion (Art 25) and the obligations of 
the state for the improvement of public health (Art 47). This would require 
complex analysis and comparison of the Arthasastra and the Indian state, 










   
  
   











Hindu norms on human experimentation 81 
could more simply examine whether the Arthasastra has any norms that 
could directly be applied to issues related to human experimentation. I will 
take this approach. 
India presents complexity when considering human experimentation and 
consent. It is in the process of modernizing and has one foot in the past and 
one in the future. The upper strata of the middle class and above are more 
heavily influenced by global trends, while the rest of society lives in condi-
tions more continuous with the less affluent India of the 1970s and earlier. 
The global trend would suggest that norms of autonomy would dictate indi-
vidual consent is central to medical or scientific interventions of any kind.14 
On the other hand, large and powerful pharmaceutical companies seek to 
utilize entire populations without significant regard for individual con-
sent.15 So, for the more affluent, consent in human experimentation presents 
the same kind of problem it does in the West, but the less affluent subjects 
of human experimentation face a different set of problems because those 
citizens rely more heavily on the state for protection from the private sector. 
Seeking bioethical norms in the classical Sanskrit texts 
The classical Sanskrit literature of India describes several ways to catego-
rize human existence.16 There are four stages (Skt. chaturashramas) that are 
loosely age-based: brahmacharya (student), grihastha (householder), vana-
prastha (retired) and sannyasa (renunciation). There are four goals of the 
human life (puruṣartha): artha (socio-economic position); kama (fulfilling 
desired); dharma (being virtuous) and moksha (liberation). There are four 
classes (varṇas) of human beings: brahmins (priests); Kshatriyas (rulers); 
vaishyas (merchants) and Shudras (labourers). 
The canonical Sanskrit texts that can be evaluated as potential sources 
of bioethical norms are clearly divided into four categories, one for each 
of the four goals of human life.17 This makes sense as the different stages/ 
purposes of life are defined by different normative systems or  dharmas. 
First, consider the four stages of life. The first stage,  brahmacharya (stu-
dent), prepares one for the following grihastha (householder) stage. Once 
that stage is finished, one enters the vanaprastha (retired) stage in which 
one prepares for the final sannyasa (renunciate) stage. Thus, there are two 
main ways of being in human life. One prepares for and then exists as a 
householder, and then one prepares for and becomes a renunciate. 
Each of these major ways of being (i.e. stages of life) is characterized by 
certain purposes. The householder is concerned with material and physical 
well-being, with marriage, children and career (artha and kama) and with 
leading a righteous law-abiding life (dharma). For this, there are rules con-
tained in the canonical texts known as sutras and shastras . Accordingly, there 
   
  
 






     















82 John Lunstroth 
are texts collected under the rubric of kama,18 under the rubric of artha19 
and under the rubric of dharma.20 Under the dharma of being a householder 
also fall some of the much earlier Vedic Samhitas, especially the Rigveda, 
Yajurveda and Samaveda. These texts cover reciting hymns (Rigveda ), per-
forming sacrifices (Yajurveda) and chanting songs (Samaveda), that is, reci-
tations, ceremonies and rituals for many aspects of day-to-day life that focus 
on being a good householder and are overseen by Vedic (Brahmin ) priests. 
The Vedic ordering of society fostered a complex legacy of both compas-
sion and tolerance for and towards the other, a sense of fundamental identity 
with the other, as well as intense inequities, such as the caste system. These 
legacies were formative in all of the Subcontinent traditions and probably 
reflected the norms of communal life that formed the earliest communi-
ties. The legacies of the  Vedic order were influential in the Jain, Buddhist, 
Moslem and other traditions although in Jainism and Buddhism, there were 
canonical rejections of some of the inequities (such as the caste system). 
The main purpose of renunciation, of moksha (liberation), is contained in 
a great wealth of other canonical texts, starting with the final layers of the 
Vedas known as the Upanishads.21 The Upanishads are grouped with two 
other texts, the Brahma Sutras22 and Bhagavad Gita,23 and are said to make 
up the teachings of Vedanta, or the completion or fulfilment of the Vedas.24 
These texts focus on the state of moksha. Moksha is obtained or attained 
after long years spent in seclusion meditating. Moving towards moksha
after the purposes of life as a householder have been fulfilled, which is 
the natural progression of a fully lived life, first means separating from the 
family. This increasing separation is the vanaprastha stage that precedes 
life as a sannyasin or renunciate that has attained moksha. Although con-
nected to a human body, the sannyasin experiences his/her self (i.e.  atman, 
pure consciousness) as completely free, and for the more advanced experi-
ences, their atman as being one with Brahman (the source of conscious-
ness). This state of being is discussed using abstract concepts, including 
dharma, karma, samsara, guru, atman and Brahman. A central tenet is that 
direct knowledge (samadhi) of these abstract concepts is possible through 
sadhana (meditation). 
The moksha state of being is profoundly disconnected from and finds no 
meaning in the political order or any aspect of the brahmacharya, grihastha
or vanaprastha stages of life. These beings are even said to exist without 
ethics or morals, in the sense that there is no need for them to consider 
what is right since everything they do is in accord with nature and the true 
Self and cannot be unethical. They are not ethical beings, as they are com-
pletely liberated. It is a very refined, rarified and subtle state of being. These 
beings live not according to artha–kama–dharma but according to moksha 










    
   
 
    
 
 
Hindu norms on human experimentation 83 
or order (dharma).26 In Aristotle’s formulation in the Politics, they would be 
gods since they are no longer political animals.27 
To summarize, there is a difference between life as a householder ( gri-
hastha) and life as a renunciate (sannyasa). These are two centres of grav-
ity, each with its own  dharma. The renunciate lives apart from society at 
large and is directly familiar with the abstract concepts that order existence. 
The householder is embedded in the political/economic order and is not 
expected to have direct knowledge of the abstract concepts. 
The householder could be said to be religious to the extent he follows the 
ritual norms laid down in the Vedas, but Hinduism cannot be restricted to 
that set of norms. Since Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism are all Hindu, and 
they reject Vedic norms, then whatever a Hindu is, he is not necessarily in 
the Vedic spirit. The presence of the entirely secular political theory of the 
Arthasastra complicates matters even more. If Hinduism is linked to the 
Vedic and subsequent classical Sanskrit tradition, including Jainism, Bud-
dhism and secularism, there is no common thing that can be identified as 
Hindu religion. 
Because ethics is a property of political/legal order, I argue that in Hin-
duism, bioethics is proper for the householder, but not the renunciate and 
that the abstract concepts (i.e. karma and atman) are inapt in bioethical 
analyses.28 Therefore, we would search the kama, artha and dharma texts 
for norms that could apply to today’s bioethical problems. Of these textual 
traditions, only one concerns itself with systematic theories of political/ 
legal order (i.e. dharma), represented best by the Arthasastra of Kautilya.29 
It presents a thoroughly secular, intensely practical manual for a king, gen-
eralized to an ideal kingdom. In that kingdom, the king freely uses all of the 
institutions surrounding moksha dharma for political purposes. There is no 
concern for the concepts of karma, atman, Brahman, moksha, etc., except 
that the king’s spies and operatives can pretend to be of this class of people 
to infiltrate groups and otherwise work for the maintenance of political and 
economic order. The king is concerned with his own pleasure and the king-
dom’s political and economic stability. Much of the book is concerned with 
maintaining order at the borders of the kingdom, with war and the mainte-
nance of order in far-flung regions. There is a fairly well-developed idea of 
public order that includes the maintenance of public health, and doctors are 
recognized as an important part of society, to the extent they can be used as 
spies at times, and spies can pretend to be doctors for their covert purposes. 
Contemporary consent issues in human experimentation 
There are three central issues raised by human experimentation today. The 









84 John Lunstroth 
experimented upon. A second recognizes that the central ethical calculus 
of human experimentation is sacrifice. The third explores ethical issues 
regarding the financial consequences of human experimentation. 
Consent 
Informed, free or voluntary consent is universally recognized as a right of 
human subjects. The right is based on fundamental notions of autonomy, 
of the right to self-direct. It is much discussed and, at this point, somewhat 
unremarkable as an individual right. However, human experiments are not 
done on individuals because the goal of a human experiment is a statistical 
picture of the experimental intervention. In developing the statistical pic-
ture, the individuality of the subject cannot be considered, only the clinical 
effects of the intervention. The individual subject disappears into the statis-
tical cohort. This means that a key ethical entity is the cohort of experimen-
tal subjects, not any of them individually. In this context, the two ultimate 
purposes of human experimentation, advances in knowledge and profits, 
give rise to the two other central ethical problems. 
Sacrifice 
It is well understood that human experimentation for the development of 
drugs, devices and treatments is grounded in the civil need for sacrifice.30 
Sacrifice is understood to be for both the community and science.31 The 
Belmont Report, one of the foundational ethical documents in the area of 
human experimentation, makes this clear regarding science in its discussion 
of the ethical principle of beneficence: 
In the case of scientific research in general, members of the larger soci-
ety are obliged to recognize the longer term benefits and risks that may 
result from the improvement of knowledge and from the development 
of novel medical, psychotherapeutic, and social procedures.32 
Pope Pius XII, at the very beginning of the radical increase in the author-
ity of science and the production of drugs, in reflecting on the Nuremberg 
Medical Case, recognizes that the community has a claim on the individual 
to participate in experimentation for the benefit of the individual, the com-
munity and science. However, it must be subject to proper understanding 
and limits.33 Not only must the experiments be serious, honest and pro-
mote the practice of medicine, but the state must also approve them. Private 
approval is ethically unacceptable because of the nature of the community. 
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the state participates fully in the essence of the state. If the state permitted 
the private sector to conduct research willy-nilly, it would be abrogating its 
responsibility to protect the individual. 
It must be noted that, in his personal being, man is not finally ordered to 
usefulness to society. On the contrary, the community exists for man. 34 
However, there is yet another theory of Lockean implicit consent, in which 
a state made up of individuals has agreed to a certain kind of unity or gover-
nance. Locke developed the idea of tacit or implied consent to justify acts of 
the government, among other things, those for the benefit of the citizenry. 35 
Thus, the argument can be made that the polity, acting through its represen-
tative government, has approved the willing sacrifice of individuals for sci-
entific knowledge for the good of the community and the individual. Pope 
Pius XII argues that this is the kind of sacrifice that is misguided. 
Profits 
The central case of human experimentation is as follows. Researchers for 
pharmaceutical companies develop chemical compounds that could be used 
to treat diseases. These compounds begin life as trade secrets, and at some 
point, if they have promise, they are patented. A patent is a legal monopoly 
on the compound. Having a patent is not enough to be able to market a 
compound, however. Before a compound can be marketed, the pharma-
ceutical company must prove, according to certain standards, to the drug 
regulatory agencies that the compound is relatively safe if used a certain 
way and relatively effective for the condition being treated. If the proof is 
sufficient, the agency may permit the company to market the compound for 
the intended use. If the agency approves the compound for marketing, it 
requires the company to label the compound to inform doctors and patients 
of the identity of the disease it treats and the nature, risks and benefits of 
the compound. Once labelled, the compound has legal status as a drug. The 
exclusive approval to market the drug combined with the patent gives the 
pharmaceutical company complete control over the market for the drug for 
the patent period. 
Although the costs of developing a drug are unknown, closely guarded 
trade secrets, the drug companies allege they are astronomical. One study 
reported that the average cost is $2.7 billion.36 A more nuanced and trans-
parent study reported that the median cost of bringing a single cancer drug 
to market is $648 million, and the median revenue is $1.7 billion.37 Some 
drugs have star status, blockbuster drugs. These generate at least $1 bil-
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their potential drives the industry. Total worldwide pharmaceutical sector 
revenues were more than $1.1 trillion in 2017, making it in the top 2 or 
3 economic sectors globally. 38 Profit margins are in the 25%–30% range, 
making total global profits in the pharmaceutical sector over $250 billion. 
More than any other industry, the pharmaceutical sector is highly 
dependent on its research and development segment. . . . Because of 
the steady loss of patent protection, the invention of new drugs is of 
vital importance for the pharmaceutical industry. Revenue losses due 
to patent expiry often are very significant.39 
The foregoing detail is warranted to understand the importance of two kinds 
of people or roles in the pharmaceutical industry, physicians and subjects, 
both somewhat invisible in the earlier description. 
Physicians are required because they are the gatekeepers to the drugs 
through their prescription writing authority. Sales of prescription drugs “by 
far” account for most industry revenues.40 Industry advertises directly either 
to physicians or to consumers with the directive to ask their physician for 
the drug. In 2016, pharmaceutical advertising in the United States alone was 
~$30 billion, about $20 billion to physicians and $9 billion to consumers.41 
On gross revenues in the United States of about $446 billion (2016)42 that 
is about 7%. 
The human experimental subject is the other role of paramount impor-
tance. Without subjects, no drug could ever enter the market. Subjects are 
essential in developing knowledge of safety and efficacy, the necessary 
ingredient in drug43 research and development (R&D). In 2016, industry 
spent $60 billion on R&D, or about 14% of revenues.44 
Although doctors get some financial benefit from the money spent by 
industry to woo them,45 subjects get virtually none. It is this fact, I want to 
use as the entry point into using sacrifice as an ethical model to understand 
human experimentation. Subjects can be looked at from two perspectives. 
On the one hand, they are considered individuals, human beings with dig-
nity, who volunteer to be experimented on. On the other hand, the individu-
ality of the subject is not relevant, rather the value/data from the individual 
is merged with that from other subjects to become the statistical whole, and 
statistical knowledge of the cohort is what has value. The ethical relation-
ship between the pharmaceutical company and the subject ends when the 
raw data have been taken from the subject. Statistical knowledge of the 
whole is a new ethical entity in the existing system that privileges the cre-
ation of private property from the experiment. 
After the development of a promising compound, the pharmaceuti-
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and efficacy must be to standards set by the regulatory industry. Since the 
United States is one of the most important and largest markets for drugs 
(45% of the global market),46 the standards set by its regulatory agency, the 
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), are considered exemplary. 
The FDA requires quantitative, that is, statistical, measures derived from 
randomized controlled trials (experiments) to evaluate safety and efficacy. 
Drug companies design protocols that establish the parameters of the exper-
iments, which must be conducted on human beings. Generally, the FDA
must approve experiments in which the data and statistics will be used in an 
application-seeking market approval. For each potential drug/disease, the 
FDA and company agree on the number of experimental subjects that the 
experiments must conduct. 
Recruitment of subjects is an area fraught with ethical problems, such 
as payments received by treating physicians for successful referrals, the 
therapeutic misconception and others. However, the legal principles that 
transform a person with a full set of rights into a subject with no rights 
regarding the researchers are the operative acts establishing the possibility 
of the sacrifice. 
When a person agrees to participate in an experiment, he or she must 
consent to be a participant. The consent document, by law, is supposed to 
fully inform the potential subject of the risks and benefits of the experi-
mental intervention. In a standard legal transaction, the informed consent 
document would have the force of a contract.47 A contract would, typically, 
provide a quid quo pro for things given or received, and, finally, a contract 
would be the basis for a cause of action in the event there were damages to 
person or things caused by one of the parties to the contract.48 In fact, the 
informed consent document does none of these things. It is not construed 
by courts to be a contract;49 it provides, if anything, for only a nominal pay-
ment for participation,50 and it provides no cause of action in the event of 
an injury. 51 
The sacrifice can be described in the terms set forth earlier. A sacrifice 
is the killing or destruction of something of value to influence the future.52 
The influence on the future, on nature, occurs through the mediation of the 
god or other authority in charge of the future who is the intended recipient 
of the value. That is, the sacrificer takes value from a thing (usually a living 
thing) by destroying it, transforms it into something invisible and transfers 
it to the authority to enhance the position of the intended beneficiary of the 
sacrifice (which does not have to be the sacrificer). 
In a scientific experiment, a human being is transformed into an experi-
mental subject. The value of the subject is a kind of biological machine 
into which an intervention is introduced. Information from the subject is 
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abandoned regarding the process when the informed consent was signed. 
The being on which the experiment is being performed is not fully human 
anymore, concerning the process. 
This is a sacrifice in three senses, or it could be said there are three sacri-
ficers and two sacrifices. In one sense, individuals sacrifice themselves and 
their rights for one of two purposes: to help themselves or help others. In 
most cases, the first reason cannot be true because it results from the thera-
peutic misconception, in which potential subjects are mistakenly convinced 
the experimental treatment will benefit them.53 The second reason is not 
valid because none of the research benefits will be freely available to the 
public except the drug if the experiment can be made successful, and then 
the public is charged an often obscene amount of money for the drug. 54 The 
only advancement of science from drug research occurs within the silos 
of the individual drug companies. The god is science and truth, neither of 
which exists in the sacrificial space, and thus the sacrifice for better health 
and scientific knowledge must usually fail. 
In the second sense, the drug company sacrifices the individuals who 
“consent” to participate. The company strips value from them, aggregates 
and then monetizes it for itself. The god is the neoliberal economic system 
that awards greed, and the sacrifice usually works. 
In the third sense, the U.S. government has established and maintains 
the legal and institutional arrangements that support the neoliberal values 
that encourage individuals to sacrifice themselves out of ignorance and the 
pharmaceutical companies to sacrifice individuals for their profits. That is, 
the U.S. government offers its citizens up for sacrifice by the companies. 
Its sacrifices fail to the extent citizens are not protected and succeed to the 
extent the large pharmaceutical companies reap extraordinary profits. 
If the purity of the sacrificial or ritual space is considered, another set of 
interesting issues arise. In both cases, the sacrificial space is impure since 
the individual participates out of ignorance and selfishness, and the com-
pany misleads the sacrificial subjects to get them to participate. Why does 
the sacrifice generally fail for the individual and succeed for the company? 
One reason could be that the individual does not have the power to influ-
ence the gods to which his or her sacrifice is directed, truth and science. 
A related or underlying question must query whether the individual has a 
duty to look into the true nature of the sacrifice, whether it is, in fact, pos-
sible for there to be a therapeutic benefit or whether the information from 
the experiment would ever become part of the public domain. The negative 
answer to these queries is readily available on the internet, but most regular 
people do not have enough experience and background knowledge to know 
they can ask those questions, and the authority of the system keeps them in 














     
  
 




Hindu norms on human experimentation 89 
subject learned the truth, it would seem there would be no motivation to 
participate. This explains why there is a cloak of ignorance spread in the 
general population about the benefits and nature of human experimentation. 
But the lesson from the success of the drug company is that the ignorance 
of the sacrificed thing is no bar to the value being conveyed to the god of 
the neoliberal system, who can then confer its rewards, profits to the com-
pany. This would be consistent with the sacrifice of non-human animals 
and inanimate things. The status of their consciousness is irrelevant to their 
value to the god. 
Consent and sacrifice in the Arthasastra
Sacrifice in the Vedas 
The Arthasastra was written in the milieu of the Vedas. Although it is dif-
ficult to date the Vedic texts with any accuracy, it is not unreasonable to say 
the core Vedic texts were relatively complete by about 1,500 BCE.55 They 
underlay what developed into the dharma sastric tradition, a very legalis-
tic system in which the dharma, or heavenly order governing day-to-day 
life, was controlled by the Brahmanical priestly class.56 Sacrifice is central 
to the Vedic texts to insure dharma is maintained in the relations between 
the non-human and human realms. For the most part, it was controlled by the 
priestly class, but individuals could also perform some rituals. By the time 
the Arthasastra was written or compiled (c 50–125 CE),57 Vedic traditions 
had crystallized into an oppressive system of laws and rules controlled by 
the priesthood that governed all aspects of householder life.58 The legalism 
caused widespread counter-movements, including the formation of Jainism 
and Buddhism and the developments in the theory of government reflected 
in the Arthasastra. The political theory became secular and pluralistic and 
instrumentalized the Vedic legalism for political ends. 
That being said, sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Arthasastra, and 
the tradition of sacrifice it principally refers to is that practised by the Brah-
min priests based in Vedic texts. To understand sacrifice in the Vedas, it is 
necessary to be aware of their texts and layers.59 
There are four Vedas: the Rig Veda, the Sama Veda, the Yajur Veda and 
the Atharva Veda. The Rig Veda contains hymns (chants, mantras) primarily 
to various deities; the Sama Veda contains excerpts from the Rig Veda ; the 
Yajur Veda contains, in addition to Rig Veda hymns, sacrificial prayers or 
formulas and the Atharva Veda consists of a special class of texts dealing 
with spells, incantations and kingly duties as well as exalted spiritual truths. 
Each Veda has two sections. The  Mantra is the collection of hymns used 
in the sacrifices, and the Brahmana contains the accessories, rules and 
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regulations for the sacrifices and discloses the meaning of the mantras, which 
otherwise might remain obscure. Vedic sacrifice was an extremely important 
way people communed with the gods (deities, higher powers). The sacrifices 
are “offerings of oblations for the propitiation of the deities.” 60 
Two additional layers of the  Vedas, developments within the Brahmana
according to Nikhilananda, are the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. The 
Aranyaka, or “forest-treatise,” was aimed at the person in the third stage of 
life, vanaprastha. This person has become a hermit and is living apart as he 
prepares for moksha (liberation) and the sannyasin stage. Since the sacri-
fices required and described in the other parts of the Veda are too expensive 
and impractical for the hermit, the Aranyaka “prescribes symbolic worship 
and describes various meditations” that are used as substitutes for the sac-
rifices. Worship is transformed to the mental level from the physical. The 
Upanishads are the most recent layer of the Vedas and describe the abstract 
principles that are characteristic of the liberated person. Sacrifice per se 
is not necessary for the sannyasin since his obligations have all been sub-
sumed in his inner attainment or perfection. 
Consent and sacrifice in the Arthasastra 
The text of the Arthasastra contains many examples of rules governing 
day-to-day life such as litigation, family law matters, inheritance, criminal 
behaviour, property, boundaries, debt, slaves and labourers, commercial 
transactions and gambling.61 Topic 24, Organization of Revenue Collection 
by the Collector, covers all the myriad ways a government raises money, 
including, for example, from taxes, fines, duties and it covers such topics as 
standardizations of weights and measures.62 
It is clear from the text that physicians play an important role and that 
there is a system of drugs, pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies regu-
lated for safety and honesty. 63 Although it is exactly the same form as it is 
today, there is a fundamental difference between  Ayurveda and scientific 
medicine that radically changes the context and makes the notion of experi-
ment much less likely to occur in the same way. Ayurveda is a revealed set 
of doctrines, like Chinese medicine and homoeopathy, and investigation 
of substances occurs through a process of Aristotelian  epagoge, in which 
reasoning begins with first principles and, for example, the medicinal pow-
ers of substances would be described and tested under the framework of the 
first principles.64 The first principles are never questioned. There would be 
no inductive epistemological activity in the ways understood in a contem-
porary drug investigation. 
I describe the polity because it is only possible to infer the capacity 
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experimented on. Presumably, in this hierarchical society, those with less 
status have correlatively less capacity to consent, whereas high-status per-
sons would have greater capacity. Would the king require such experiments 
for public health purposes, he could order people to participate. How he 
would determine who was chosen is not clear. 
However, because sacrifices are such a big part of day-to-day life, and 
people pay priests and others for the materials and expertise to make sacri-
fices, sacrifice is a regulated economic and civil activity. We can identify at 
least one norm in the Arthasastra that is more directly applicable to contem-
porary human experimentation. 
In On Justices, Chapter 14 deals with commercial subjects, including 
employment. In that chapter, Topic 66 is titled Partnerships. In Partnerships, 
the wages and other costs of sacrifice are regulated in some detail.65 The 
rules protect the financial interests of the sacrificers and ensure the sacrifice 
is completed on behalf of the patron. 
It is not a far stretch to analogize the Vedic sacrifice to the sacrifices privi-
leged and institutionalized in the neoliberal pharmaceutical sector. 
Regarding the sacrifice made by the individual, he or she is both patron 
and thing being sacrificed. The emphasis of the rule on the sacrifice being 
completed suggests the state is interested in maintaining the integrity of the 
sacrificial transaction. Since, on this view, sacrifices are known to work and 
are such an integral part of day-to-day life, the suggestion is that the institu-
tional misleading of the patron as to the true nature of the sacrifice (it is not 
therapeutic and it will not result in the common good) would be prohibited. 
In theory, this is done today with the informed consent process, but it is clear 
institutional pressures nullify the informed consent generally speaking. 
Regarding the sacrifices by the pharmaceutical company and the state, 
the rules’ emphasis on the transactional aspects of the sacrifice suggests 
that industry would be much more tightly regulated. In other words, the 
Arthasastra envisions a relationship between the state, the citizens and 
industry that is different from that institutionalized in the neoliberal politi-
cal order. Here, the state would exercise more control over the financial 
transactions at the heart of the research enterprise. This could go as far, 
perhaps, given the centrality of sacrifice to the public, as regulating human 
experimentation as a utility, setting profit margins and prohibiting or limit-
ing monopolies on medical treatments, devices and drugs. Additionally, it 
could confer greater power on the individual sacrificers/subjects to negoti-
ate as cohorts for participation or shares in the profits of the drug and set 
fees, and other benefits subjects could be paid for participation, perhaps 
based on risk, etc. 
About international relations, such as a human rights regime in which the 
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under the principles of international relations set out in the Arthasastra.66 
The Arthasastra posits a sixfold strategy in international relations. The first 
principle is the peace pact. If the conditions exist for a peace treaty, then typi-
cal issues addressed in the pact would be land, allies, money and projects. 
This suggests openings for discussion of trade in drugs but recalling the drug 
trade would not be anything like our trade now, which is already subject to 
many international, transnational and global agreements. Perhaps, an agri-
cultural compact to grow certain herbs (i.e. drugs) could be envisioned. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis answers, with a yes, whether Hinduism has any ideas 
to offer the contemporary regulation/policy of human experimentation. 
However, that affirmative answer comes only after the question is unpacked 
and after considerable historical translation of ideas and explanation of the 
unpacked question. In summary, it seems to envision a more tightly regu-
lated pharmaceutical industry performing experiments on subjects that have 
been given much more agency. 
Whether the norms expressed in the Arthasastra can be considered reli-
gious is complicated. The centrality of sacrifice to the householder who 
adheres to Vedic norms is indisputable and could be described as religious 
since, for example, sacrifices are made to deities, etc. Moreover, even in 
moksha dharma, a dharma reflected throughout the cultures and traditions of 
the subcontinent in its more abstract forms, the notion of sacrifice is impor-
tant, albeit not as a physical rite. However, the  Arthasastra is decidedly secu-
lar and suggests throughout that religion could be used, for example, as a 
pretence for covert political activity. That suggests the central concern of the 
rules is to maintain civic order, not to institutionalize a religion. 
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 8 Informed consent and clinical 
trials 
A Jewish perspective 
 David Heyd 
Clinical trials started no more than 150 years ago. Informed consent is 
an even more recent moral principle in medical practice. Accordingly, it 
is no surprise that the Jewish tradition (like all other religious and ethical 
systems) consists of no direct instruction on these practices. However, it 
does not mean that the two-and-a-half millennia old corpus of Jewish law is 
completely silent on the principles which may guide us in modern times in 
the regulation of experiments on human subjects and the role of individual 
consent on the part of those participating in them. 
It is a second-level methodological principle in the Jewish halakhic tra-
dition that any practical opinion or ruling must be anchored in previous 
opinions of rabbinical authorities. These, in turn, also rely on earlier rulings 
and the argumentation supporting them—down to the formative texts of the 
Talmud and ultimately the Torah, the foundation of all religious authority. 
One of the most powerful intellectual tools for forming opinions on mat-
ters that are novel and never addressed in the past is called hekesh, which 
can be translated as analogy or inference. Analogical thinking is the bridge 
between the necessity of maintaining the binding authority of past thought 
and the need to solve entirely new problems which arise in our age. 
Take a typical case for the way contemporary rabbis debate the issue of 
clinical trials and informed consent. They go back to the sixteenth-century 
authority, Rabbi David ben Zimra, who in one of his thousands of responses 
to various religious questions discusses the following imaginary case: 
What if the ruler tells a Jew, “let me cut one of your non-vital body 
parts or I shall kill one of your fellow Jews”? Some say that the Jew 
must let his organ be cut [thereby saving the life of his friend] since the 
organ is not vital [like a leg or an eye]. 1 
The historical context of this question in the sixteenth century is the experi-
ence of such terrible dilemmas faced by members of a persecuted minority 
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which is, sometimes, the victim of cruel bullying. Strikingly, it became a 
classical source for rabbinical debates about life-saving organ donation in 
recent decades and, although more abstractly, about vaccination and partici-
pation in clinical trials.2 
Ben Zimra’s opinion is unambiguous: letting the ruler cut part of one’s 
body is supererogatory, a matter of charity (hassidut), that is to say—going 
beyond the call of duty or the requirement of the religious law (din ). This is 
not a trivial ruling since what is at stake is a person’s  life, which in Jewish 
law and ethics is the greatest of all values justifying even the violation of 
the Sabbath or almost all religious commandments. Hence, exempting one 
from saving the life of another human being calls for special justification, 
which Ben Zimra is at pains to provide. One kind of reasoning is that the 
sacrifice of one’s limb  may cause profuse bleeding resulting in death (and 
then, there is no reason for me to sacrifice my life for another person’s life 
which is not worth more than mine). Another, more principled, the argu-
ment is that organs are integral parts of one’s life and hence cannot serve 
as instruments for either punishing a criminal or saving another person’s 
life. The ultimate argument of ben Zimra is that “the way of the Torah is 
gentle and it is necessary that its judgements agree with reason and com-
monsense.” Can it really be expected, asks ben Zimra, that a person would 
allow his eye to be taken or his hand or leg be cut to save the life of another? 
Hence, he concludes that it is entirely optional and supererogatory to save 
one’s friend’s life by sacrificing a non-vital organ, and he who can bring 
himself to do it should be blessed. However, adds ben Zimra, if the sacrifice 
of an organ risks the life of the donor, he should be considered a “foolish” 
or irrational man (hassid shoteh), rather than a virtuous person. 
The historical circumstances have changed: no ruler nowadays poses a 
threat “let me cut your hand, or I will kill your friend.” Now the threat 
is “get vaccinated, or some people in your community will die in an epi-
demic.” But, the normative dilemma remains the same: must an individual 
make some physical sacrifice to save other people’s lives in the community. 3 
On the one hand, the Jewish normative system is typically communitarian, 
guided by solidarity and mutual responsibility. The social commitment may 
sometimes make substantial demands on the individual. On the other hand, 
the individual has a strong duty of self-care.4 The Jewish halakhic tradition 
wavers between the commitment to the saving of life (often encapsulated 
in the verse “thou shall not stand idly by”)5 and the recognition that an 
individual has a special and maybe prior commitment to his own life and 
bodily integrity. There is a whole set of rules regarding the prohibition of 
self-mutilation, and the rabbis discuss in detail the exceptions which usually 
have to do with the possible saving of another human life and especially of 







Informed consent and clinical trials 99 
considered self-harm that cannot be justified in terms of the direct utility to 
an identifiable relative. Ben Zimra takes the middle way in solving this ten-
sion: sacrificing a limb for the sake of saving the life of another person is at 
most an admirable act of pure altruism but never a duty. 
Organ donations are closely analogous to these older non-medical dilem-
mas since they involve a direct life-saving sacrifice of one’s limb. But, vac-
cinations and clinical trials raise similar tensions between the individual 
duty of self-care and the social commitment to public health, which is a 
public good. Some vaccinations and some clinical trials involve danger to 
one’s life and health and hence face the same difficulty that besieged Jew-
ish communities in the past had to deal with. There is, though, a significant 
difference between clinical trials and medical experiments: the former is a 
practice that aims at preventing concrete threats of infectious disease, which 
may cause direct harm to a high number of people in the actual community. 
Medical experiments aim at promoting chances of curing diseases of future 
people whom we do not know and who may not have even been born yet. In 
that respect, refusing to be vaccinated and taking a free ride on fellow citi-
zens is unfair and consequently justifies legal enforcement of some form. 
Medical experiments have a more remote utility and hence nowadays are 
never forced. Taking part in them is supererogatory. 6 An even more extreme 
view is presented by the philosopher Hans Jonas who argues that due to 
their health risks, we should prohibit even volunteers from taking part in 
dangerous medical experiments and allow only the researchers themselves 
to undergo the experimental procedure as a matter of professional responsi-
bility or noblesse oblige. However, in today’s methodologies, Jonas’ restric-
tion is unrealistic. We need a very large number of subjects for any clinical 
trial and hence the cooperation of sick patients and healthy people for a 
control group. So to what degree should society allow its members to be 
subject to health risks? 
Here, we come to another principle that has guided the rabbis from ancient 
times—the degree of risk. Naturally, contemporary rabbis are more aware 
of the importance of probabilities, and their arguments about medical exper-
imentation have become more sophisticated. One significant distinction is 
between the experimental treatment of a particular sick patient and clinical 
trials that recruit healthy people.7 Regarding the treatment of a particular 
sick person, there is a distinction between a patient whose life is in danger 
and a patient who suffers from a non-fatal illness. If the threat of death is 
real and the treatment has some reasonable chance of saving the patient’s 
life, although some chance of shortening his life, he is permitted (though not 
obliged) to choose to take the risk of that experimental treatment. It is inter-
esting to note that unlike the older tradition, which did not even raise the 
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in this contemporary opinion, the patient is asked whether he wishes to 
take the experimental medication and if “it is impossible to talk about it 
with the patient” the family should be consulted. Although patient consent 
was already implied in older opinions of the kind we have discussed ear-
lier in the form of leaving a space of permission to people who choose to 
donate an organ to save the life of another, rabbis in modern rulings explic-
itly require consultation with and consent of the patient. Furthermore, this 
applies equally to patients who are not in life danger but are given a chance 
to recuperate or relieve pain by taking an experimental medication. 
As for experiments involving healthy people, these raise again the ten-
sion between the duty of self-care and the duty to save the lives of oth-
ers. Again, there is a distinction between cases in which the other is an 
actual person “standing in front of me” and an unidentified future person 
who might enjoy the benefits of the clinical trial. If the actual person has a 
good chance to be saved from death by my help (blood donation or organ 
donation) while the risk of death I incur is minimal, then I am allowed to 
undergo the experimental procedure. However, if those who stand to benefit 
are future unidentified people (as is the case in most clinical trials), it would 
be my duty to take part in them only if the harm they involve is minimal or 
non-existent.8 Experiments on human subjects which are risky and poten-
tially harmful in more significant ways are prohibited, which means that the 
doctors are not allowed to conduct them, and individuals are barred from 
volunteering to take part in them. Even informed consent would not legiti-
mize them. The rabbinical ruling here accords with the common bioethical 
belief that “statistical lives” are not as valuable as the life of actual people 
(a belief that is challenged by some philosophers who regard this belief as 
irrational and ethically unsound).9 
A relatively rigid and “polarized” opinion is expressed by Immanuel 
Jakobovitz, former chief rabbi of the U.K. and the pioneer of Jewish bioeth-
ics in modern times. Jakobovitz argues that, on the one hand, if there is no 
risk or danger involved in the experiment, we have a positive duty to take 
part in it; on the other hand, if there is some risk or danger to our health, we 
are straightforwardly prohibited from partaking in the experiment.10 This is 
a conservative view that is not representative of current rabbinical thought. 
It leaves no room for volunteering since taking part in the clinical trial is 
either obligatory or prohibited. 
A more restrictive opinion is offered by an important rabbinical authority 
of our age, R. Waldenberg. 11 Taking part in medical experiments should be 
kept entirely voluntary even if the risk involved is minimal or considered 
non-existent. One can never know about hidden risks involved in experi-
mentation, and one should also consider the possibility of the unpredicted 
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never guarantee that the experiment would yield the expected benefit to 
future people. In other words, the probability of some harm to the subject 
taking part in a medical trial is often higher than is commonly thought, and 
the probability of benefit to future patients too low to justify any social obli-
gation to participate in medical experiments. In my phrasing, Waldenberg’s 
idea is that our bodies cannot serve as instruments for promoting the health 
of other people. 
Although the patient’s consent to treatment has not been tradition-
ally considered by the halakha as a condition for medical treatment— 
particularly in life-and-death situations—donating organs or participating 
in altruistic clinical trials was either forbidden or left to the free choice of 
the individual. Note that this is a weak sense of consent. However, under 
the influence of the rigid condition of informed consent in modern bioeth-
ics, we see the rabbis following suit. In one recent response, we find a clear 
statement: “even if the results of clinical trials are important, it is impossible 
to force an individual [to take part in them] without his knowledge.” It is the 
doctor’s duty to explain to the patient that with his help, human lives can 
be saved and ask for his consent. It is an offence to experiment on patients 
without their knowledge and against their will, even if the intention is the 
hope to cure future patients.12 
On a more philosophical level, one should note that despite adopting 
the general idea of informed consent, the Jewish way of thinking does 
not accept the principle of autonomy as the grounds for informed consent. 
Autonomy is a richer concept than consent. It implies a general view of 
human beings as masters of their lives, the source of value and moral duty. 
It is the key notion of the anthropocentric version of humanism. Jewish reli-
gious thinking does not consider the individual as sovereign over his own 
life, and even his body is not considered his property. The requirement of 
consent in medical treatment is based on the potential suffering and harm 
to the body and the duty of self-care rather than absolute control of human 
beings over their lives. Thus, informed consent is not a major principle in 
the doctor–patient relationship since it is a doctor’s duty to heal and a paral-
lel duty of the patient to be healed. Being cured is not a matter of choice or 
personal autonomy. 
However, when it comes to taking part in clinical trials, in which  other
people are the beneficiaries, there is no such duty (to be healed), and the 
individual must be asked to express his genuine consent before being 
recruited.13 Or take experiments on minors. They are prohibited because 
children cannot give consent to a procedure that might cause them pain or 
undermine their health. But, according to some rabbinical authorities, such 
experiments are allowed if they do not involve any suffering or risks to the 
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consent even when there is no risk or pain involved in the experimental pro-
cedure. Consider the well-known danger of giving too much information to 
the patient (in either medical treatment or the recruitment of subjects for a 
clinical trial): as research has shown, too much information may disrupt the 
rational deliberation of the patient giving the consent, thereby undermining 
his autonomy. How do we know when autonomy is undermined? For the 
Jewish approach, restricting the amount of information given to the subject 
does not pose a problem since it is sufficient for the doctor to be convinced 
that extra information might cause unnecessary anxiety and suffering to 
the patient. The liberal, autonomy-based approach requires that all potential 
participants in the trial be given the same amount of information. The Jew-
ish, consent-based attitude allows for different amounts of information to 
different subjects based on their degree of anxiety. 
We can now see why the general attitude of contemporary halakha is 
compatible with the principles of the Helsinki Convention although its 
theoretical basis is different from the liberal principles underlying that Con-
vention. Consequently, the legal regulation of experimentation on human 
subjects in Israel does not encounter any obstacle on the part of religious 
circles or parties. The Helsinki Convention is accepted as the supreme guid-
ing document in the ethics of experimentation, and a Helsinki committee in 
each research hospital is a statutory legal requirement. But again, this does 
not mean that religious authorities accept the practice in the liberal terms 
of rights, autonomy and informed consent. They instead appeal to the prin-
ciples of the sanctity of life, the duty of self-care, social solidarity and the 
value of bodily integrity. 
How do all these developments in religious discussion of clinical trials, 
vaccinations and informed consent affect the actual way in which the ortho-
dox religious sectors behave regarding those practices? There is a lower 
rate of immunization in the ultra-orthodox sector of Israeli society, but the 
cause for that phenomenon is not easy to detect. Indeed, there were a few 
cases in which leading rabbis instructed their communities to avoid immu-
nization, but this occurred on the occasion of some medical controversy 
about the effectiveness of particular immunization (which also led some 
non-religious sectors to refuse to immunize their children). There is some 
general suspicion from these communities regarding the State and the Min-
istry of Health instructions. This suspicion is not derived from any formal 
religious argument against the idea of immunization as such. Living in 
small and relatively isolated communities, this sector in the population may 
feel that the “herd effect” of most people getting immunized is sufficient to 
protect them from the disease without them taking the inoculation. 
Furthermore, some immunizations are thought of as conveying a negative 
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cervical cancer in young women. However, beyond these sociologically rel-
evant explanations, I should emphasize that the leading religious authorities 
do not oppose immunization, and many of them strongly encourage their 
followers, including children, to take them. Some consider them and clini-
cal trials even as “a holy war” against the threat of fatal illness, a war that 
calls for a universal draft. 
The issue then is not informed consent. Nor is it a problem of dietary 
restrictions (kashrut). Ultra-orthodox people—even though they can under-
stand informed consent forms and the terminology used in them—need the 
authority of the rabbis to get involved in practices that might create a reli-
gious problem. For them, taking part in clinical trials or an immunization 
program is a matter of legitimacy rather than autonomy. We could say that 
their consent is mediated through the rabbis. Hence, as a matter of state pol-
icy, the medical community must convey to the rabbinical authorities state-
of-the-art information about effective and experimental treatments so that 
the rabbis can lend their authority to individuals who hesitate to opt for them. 
The small minority of ultra-orthodox communities in Israel (and abroad) is 
not a case of a vulnerable group, but rather that of a group that should
be encouraged by its religious leaders to join a highly profitable health 
scheme that their leaders recognize to be so. Mediated consent is the most
effective means of creating trust conditions, which is a key to the success of
experimental and preventive programs, indeed, to medical practice in general.
 Notes 
1 R. David ben Zimra, Responsa, part 3, section 627. My translation. Responsa are 
the most common medium in the development of halakhic rulings. They are writ-
ten replies by a rabbi or a Talmudic scholar to inquiries on any matter of Jewish 
law. They are usually collected in volumes authored by either the rabbi himself or 
later by his pupils. They serve as rulings for the community of that rabbi and as 
opinions to be considered by later scholars engaged in the same inquiry. 
2 I first encountered this source in a seminar paper of a student of mine, Noam 
Shar’abi, on the subject of organ donations. 
3 There is a famous Talmudic dilemma: should the enemy command the com-
munity to hand over one of its members to be killed or otherwise be all put to 
death—what should the community do? The received answer is that the com-
munity should avoid sacrificing one individual and be prepared to be completely 
wiped out. However, if the enemy identifies the wanted individual,  he should be 
handed over. By way of analogy, one might argue that if a particular individual 
contracted a highly infectious disease, he could be removed from the city, even if 
that means that he will die. However, if one person should be arbitrarily selected 
to take part in some lethal medical experiment that might save the whole com-
munity, it would be strictly prohibited to force him to undergo that experiment 
(although as in the case of the wanted individual, he will anyway die with the 
whole group). See Jerusalem Talmud , Tractate Terumot, p. 47a. 
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4 “For your own sake, therefore, be most careful” (Deuteronomy 4:15). This verse 
was given in later ages its current physical meaning, including the duty to be 
healed by getting medical treatment. 
5 Leviticus 19:16. This strong commandment to save the life of another person 
is unambiguously asserted by Maimonides, in his Mishne Torah, “Rotzeach 
uShmirat Nefesh,” chapter 1, section 14: “Whenever a person can save another 
person’s life, but he fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as 
Leviticus 19:16 states: “Do not stand idly by while your brother’s blood is at 
stake.” 
6 Nevertheless, despite the authority of ben Zimra on the matter, there are some 
contemporary rabbis who—being aware of the immediate threats of certain new 
epidemics (say, AIDS)—view medical experimentation as “a holy war” (“a war 
of duty”), in which, according to the Torah, everybody is under a duty to take 
part. This is a more dramatic way of giving clinical trials a religious value. See, 
for example, M.D. Wellner, “The Rights and Authority of the Physician,” in 
Hatora ve’Hamedina [The Torah and the State], Vol. 8, ed. Shaul Yisraeli (Kfar 
Haroeh, 1956–7), 306–307, 312. [In Hebrew]. 
7 Avraham Sofer Avraham, Nishmat Avraham, part 3, section 349 (Jerusalem: A.S. 
Sofer, 1985). The author is not a religious authority but a religious physician 
writing on bioethical issues. 
8 Avraham Sofer Avraham, “Experiments on Human Subject,”  Noam: An Annual 
for the Discussion of Halakhic Problems 17 (1964): 161–164. [In Hebrew] The 
view expressed here is slightly different from that expressed in his other book 
cited earlier. 
9 In his handy Encyclopedia for Halakha and Medicine (Jerusalem: Schlesinger 
Institute, 1994), Avraham Steinberg quotes R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as rul-
ing that one is under no duty to save the life of another even if it involves no 
risk; but one is permitted to do so. However, it is prohibited to take part in an 
experiment that is risky to one’s life. But, adds the rabbi, it may be allowed if 
the person to be saved from death is “standing in front of us,” i.e., an identifi-
able concrete individual desperate to be saved. Entry “Medical Experiments on 
Human Subjects” (Vol. 7), p. 490. 
10 Immanuel Jakobovitz, Jewish Medical Ethics (New York: Bloch Publishing 
Company, 1975), 291–294. Although the book’s first edition was published 
before the Helsinki Convention in 1964, the second edition was published quite 
a while after it but, in a way, ignores it. 
11 R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer [Responsa], 2nd ed., Vol. 13, section 101 
(Jerusalem, 1985). Waldenberg (1915–2006) was one of the foremost authorities 
on religious medical ethics. 
12 Moshe Sternbuch, Teshuvot ve’Hanhagot [response], part 1, section 895
(Jerusalem: Netivot ha'Torah ve'Hachesed, 1992). 
13 Yechiel Michael Barilan, Jewish Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 













  9 Christian perspectives on 
informed consent 
 Laura Palazzani 
Informed consent: general ethical principle from 
the Christian perspective 
The Christian perspective in bioethics, in the framework of a creationistic 
concept of nature with a normative value (finalism) and in a belief to know 
the truth in nature (cognitivism), considers human life as worthy of respect 
and protection (as a gift from God and created in His image) since it is the 
expression of personal life, dynamically intent on fully manifesting itself. 
The principles proposed in bioethics are the following: the defence of 
human life’s objective and absolute value, its intangibility and the impos-
sibility to dispose of it arbitrarily; the therapeutic principle, according to 
which any intervention on life is justifiable only if it aims to cure the subject 
(to save lives and improve health); the principle of freedom and responsibil-
ity, where freedom denotes an objective limit to respect the lives of others; 
the principle of justice and solidarity or attaining common good through the 
good of the individual and solidarity towards those in need according to 
their particular vulnerabilities.1 
Informed consent acquires a specific meaning in this conceptual frame-
work. The Catholic Medical Association and National Catholic Bioethics 
Centre published a document entitled “Catholic Principles and Guidelines 
for Clinical Research,”2 which made references to the concept of informed 
consent in both clinical practice and research. The basic understanding of 
Christianity regarding informed consent is 
The physician’s duty to inform and tell the truth in a complete, clear and 
comprehensible way about the health of the patient and the possibil-
ity to be cured (prevention, diagnosis and therapy) and cared for. The 
physician should be neither directive nor descriptive/neutral towards 
the patients but help them make conscious decisions oriented towards 
proportionate protection and respect for life. There is no place for 
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intentional falsehoods, misleading statements or bias. It is the respon-
sibility of everyone, especially a physician or a medical researcher, to 
respect the sacred and inviolable right to life of the human subject at 
every stage from its first formation to death. In this regard, the obliga-
tions of the natural moral law and Catholic moral teaching must always 
be respected. The medical researcher and those who assist in medical 
research must strive to do good (principle of beneficence) and avoid 
causing deliberate harm to the subjects in any possible way (principle 
of non-maleficence). 
2 The duty of the patient to be informed to be aware of the decision. 
When there is a trusting relationship with the physician (a sort of “con-
scious paternalism” requested by the patient), there may also be a right 
not to be informed in specific circumstances. In both cases, the Chris-
tian perspective emphasizes the duty to accept the cure and care of the 
physician. In this sense, the patient’s conscious, free and autonomous 
choice is respectful of life’s value when it is orientated towards the 
objective good: the conservation of life and health improvement by 
accepting appropriate treatment. In the case of minors and those who 
lack the capacity to consent (incapacitated), either parents or surrogates 
may offer decision-making according to their best objective interests. 
The priority of the objective value of life is derived from the natural 
law precepts to conserve life. In this context, there may be a difference 
between the Protestant (more open to subjectivity) and the Catholic 
perspectives (more linked to the objectivity of the ethical choice).3 
3 Informed consent for both the physician or health professional and the 
patient should (in a framework of human dignity and personal integ-
rity) respect the principles of beneficence (priority of the good for the 
patient) and non-maleficence (not to harm the patient). These prin-
ciples refer to the criterion of risk–benefit proportionality: the poten-
tial (direct or indirect) benefits of any study must be weighed against 
potential risks (concerning integrity, health and well-being). When a 
particular intervention does not directly benefit a minor or members of 
a vulnerable population, the associated risks must be relatively insig-
nificant (a burden, reduced to a minimum). Research against the good 
of the person is immoral. High risk is unacceptable. Adequately verify-
ing all the benefits and risks involved in the intervention is essential. 
4 In this respect, the principle of responsibility should guide the choice 
of both the patient and the physician. The physician has therapeutic 
responsibility towards the patient, and the patient or subject has per-
sonal responsibility towards one’s life and health and social responsibil-
ity for the good of science and society. Regardless of physical-psychic or 
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protected as a person worthy of respect. Generally, both the human sub-
ject and the researcher must recognize the moral obligations under natu-
ral law deriving from the value of life and be responsible for it.4
 5 The principle of autonomy. The physician must respect the spirituality 
and religious beliefs of the human subject. The physician should not 
compromise these beliefs without failing in some moral duty of the 
natural law. If the patient refuses an appropriate treatment (or asks 
for inappropriate treatments), the physician should try to convince 
him to be cured but cannot impose his view. Conversely, in case of a 
confident refusal, grounded in religious or rational/emotional motiva-
tions, he needs to accept it. Verbal coercion or forceful persuasion is 
not acceptable. However, based on the assumption that patients are, 
sometimes, in too much pain and are not objective enough to make 
the right moral decision, medical staff and family members can with-
hold certain information and persuade the patient to make the best 
moral choice. Free and informed consent should not be individualistic 
as if the patient were an isolated decision-maker. Instead, it should 
embed the patient in a relational context that supports and properly 
orients his choices. He or his surrogate should have access to medical 
and moral information and counselling to form her conscience. Free 
and informed healthcare decisions should be followed if they do not 
contradict Catholic principles. If a request for treatment goes against 
the moral conscience of the physician, he could object (conscientious 
objection). The medical researcher has the moral responsibility to act 
with a properly formed conscience and withdraw from a scientific 
intervention or investigation rather than act against his judgement of 
conscience. 
6 Informed consent is inspired by Jesus, who cured the sick with compas-
sion, generosity, and understanding. Christians believe that disease and 
suffering are trials from God to bring them closer to salvation through 
the death and into His grace. Scientific research should be done to 
serve those who are ill, not solely or primarily for the benefit of the 
researchers. Research should be conducted according to accepted sci-
entific principles, and it should be deemed necessary and potentially 
useful for the patient. We cannot subject an individual to unnecessary 
or disproportionate risks which exceed the research’s expected ben-
efit. The researcher must never participate in projects that may involve 
treating the human subject as an object of interest. Studies that may 
involve immoral cooperation with evil must be avoided. The subjects 
may choose to accept risks or sacrifice themselves (especially in exper-
imentations where risks are higher) for the good of others and society 
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integrity by verifying authentic intention and the absence of any coer-
cion or pressure. 
In this perspective, 
The Church respects and supports scientific research when it has a 
genuinely humanist orientation, avoiding any form of instrumentaliza-
tion or destruction of the human being and keeping itself free from the 
slavery of political and economic interests. In presenting the moral ori-
entations dictated by natural reason, the Church is convinced that she 
offers a precious service to scientific research, doing her utmost for the 
true good of the human person. In this perspective, she recalls that, not 
only the aims, but also the methods and means of research must always 
respect the dignity of every human being, at every stage of his develop-
ment and in every phase of experimentation.5 
Informed consent and conditions of vulnerability 
The principle of precaution/prudence is generally applied in the Christian 
perspective. Above all, it must be applied in case of conditions of vulner-
ability because of the severity of the illness, age (minors, elderly), sex (men/ 
women), socio-cultural conditions (indigent, immigrants).6 
Informed consent of the incapable person and minors 
In the case of minors who are legally not capable of understanding and mak-
ing decisions, their involvement is justified by a proportionality between 
the foreseeable risks and benefits in the framework of good and relevant 
research. Experimentation that is not expected to provide direct benefits for 
the minor, but only for other persons in similar conditions (in terms of age, 
type of illness and other characteristics), can be ethically justified when it is 
not possible to obtain the same results through experiments on adult, com-
petent subjects and the risks and burdens are minimal.7 
On the basis of the principle of equality and justice, just like any other 
human being, children have the right to receive drugs that will guarantee 
health in the same way adults do. It would not be ethical to exclude children 
from trials since it would mean discriminating against their interests and 
fundamental rights to life and health. 
One of the most critical elements of clinical trials in children is informed 
consent. The need to obtain the consent of both parents is an established 
bioethical practice. Concerning the general information before consent, the 
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recruitment in a trial and exclude ethically unacceptable reasons. For exam-
ple, to benefit from medical treatment that is otherwise not guaranteed or 
obtain greater attention by the doctors in the treatment of the children. 
The parents’ consent should be accompanied by the child’s assent, which 
is proof of their actual involvement in the medical decisions, together with 
their parents. The appropriateness of the information will be evaluated case 
by case according to cultural and social context and the existential context 
since each child has a different evolution and maturity and can react differ-
ently to illness or pain. 
The minor should receive information from expert personnel proportional 
to their capacity to understand the risks and benefits according to age and 
maturity. Furthermore, the investigator should consider the desire expressed 
by the minor to take part in the experimentation or withdraw from it at any 
moment. The child should be told that their desires are important in the 
decision, making it clear that they cannot be decisive alone. Specific atten-
tion should be paid so that the child’s involvement is not an indirect insis-
tence on participation, which should always be free and unconditioned by 
external factors. The conditioning is particularly problematic in a paediatric 
phase given the child’s vulnerability from the external influences of adults, 
members of the family and doctors. In the context of assent, doctors should 
help the child to understand the aim of the trial, the procedures forthcom-
ing and the experiences that they will have. They should try to perceive 
how much the child has understood and what are their often-unexpressed 
concerns are to help participants to overcome them. The best interests of the 
children is the principal Christian value in clinical practice and research. 
A challenging element is the involvement of healthy or sick children as 
a control group or as subjects of “non-therapeutic” experimentation. They 
will not receive any direct benefits but only indirect ones by helping other 
children with identical pathology in the future. Non-therapeutic experi-
mentation on minors cannot be excluded if significant improvements in 
scientific knowledge were to be achieved with a positive willingness and 
minimum risk or discomfort. 
Disputes exist among Catholic moral theologians and bioethicists about 
whether proxy consent can ever be morally valid in non-therapeutic settings 
and, if it can, under what conditions and why. One of the most debated issues 
regards the concepts of minimal risk and discomfort in non-therapeutic 
research. Is it licit to subject the incompetent persons to non-therapeutic 
procedures involving minimal risk or a risk slightly exceeding minimal? 
If so, what benchmarks should be employed? If not, would any amount 
of risk in non-therapeutic experimentation render it morally objectionable? 
What degree of risk can be justified in non-therapeutic settings, and how is 
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justification of the scientific relevance of the study and a detailed reflection 
on informed consent in Catholic anthropological and moral premises, which 
give priority to the dignity of the human person.8 
In this context, it is indispensable that informed assent/consent exists 
regarding the risk and the entity of the risk. Christian perspective consid-
ers it legitimate to perform a non-therapeutic trial on a child with an actual 
capacity of informed assent and supported by the consent of the parents or 
legal representatives if there are no significant risks either for the life or for 
the physical integrity of the minor. The requisite of the minimum risk and 
or discomfort is ethically central. 
It is a different bioethical evaluation to use experimental drugs as a last 
resort to save a minor’s life with incurable terminal conditions (maybe also 
in a condition of imminent death) and in the absence of effective therapeutic 
alternatives. In such cases, the ethical decision should be proportionate to the 
actual circumstances to seek the conditions that are respectful of the dignity 
of the minor. In the first place, it is essential to gather objective scientific data 
about the seriousness of the illness (verification of the condition of impos-
sibility of cure). Second, we need to consider the present and foreseeable 
future suffering, the patient’s quality of life and the reduction of suffering. 
Experimental pharmacological interventions which are aggressive and 
intensive are ethically licit and proper in the Christian perspective when 
there is a minimum “therapeutic hope” and when the likely suffering is 
proportionate to the potential benefits to improve the quality of life (or at 
least minimization of suffering), with the consent of the parents and pos-
sibly the assent of the minors. The suspension of aggressive and intensive 
experimental therapies is ethically licit and, sometimes, dutiful when life 
expectancy is short, the prognosis is undoubtedly poor and the therapies 
futile and harmful. In these cases of so-called therapeutic obstinacy, only 
ordinary treatment is given along with palliative care and human caregiv-
ing. Human and Christian solidarity justifies these gestures and gives them 
meaning and value. 
Research on women: informed consent of fertile, pregnant 
and breastfeeding women 
There are different reasons for underrepresentation and numerical inferi-
ority of participation of women in clinical trials. Some reasons generally 
concern the way of considering experimentation and medicine. In experi-
mentation, there is a tendency towards “generalization,” a tendency towards 
“neutrality” and assimilation of women to men. These orientations conflict 
with the need for individual specification and gender differentiation, above 







Christian perspectives on informed consent 111 
The possible pregnancy in childbearing age has led the pharmaceutical 
companies to exclude women from clinical protocols or impose specific 
hormonal contraceptives as a condition for participation in research because 
of the possible risks to the foetus. 
From the Christian perspective, if clinical trials endanger the foetus’s 
life or health recognized as a subject of rights, it is ethically preferable for 
women not to participate when such risks exceed the potential benefits to 
the women. Suppose the woman decides to enrol in the trial for social or 
personal aims. In that case, she should, nevertheless, be able to choose the 
modalities freely and responsibly to avoid pregnancy following her values 
and religious beliefs, among which abstinence from sexual relations, inso-
far as she should deem the use of contraceptives illicit owing to the scis-
sion between unitive act and procreation (as in the Catholic perspective). 
Using contraception also raises the problem of contra-gestation, which 
may impede not only the fecundation of gamete but also the process of 
implantation. 
This particularly thorny issue requires a bioethical analysis that bal-
ances the needs of the trial with the values of the subjects taking part in the 
experimentation. The Christian bioethics perspective of informed consent 
will consider the gender difference and the moral principles of those taking 
part in the trials, offering women the possibility of sexual abstinence. If it 
is incompatible with the trial protocols, women will receive appropriate 
consultation to choose responsibly according to their moral and religious 
values. Informed consent should also be undersigned by her partner and 
include a variable time frame that can be extended even after the trial.10 
Another specific bioethical issue in clinical research involves pregnant 
women. In this context, physicians often prescribe drugs for pregnant and 
breastfeeding women without studies or evidence of safety and efficacy 
under those conditions. Such treatments may include medications that 
can cause serious harm for both the woman and the foetus. The exclusion 
of pregnant women from clinical trials is the cause of the lack of data on 
potential benefits and harms to women and their future children. Therefore, 
we need to design research protocols for pregnant and breastfeeding women 
to determine potential risks and benefits. 
Clinical research on pregnant women needs specific ethical requirements. 
Research with a potential direct benefit is only allowed when it cannot be 
carried out on non-pregnant and non-breastfeeding women. Risk–benefit 
assessment must consider the specific pregnancy situation, extend it to 
foetuses and even include the preconception staged. In such research, the 
criteria of minimal risk and minimum burden are compulsory for both the 
woman and the child. “Minimal risk” refers to the degree of harm or dis-
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routine physical or psychological examinations. Research ethics commit-
tees require specific attention and prudence. In any event, evidence from 
prior animal experimentation is necessary. 11 
According to the Christian perspective, pregnant or breastfeeding women 
should not participate in non-therapeutic research that carries more than min-
imal risk to them and the foetus or infant unless the experiment is intended 
to explain pregnancy or lactation problems when there are no alternatives. 
When the research during pregnancy carries more than minimal risk, the 
woman should participate in follow-up evaluations to assess the effects on 
her and her foetus or child. She should be informed of the risks that par-
ticipation may have on her health and the embryo, foetus and infant. If new 
scientific information arises during the research, this information should be 
immediately given to participants. At any stage of the research, the subject’s 
right to withdraw consent should be respected. Follow-up of the pregnancy, 
the foetus and the child is essential, even months after the study. 
Research in a multicultural setting: intercultural informed consent 
Special attention must be given to vulnerable persons in clinical experi-
mentation because of dependence (students, prisoners, military service 
personnel), social insecurity or poverty (the homeless, the unemployed, 
immigrants) and lack of education. These vulnerable situations could make 
it difficult to obtain valid informed consent. 
Research carried out in emerging or developing countries should have 
clinical and scientific objectives that directly and specifically concern the 
local population. The scientific and ethical criteria used to evaluate and con-
duct these experiments must be the same as those conducted in developed 
countries. This research must respect local traditions and cultures and be 
approved in advance by either a national ethics committee of the sponsor-
ing country or the local ethics committee. Researchers may carry out clini-
cal experiments, especially those dealing with severe pathologies with no 
proven treatment. Experimental treatments could also involve women and 
men of childbearing potential, with possible risks when pregnancy occurs.12 
Applying general ethical standards of clinical trials to the different cul-
tural contexts, particularly in developing countries, needs interpretation 
and specification. The Christian priority towards human dignity and justice 
necessitates additional safeguards to avoid exploitation or abuse of vulner-
able populations due to poverty, lack of education and understanding of sci-
entific issues, lack of technical skills, scarce resources, disease and inability 
to have access to essential health products and services. 
Community consultations might help the process of interpretation 
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representatives in elaborating research projects. In this context, the role of 
the cultural mediator is essential. The aim is neither to impose foreign ethi-
cal standards (in a sort of ethnocentric imperialism or paternalism) nor to 
adapt to local standards (in a pragmatic relativistic attitude). It is meant to 
apply generally recognized Christian principles and values and seriously 
consider the specific culture’s conditions and needs with an intercultural 
and interreligious approach. 
Explicitly or implicitly, extra ethically required standards include the fol-
lowing: direct relevance of the clinical trial, equity in enrolment, tailored 
informed consent, proportionality and compensation for risks and damages 
and training and assistance to develop “collaborative partnerships.” 
Informed consent should be tailored to local customs, verifying that it is 
voluntary and freely given without coercion, incentives or “undue induce-
ments.” It may be oral and witnessed for the illiterate, with community 
leader’s permission or family involvement in specific circumstances. In 
developing countries, participation in a trial could be an incentive to obtain 
food and primary healthcare and affect their voluntariness and presence of 
“undue” influence. The socio-economic conditions could push these coun-
tries to participate in the research without adequate awareness of the risks. 
Another problem consists of some populations’ difficulty to grasp the 
concept of research, which tends to be confused with care and assistance 
(the so-called therapeutic misconception). Involvement of other persons in 
formulating informed consent is acceptable only if we can verify the genu-
ine awareness of individual participation (as well as the possibility to with-
draw from it) and an absence of direct or indirect external pressure. This 
awareness should be verified as being personal and cannot be substituted 
by someone else. 
Confidentiality is another issue connected to informed consent. It may 
be weakened (or obliterated) with the family’s possible involvement in the 
process of granting permission to carry out the research. Some cultures do 
not have a concept of “privacy.” It raises an ethical problem because partici-
pation in research may, for some vulnerable populations, carry the stigma 
of being sick. In such contexts, cultural associations may play a supportive 
role to help the patients not to be marginalized. 
In the Christian perspective, the principles of justice and solidarity 
require participants to receive appropriate treatments that yield potential 
benefits. They should, otherwise, be compensated for any harm directly 
related to participation in research. As an expression of international coop-
eration and solidarity, healthcare infrastructures are needed to support 
proper distribution. They guarantee continued access to post-trial benefits 
and treatment to participants and populations outside the research context of 
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provided through arrangements of mandatory insurance because of possible 
damages, where the premium is assessed according to the local economic 
situation. This arrangement could be guaranteed by non-profit and inter-
nationally accredited independent organizations, which may monitor this 
ethical requirement. 
An ethical requirement from the Christian perspective is to help develop-
ing countries build the capacity to become fuller partners in international 
research on both scientific and ethical levels, enhancing collaboration and 
creating an atmosphere of trust and respect. There should be a guarantee 
of assistance to developing countries during the experimentation without 
inflicting on them the burden of the “indirect costs” on an already precari-
ous local health system. This collaboration will help them become full part-
ners in international research and stimulate the improvement of the local 
health system by transferring technical and scientific skills. Involving doc-
tors and representatives of the host country will help monitor compliance 
with ethical standards and avoid abuse.13
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 10 Fitting informed consent onto 
an Islamic moral landscape 
and within Muslim contexts1
 Aasim I. Padela 
 Introduction 
Informed consent is a central feature of contemporary medical practice and 
healthcare research. Scholars have spilled much ink discussing its theoreti-
cal foundations, and healthcare professionals have convened many meet-
ings delineating the processes of obtaining informed consent. A casual 
observer of these discourses may thereby assume that there is no new theo-
retical ground to break and that informed consent processes are universally 
practised and globally identical. That observer may be surprised to find that 
state actors such as the European Union are actively funding research on 
the ethics and practice of informed consent and that pharmaceutical compa-
nies such as GlaxoSmithKline and bioethics institutes such as the UNESCO 
Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights are actively mapping out religious 
and cultural dimensions of informed consent. Indeed, there remains much to 
discover about fulfilling the ideals and meeting the moral ends, of informed 
consent. This knowledge and research gap is exemplified by scant research 
at the intersection of the Islamic tradition and informed consent. 
Where there is literature, it broadly speaks to the structural, legal and 
regulatory aspects of informed consent in Muslim countries and thereby 
bypasses in-depth analyses from within Islamic moral frameworks.2 Simi-
larly, there are few ethnographic and social scientific studies of the lived 
experiences of Muslims with informed consent processes and little data on 
whether such practices met their ethical goals within Muslim healthcare 
environments.3 A few scholars have begun to analyse how research ethics is 
viewed by Islamic jurists4 and aligns with scriptural values,5 and this paper 
aims to build upon these investigations by laying the groundwork for deeper 
inquiry in theological ethics. 
This commentary will consider how the bioethical construct of informed 
consent fits within an Islamic moral universe. More specifically, I will 
describe theological concepts that can provide homeomorphic equivalents 
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for elements of informed consent theory. 6 After this theoretical exposition, 
I will describe features of Muslim cultures that suggest informed consent 
procedures and processes need to be re-imagined and culturally adapted. 
Taking these features into account requires adjustments that will make 
informed consent processes appear different in Muslim contexts, yet argu-
ably, the adjusted processes will achieve similar ethical ends. 
A conception of informed consent 
Before diving into Muslim moral contexts, I would like to provide a brief 
account of informed consent. I readily acknowledge there are multiple ori-
gins stories to informed consent and that informed consent practices con-
tinue to evolve. I also admit that some aspects of my representation are 
debatable. However, when analysing my argument, the reader will find this 
section to be a helpful reference point. 
Informed consent is an ethical construct that grows out of the principle of 
respect for autonomy. 7 The notion of respecting autonomy, in turn, emerges 
from the view that an essential characteristic of the human person is his/ 
her capacity and ability to make autonomous choices.8 In this way, respect 
for autonomy is closely related to respect for persons. This integral human 
capacity for deliberate choice begets moral duties; one should not infringe 
upon another’s ability to make autonomous choices. Instead, one should 
facilitate such choice-making in so far as possible. The theoretical roots 
of informed consent attach themselves to these foundations and are imple-
mented through acts that facilitate the patient’s self-regulating decisions. 
Informed consent doctrine and practice thus seek to maximize the pursuit 
of self-interest and individual self-regulation.9 When surrogate decision-
makers are involved, the practices are someone altered but still adhere to the 
same ethos.10 Notably, the locus of moral concern is the individual, and as 
they become a right-bearer and all other members of society become mor-
ally obligated to not infringe upon those rights. 
In a Western context, informed consent is established through regulations 
and laws that penalize healthcare systems for infringements, and standard-
ized forms assist in seeing the informed consent process through medical 
care and research. Obviously, to make informed choices, an individual (or 
a surrogate decision-maker) must be able to understand and process the 
risks and benefits of the procedure or therapy, thereby meeting the ethi-
cal ends of informed consent, that is, autonomous decisions made out of 
self-interest requires health literacy. Furthermore, theory and practice 
assume rational actors. Should patients be unable to process the information 
required to make informed choices, be it due to cognitive deficiencies, acu-
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decision-makers are morally charged with the duty to protect the patient 
from the harms of therapy and/or research in so far as possible.11 
In its ideal form, informed consent theory and practice envision a patient– 
doctor dyad with reciprocal moral duties and obligations. The patient’s
ability to make informed decisions needs to be maximized because decision-
making is core to being a human person, and the physician is ethically
bound to do so and undertakes the responsibility to provide that biomedical 
data needed to make decisions. This provision of information attends to the 
“informed” portion of informed consent. To assure consent, the physician 
attempts to assess whether the patient is being coerced by others to make 
a certain choice by others. He works with the patient to marginalize such 
influences if any. 
Furthermore, risks and benefits are discussed openly and transparently so 
that the patient can weigh them, and discussions about a patient’s particular 
values and life goals take place to assess whether the specific choice helps 
meet them. In this way, the physician acts under Emanuel and Emanuel’s 
interpretative and/or deliberative model for the doctor–patient relation-
ship12 and informed and voluntarily given consent is enabled. In a struc-
tured process, informed consent requires that clinicians (or researchers) 
provide patients (or research subjects) with sufficient information regard-
ing the medical procedures, potential risks, benefits and alternatives (no 
matter how remote) so that the individual understands this information 
and can make a voluntary decision to take the treatment (or enrol in the 
research study). It further requires physicians (or researchers) to do so in 
a way that is understandable to the patient (or surrogate decision-makers). 
Next, informed processing and voluntariness on the part of the patient/ 
research subject (or surrogate) are accessed, and if satisfactory, then con-
sent is secured and the procedure authorized. As noted earlier, this ideal-
ized form of a two-person dyad of a patient and a clinician (or a potential 
researcher subject and a researcher) often extends to surrogate decision-
makers who act on behalf of the patient. Additionally, it can extend to other 
healthcare team members, such as collaborating physicians and researchers, 
and encompass family members and important others who are essential to 
the patient’s decision-making process. 
As a leading scholar of medical ethics, Mark Siegler argues that moral 
certitude in the patient–doctor relationship emerges via negotiation between 
respective worldviews and values.13 This negotiation results in a “physician-
patient accommodation model . . . in which the moral and technical arrange-
ments of a medical encounter are determined mutually, voluntarily, and 
autonomously”14 and yields a wilfully chosen, respectful and therapeutic 
relationship. Informed consent processes are also subject to negotiation
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In other words, patients and doctors can negotiate how the process is carried 
out, who is involved, what sort of information is shared and variations can 
be ethically justified so long as the dyad is satisfied with the end result of 
the negotiation. 
Islamic moral theology15 and notions of informed consent 
Before venturing into Islamic thought and Muslim practices, several pro-
visos are needed: Islamic morality is pluralistic and Muslim practices are 
diverse. In addition to their being two dominant sects within Islam, Sunni 
and Shia, each sect has multiple legal schools and orthodox creedal systems. 
Thus, finding a singular view on any specific matter of theology or law is 
challenging. Indeed, moral pluralism is an orthopraxic feature of Islamic 
thought and enshrined within moral and legal theory. 
Additionally, as with any religious tradition, adherents live out their 
tenets variably. As religious beliefs inform social norms and Muslims turn 
Islam into a lived tradition, an immense diversity of expression is observed. 
One need only look to how religious dictates of modesty inform diversity 
in dress codes and forms of social interaction across the Muslim world to 
see how different people interpret how to live a religious life. This diversity 
is increased further when one considers Muslims whose identities are less 
strongly formed by religious teachings as a Muslim society’s norms and 
practices are constituted by all inhabitants, not simply the most religious 
amongst them. On top of that, forms of government and state regulations 
also differ widely across the Muslim world, making chances for uniformity 
in law and ethics more remote. 
On the other hand, pluralism and diversity do not equate with ethical 
relativism or moral anarchy. Indeed, there must be shared ideas, norms 
and teaching for there to be something called “Islam.” In what follows, I 
will draw upon shared theological notions and moral teachings to point out 
homeomorphic equivalencies for informed consent theory within the tradi-
tion. Following that, I will describe some cultural features that may require 
adaptations from following Western informed consent practices to meet the 
ethical ends of informed consent in the Muslim world. 
The notion of moral liability,  taklīf, provides a theological building block 
for a Muslim version of informed consent theory. The term symbolizes 
standing before God in judgement and connotes being morally responsible 
to God for one’s actions. A morally liable person is called a  mukallaf, and 
mukallaf status signifies that an individual has the requisite cognitive ability 
to recognize God, evaluate the merits and harms of actions and act wilfully 
out of self-interest. Therefore,  taklīf is linked to the maturity of intellect 
(‘aql).16 The minimal intellectual capacity needed to be judged mukallaf is 
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the ability to distinguish between beneficial from harmful actions (this state 
is termed tamyīz) while having the maximal faculty leads to the adoption of 
righteous character (rushd). 
Closely related to mukallaf is the construct of ahliyyah, legal capacity. 17 
Legal capacity is of two types: ahliyyah al-wujub and ahliyyah al-‘ada. 
Aaliyah al-wujūb is the ability of a human being to acquire rights and obliga-
tions, while ahliyyah al-‘ada is the capacity for execution and performance 
of duties. This latter capacity is further subdivided into three categories: the 
capacities related to (i) criminal liability, (ii) civil/financial liability and (iii) 
liability for acts of ritual worship.18 While mental/intellectual maturity is a 
precondition for taklīf (and ahliyyah al-‘ada), because mental faculty has 
gradations, one can be morally culpable for some acts but not others. 
The linkage of mukallaf status to the intellectual capacity to distinguish 
harms and benefits and an ability to execute wilful actions is analogous to 
the theoretical foundations of informed consent. A person cannot engage in 
an informed consent process if they do not (i) have the cognitive resources 
to assess risks and benefits of choosing or are (ii) not free to choose. Being 
morally accountable for an action in Islam similarly demands that indi-
viduals evaluate their options and choose autonomously. Likewise, both 
informed consent and Islamic law require information to be presented so 
that a moral choice can be made; the former requiring the biomedical risks, 
benefits and purposes, and the latter data about the Islamic ethico-legal sta-
tus of each of the proposed choices. Moreover, just like in informed consent 
theory, should individuals have diminished mental abilities such that they 
cannot work through the benefits and harms of choices, surrogate decision-
makers come to bear the moral duties of protection. It is important to note 
that mukallaf status is reserved for Muslims within Islamic law, and thus 
children and non-Muslims are considered to have mukallaf potential. The 
reason for this is that in the religious sense, children are considered to not be 
morally liable for actions prior to having reached the level of tamyīz. Their 
legal guardians, however, can be liable to provide recompense in this world 
for harms they commit, for example, paying for stolen items or property 
damage. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, are obviously not accountable 
to Islamic law, for they have not chosen Islam as the source of their moral 
commitments. 
Moving from a theoretical space to a more practical one, it appears that 
Islamic law would support policies and structures that help adults with suf-
ficient intellectual capacity make autonomous choices about medical care 
and research. Mukallaf status appears to provide a homeomorphic equiva-
lency between Islamic thought and informed consent theory such that the 
prerequisites for moral liability in one system turn out to be the same pre-
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equivalency, 19 I am not suggesting that the meaning or the function of taklīf
in the Islamic moral universe shares meaning or function with informed 
consent procedures in any way. Indeed, they operate not only in different 
cultural systems; they are constructs that operate at different registers with 
the former being a theological construct that is reflected into moral law 
while the latter is an ethical construct reflected within medical practices. 
Yet, the equivalence is helpful for bridging the values of Islam and contem-
porary biomedicine. 
Another Islamic bioethical argument can be made to support informed 
consent. According to Islam, every action has moral significance and can 
bring about reward or retribution in the hereafter. An action that pleases 
God will be generally rewarded and that which displeases Him will gen-
erally be punished. Insights into God’s approval or disapproval are found 
within the Quranic texts and the Prophet’s practices. Islamic jurists thus 
look to these scriptural sources to determine the moral status of actions and 
place actions into five (or seven) categories from prohibited to obligatory 
and then map out the moral duties corresponding to each category. 20 For 
example, a Muslim can be obligated to perform an act, for example, ritual 
prayer as well as not to perform an act, for example, drinking wine, and sin 
is carried for shortcomings in either non-performance or performance based 
on which category the act falls into. Contextual considerations and contin-
gencies are accounted for by allowing exemptions from the normative pro-
hibitions and specifying general rules to individual cases. In light of this, it 
is important to recognize that seeking medical treatment and participating in 
research are actions that have Islamic moral significance. Both are consid-
ered to be permitted actions but generally non-obligatory, that is, no sin for 
non-performance.21 However, at least in the case of seeking healthcare, the 
moral status of permission can be changed into a moral obligation to pur-
sue treatment when a particular treatment is deemed certainly life-saving or 
when disability or contagion ensues because of non-treatment.22 A religious 
valuation thus depends upon a biomedical assessment of risks, benefits and 
harms. In other words, to properly assess the moral significance of seek-
ing healthcare (or participating in research), biomedical data regarding the 
risks, benefits and harms of both non-treatment and potential treatments are 
necessary. 
Hence, religious authorities, patients and surrogate decision-makers all 
require accurate biomedical data to make moral assessments within Islamic 
law. Recall that informed consent is built upon the principle of respect-
ing an individual’s autonomous decisions that are made voluntarily and 
also involves evaluating the risks and benefits of various choices. In an 
Islamic context, every decision has moral significance. For patients (and 
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of seeking healthcare or participating in medical research, accurate infor-
mation must be conveyed so that the moral agent can process it and make 
choices without coercion since the individual is morally culpable (to God) 
for the decisions they make. Hence, informed consent processes aid indi-
viduals in living an Islamically moral life. 
In closing, Islamic moral theology appears to support informed consent 
theory and practice. To rightly order one’s life towards God’s pleasure, 
that is, act in accordance to Islamic ethics and law, one needs information 
about biomedical benefits, risks and harms attributable to each choice, one 
must also have the requisite mental abilities to reason through this data 
and ultimately be able to make a voluntary choice. Consequently, the bio-
medical information must be made available in an understandable form, 
and structures and processes need to be put into place to minimize coercion 
and undue influence. These ideas grow out of the construct of  taklīf and the 
human relationship to God rather than ideas about respecting autonomy or 
reducing infringements upon humankind’s natural rights. One could argue 
that within an Islamic moral universe, the principle of respect for persons is 
operative and connects taklīf to medical ethics. Certainly, when persons are 
viewed primarily as moral agents standing before God and the human com-
munity as their helpers, communal moral duties are delineated to facilitate 
individuals being better moral agents. As Sachedina states, Islam legitimizes 
“individual autonomy within its religiously based collective order by leav-
ing an individual free to negotiate his/her spiritual destiny, while requiring 
him/her to abide by a communal order that involve[s] . . . a regime of rights 
and responsibilities”23 based in Islamic law. Consequently, the individual’s 
exercise of autonomy is somewhat constrained because a communal order 
of public adherence to Islamic values is privileged. At the same time, the 
community, and particularly state authorities, become morally responsible 
for helping its members make righteous choices by providing information 
and enacting policies and laws that help foster a society that adheres to 
Islam. 
Muslim cultures and informed consent 
As medicine has globalized, so has bioethics. Just as medical technology 
and curricula are patterned after Western academies, bioethics teaching 
around the world also draws upon ethical principles and moral frameworks 
first worked out in the “West.” 24 It should come as no surprise then that 
the four-principle Georgetown model of medical ethics is widely taught in 
Muslim lands and that research and medical practice guidelines in these 
countries are borrowed from American and European institutions. While 
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guidelines based on indigenous Muslim cultural values or based on Islamic 
law, these efforts are in their infancy and not as yet widespread. 25 Given the 
scant literature available on informed consent practices in Muslim contexts, 
these trends suggest that informed consent processes and structures likely 
mimic implementation models within the United States and Europe. In what 
follows, I will draw attention to a couple of features of Muslim culture that 
problematize such consent processes and thereby necessitate revising these 
procedures to suit Muslim sensibilities and culture. 
The first feature that must be considered is that Muslim societies operate 
out of a communitarian ethos and shared decision-making processes. Many 
scholars have pointed out that within Muslim societies, the patient–doctor 
dyad is often not the only locus of decision-making.26 Instead, an individual 
in many Muslim societies is better conceived of as a person that “is wed-
ded to social bonds that are inextricable, and [that] these bonds are a vital 
source of decision-making.”27 People trust their relatives and community 
members and value interdependence. Therefore, limiting decision-making 
within person-centric rights can deny the value attached to such relation-
ships.28 Moreover, as foreshadowed earlier, Islamic law defines rights that 
an individual has upon their community and relatives. For many Muslims, 
these need to be accounted for when making medical decisions.29 How-
ever, widening the circle beyond the patient–doctor dyad poses practical 
and ethical challenges for informed consent processes; how does one know 
who should be involved and where decisional authority resides? How does 
one distinguish coercion from acceptable influence by family members and 
important others? When would “forcing” a patient to act out of self-interest 
be ethically objectionable? Ethicists have tried to solve these problems 
through relational and second-order autonomy frameworks, but these fixes 
appear not to address the issues at hand fully. 30 My colleagues and I have 
argued elsewhere that, at least theoretically, a culturally tailored version of 
the principle of respect for persons may offer an alternative ethical guide 
for clinicians attending to such issues but how such a principle would lead 
to adaptations in informed consent procedures remains to be worked out.31 
A second feature of Muslim contexts that needs to be considered is that 
the culture of communication within many Muslim societies is high con-
text. According to Geert Hofstede, an expert in cross-cultural issues in busi-
ness, a high-context communication culture is “one in which little has to 
be said or written because most of the information is either in the physical 
environment or supposed to be known by the persons involved . . . this type 
of communication is frequent in collectivist cultures.”32 In such cultures, 
individuals do not expect or desire a great deal of explicit information. 
Instead, too much information can leave individuals feeling uninformed 
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low-context cultures rely on mounds of explicit information in written and 
oral communication and, without such information, are distrustful. In Hof-
stede’s analyses, Arab countries were the most high-context and the United 
States the most low-context. As Drs. Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo and Joseph 
Fins, cross-cultural bioethics experts, point out that the doctrine of informed 
consent is vague on what constitutes adequate information and reasonable 
disclosure for therapeutic or research purposes.33 Given that people from 
high- and low-context societies expect different quanta of information, it 
appears that what constitutes adequate information might vary from con-
text to context. Indeed, providing too much information in one context can 
lead patients to distrust clinicians, while too little information leads to the 
same consequence in another context; the Goldilocks scenario thus arises. 
As del Pozo and Fins argue, Western standards and structures for informed 
consent where the doctor shares detailed biomedical data with the patient 
do not appear to work well in Qatar (an Arab Muslim country). 34 Expert 
physicians in that society often use family members and nonverbal clues to 
deliver necessary medical information and effect informed consent. They 
argue that there “are no objective standards to define the proper mix of 
verbal and contextual channels to deliver [medical] information, Ameri-
can standards cannot be extrapolated.”35 Allying themselves with Siegler’s
view on patient–doctor accommodation, they contend that patients and doc-
tors have to construct the moral norm socially and that the notion of self-
determination within informed consent doctrine is culturally mediated.36 
A third feature of Muslim societies that needs to be considered when 
implementing informed consent processes is how to ground ethics regu-
lations within Islamic law. 37 For example, Saudi laws on research ethics 
make repeated references to the Shariah as a source of ethical guidance 
to garner professional support for the statutes.38 Fogarty-funded research 
ethics training programs in Jordan similarly seek to support the teaching of 
the Belmont report by citing Quranic verses that appear to support its prin-
ciples.39 Whether or not ethical policies and regulations are built up from 
the first principles of Islamic law or are based on traditional hermeneutical 
approaches to scripture does not appear to matter. Rather statements that 
note that these cohere with Islam are used to legitimize ethical regulations. 
Indeed, some researchers have pointed out the weak connections between 
Islamic moral theology and such guidelines.40 Irrespective of this, the need 
to, at least rhetorically, attach ethical guidance to Islamic law remains 
true.41 Public and professional acceptance depends on such linkages, and 
ethicists and clinicians seeking to adapt informed consent doctrine and 
practices need to recognize the thirst for Islamic legitimacy. Research into 
conceptual analogues and homeomorphic equivalencies between Islamic 
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prove fruitful in identifying ways to bridge Islam and contemporary bio-
medicine authentically. 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have outlined how Islamic moral theology appears to sup-
port aspects of informed consent doctrine, although the ethical grounding
comes from the theological construct of moral liability in front of God,
and not from the principle of respect for autonomy. I have also described
several features of Muslim culture, namely, its communitarian ethos,
high-context communication norms, and need for ethical guidelines to be
religiously legitimated, that require amending “western” processes and
structures of informed consent for use in Muslim contexts. As the global
bioethics community culturally translates and religiously adapts informed
consent for implementation in Muslim contexts, informed consent pro-
cesses may look and feel different in Muslim societies but may serve the
same ethical ends.
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